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1 Introduction 
Digital platforms and infrastructures play a critical role in the lives of individuals and in the 
functioning of societies. However, they have mostly been discussed in the literature within the 
implicit or explicit context of either an open Internet that supports the agnostic packaging, 
distribution, and re-assembly of data packages, or in terms of highly complex and organic evolved 
infrastructural arrangements characterized by innovation inertia. Core to the understanding of 
either of these discussions is the understanding of decentralization.  In the case of the open Internet 
infrastructure, the relationship between centralization and decentralization can be characterized as 
through paradoxical forces of concurrent centralized and decentralized control (Tilson et al, 2010). 
The basic open Internet infrastructure has supported the highly decentralized exchange of data, and 
of unrestricted decentralized innovation of new services and protocols based on a common anchor-
point of the IP protocol. However, the secure exchange of economic or legal rights requires 
established institutional arrangements or digital platforms as mediators — hence the open Internet 
has been a petri-dish for an explosive growth of digital platforms of which a few has gained global 
dominance within their field of activity. Some of the most successful global digital platforms are 
blurring the platform/infrastructure boundaries by seeking to become infrastructural, for example 
through offering easy open authentication (de Reuver, 2018). Furthermore, much debate on these 
digital platforms are concerned with their central position in the harvesting of data, having excess 
market power, and distorting the political debate (Zuboff, 2019). In the contemporary academic 
debate on digital innovation, discussions of the interrelationships between digital platforms and -
infrastructures, the issue of de/centralization is, therefore, of core theoretical importance.  
The aim of this working paper is to propose an analytical framework characterizing de/centralization 
in digital networks.3 This framework can subsequently be used for the in-depth analysis of 
de/centralization of digital platforms and -infrastructures in general. However, at this stage the 
framework will have most immediate impact for the theoretical framing of de/centralization within 
blockchain networks.4 The specific characteristics of blockchain networks render these particularly 
fertile in serving as the foundation for novel theorization on de/centralization since this has been 
one of the core issues under discussion within the broader blockchain community, and since 
blockchain networks cannot be considered as merely technological, cryptographic, organizational, 
personal, legal, or economic entities, but all of the above. The agnostic character of the IP-based 
open Internet “hour-glass” (Zittrain, 2008, 2019) implies that aspects and interdependencies that 
here easily can be abstracted, such as the content of data, in the blockchain context becomes an 
immediate concern.  
                                                          
3
 We will purposefully in this report avoid using the terms “platform” and “infrastructure” as theoretical 
constructs for our analysis as the aim of the framework is subsequently to serve as a means of unpacking the 
de/centralization of digital platforms and -infrastructures and, therefore, formulating the theory in terms of 
the object we wish to characterize is problematic.  
4
 Please note that we assume readers have a basic understanding of blockchain and cryptocurrency mechanics 
to appreciate the argumentation forwarded, as the document does not provide such an introduction. A good 
source could be one of the books by DuPont (2019), Burniski & Tatar (2017), Lacity (2019), or Tapscott & 
Tapscott (2017). There are also brief introductions in the articles by Lacity and colleagues (2018, 2019), Beck et 
al (2018), or Zachariadis et al (2019). The Internet also has plenty of articles and videos to assist if necessary.  
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We have not been able to identify any work attempting to establish a relationship between the 
inherent tensions generated by the interplay between the platform and the infrastructural 
dimension of any digital network and the tensions emerging from the centralizing forces in 
blockchain networks. Neither have we identified any work attempting to study the centralizing 
trends of blockchain networks in the light of the platform-infrastructure interplay even though an 
emerging literature in media studies (Helmond, 2015; Helmond et al., 2019; Nechusthai, 2018; 
Plantin et al., 2018; Plantin and Punathambekar, 2019), information system (Bygstad and Hanseth, 
2018; Costantinides et al., 2018; Lorenz and Stefan, 2018; Kazan et al, 2018) and legal studies 
(Zittrain, 2018; Flew, 2019; Flew et al., 2019) is beginning to address the issue.  
Blockchain is usually defined in the literature either as a platform (De Filippi and Wright, 2018: 
chapter 1; Glaser et al., 2019; Mattila and Seppӓlӓ, 2018; Narayanan et al., 2016: chapter 9; Perreira 
et al, 2019), or as an infrastructure (DeFilippi and McMullen, 2018; De Filippi and Wright, 2018: 
chapter 2; Finck, 2019: 11; Glaser, 2017), especially as a “financial infrastructure” (McWaters et al., 
2016; Walch, 2015). Nakamoto (2008) never qualifies its distributed time-stamp system neither as 
platform nor as infrastructure, but Buterin (2014) defines Ethereum as a “decentralised application 
platform.” The confusion might reflect the shift in attention from the original bitcoin use case, which 
tend to understand blockchain as an infrastructure as also originally envisioned (Nakamoto, 2008), 
to the rise of the new Ethereum-based use cases supported by general-purpose networks such as 
Hyperledger or Corda, which are often referred to as “platforms” (Lacity, 2018).5 But no work has so 
far attempted to define blockchain theoretically in function of the concepts of digital platform and 
infrastructure, and through this derive its necessary and sufficient characteristics in an analytical 
manner. This might be problematic when trying to discuss the meaning and nature of 
de/centralization in digital networks as our understanding of de/centralization might directly depend 
on the way in which the interplay between platform and infrastructure is understood. As a result, 
such a study of the fundamental characteristics of digital platforms and infrastructures, through the 
case of blockchain, will also in turn enable a theoretical discussion of the degree of de/centralization 
of a given blockchain in terms of the infrastructural and platform aspects of a digital network.  
The working paper, therefore, extends a nascent stream of literature with the last few years 
witnessing an increasing interest in the governance of blockchain technology, and in the meaning of 
its “decentralized” nature. An emerging body of academic research seeking to make sense of this 
phenomenon is still very much in its infancy with relatively less work than warranted by the public 
debate. Although an increasing number of papers on blockchain governance is emerging especially, 
but not exclusively, in the legal literature, there is still a paucity of conceptual and theoretical works 
on blockchain grounded within management and Information Systems. Current exceptions are Beck 
et al’s (2018) and Zachariadis et al’s (2019) papers on blockchain governance, along with 
practitioner-oriented papers on corporate blockchain arrangements (Lacity, 2018; Beck et al 2019; 
Lacity et al, 2019).    
The governing rationale of the report is that there is a lack of theoretical understanding of 
de/centralization in digital networks in general, and in the multi-disciplinary blockchain debate in 
                                                          
5
 The four limitations of Bitcoin recognised by Buterin (2014: 12-13) – lack of Touring completeness; value 
blindness; lack of state; blockchain blindness– can all be understood as more or less directly associated to the 
transition from infrastructures to platforms.  
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particular. This paper seeks to address this issue by providing an analytical framework for digital 
networks, and critically to apply this in the context of blockchain networks. De/centralization is 
characterized in terms of interactional symmetries and asymmetries between the generic elements 
of Data, Network Technology, and Social Community, where these three elements belong to, 
respectively, three basic dimensions of a digital network: the symbolic dimension (the social 
meaning of value and rights), the technological dimension (the logic and architecture of the 
network), and the political dimension (moral principles norming and guiding the decisions of the 
community members). This is, in the context of blockchain arrangements translated into an 
investigation of the relationships between Coin (C), Network Technology (NT), Social Community 
(SC), and analysing how the addition of the element of the Consensus Protocol (CP) shapes their 
interaction.  
We show how de/centralization can be described in terms of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
interdependencies between these elements across two different dimensions. Our first-order analysis 
of de/centralization considers the relationships within each of the three main constitutive elements 
(C, NT, and SC) within the context of a Consensus Protocol. For example, symmetry or asymmetry in 
the interdependencies between coins within a blockchain, between members of the social 
community, or between the nodes in the network. Our second-order analysis of de/centralization 
then considers the possible variation in the interdependencies between the constitutive elements in 
the analytical framework — between: (CSC) the coin and the social community; (CNT) the coin 
and the network technology; and (NTSC) the network technology and the social community.  
The insights proposed in this report are gained from theoretically focusing the analytical study of 
de/centralization on the interdependencies between the constitutive elements in the framework, 
combined with the insight that de/centralization in digital networks must be considered as both 
first- and second-order interdependencies. This allows us, based on the study of the extant 
blockchain literature, to make theoretical claims on the diversity of aspects of de/centralization in 
blockchain networks. This is in contrast to the main thrust of the theoretical debate on blockchain 
de/centralization, which either takes decentralization as a given, or is based on one particular 
perspective, thus ignoring the way in which the interactions between different elements belonging 
to different dimensions can dynamically affect the nature of the overall system. This report 
disentangles these perspectives and provides a synthesis of a number of distinct de/centralization 
perspectives. 
The main insight of the work regarding blockchain de/centralization is that while much blockchain 
research makes claims related to decentralization, there is a fundamental incongruity between the 
way in which blockchain (and digital network in general) is defined and the way in which 
de/centralization in understood. The analysis of blockchain in function of the core dimensions of 
digital platforms and digital infrastructures reveals that blockchain (as any digital network) is a multi-
dimensional system defined by the dynamic interactions of multiple elements across different 
dimensions. As a result, in order to retain logical and analytical consistency we argue that all 
concepts qualifying blockchain should also be understood as multi-dimensional and dynamic 
(relational). While much blockchain research makes claims related to decentralization, then these 
claims are generally related to first-order and static interdependencies. However, decentralization at 
the level of the individual elements for one specific dimension of the digital network does not 
necessarily imply that the digital network can be characterized as de/centralized. The report 
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discusses in significant depth and detail the diversity of de/centralization when considering second-
order interdependencies between network elements across the three different dimensions 
(symbolic, technological and political). 
In the current version of the report, we exclusively relate the analytical model of digital network 
de/centralization to blockchain literature. It is the aim of the present work to provide the most 
comprehensive overview and detailed understanding of the nature and meaning of de/centralization 
in the case of blockchain. It is, however, the aim of subsequent work to draw more general 
conclusions on the applicability of the analytical framework to characterize de-centralization in 
digital networks in general. This could also allow us to make fundamental claims on a variety of 
digital platforms and infrastructures. 
1.1 Overview of Working Paper 
Practically, this working paper is in effect three interrelated, yet to some extent separate, arguments 
wrapped into one document. The paper also proposes a theoretical framework for analysing the 
first- and second-order interdependencies between the constitutive elements of a digital network. 
The paper then proposes a variant of this framework for the analysis of blockchain networks. Finally 
the paper applies this framework to the analysis of de/centralization in blockchain networks.  This is, 
in more detail organized as follows: 
Section 2 sets the stage by briefly outlining the main themes in the literature on digital platforms 
and -infrastructures. Then the section turns to an overview of the treatment of de/centralization 
within the discussions of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. The section then identifies the main 
issues with the current literature, namely, 1) the predominant underlying circular definition of 
blockchains being decentralized because they are based on blockchain technology; and 2) the mono-
dimensional discussions of decentralization in an inherently multi-dimensional context. Section 2, 
furthermore, established the analytical categories, which will form the foundation for the further 
discussion, the: Technological (architectural and logical); economic, political, and legal interpretive 
approaches.  
Section 3 develops a general framework characterizing de/centralization in digital networks, across 
the dimensions of use and access, consisting of the elements of: Data, Network Technology 
(Architectural and Logic), and Social Community. This section, furthermore, develops the notion of 
first-order and second-order systems of de/centralization.  
Section 4 applies the analytical framework presented in Section 3 and translates it into the context 
of blockchain as a digital network. This translation presents the elements of the framework as: Coin 
(C), Network Technology (NT) — Architectural (A) and Logical (L), Social Community (SC), and the 
additional element of the Consensus Protocol (CP) — See Figure 1.1. The section argues that rather 
than considering de/centralization as either characteristics of each element, or indeed as merely 
first-order interdependencies, the notion should be understood in terms of second-order 
interdependencies between the elements. The section also proposes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a network to be considered a blockchain, and discusses the types of systems emerging 
when one of the necessary conditions are not satisfied. Finally, the section argues that while the 
necessary and sufficient conditions may enable the definition of a blockchain, this does not 
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necessarily imply that blockchains are decentralized as this aspect is not determined by the 
properties of first-order interdependencies, but of more complex second-order interdependencies.  
Section 5 then in detail explores these second-order interdependencies by carefully in turn analysing 
the three interactions between the three main elements in the framework: (CSC) the coin — 
social community interdependencies yielding the metallist and information perspectives on 
blockchain; (CNT) the coin — network technology interdependencies yielding the protocol-logic, 
the permission-logic, and the market power perspective within a techno-economic framing, and the 
platform-logic, the code-is-law, and the principal-agent perspective within a techno-legal framing; 
and finally, (NTSC) the network technology — social community interdependencies, discussing the 
critical and often neglected role of the social community to sustain and developments.   
Section 6 provides a brief conclusion. 
Section 7 – Appendix A: provides a brief characterization of the approach adopted for the literature 
study of more than 400 academic articles on blockchain. 
Readers who are really mainly interested in a brief overview of an analytical framework for 
understanding blockchain and cryptocurrencies, can skip to Section 4. Each of Section 3, 4, and 5 
contains summary sub-sections 
 
Figure 1.1:  The analytical blockchain de/centralization framework. Constructed by projecting the general framework 
Data, Network Technology (Architectural, Logic), and Social Community onto the context of blockchain, replacing Data 
with Coin (C) with the addition of the consensus protocol (CP). 
 
8 
 
2 Setting the Stage  
This section briefly situates the issue of de/centralization within the context of: 1) digital platform 
and -infrastructure research; and 2) within the context of blockchain developments. 
2.1 Platforms and Infrastructures 
The recent years have witnessed the emergence of the platform concept as one of the core 
elements of the current socio-economic system. This increasing importance of platforms, or 
“platformization” has been characterised as “platform revolution” (Parker et al., 2016), “platform 
society” (van Dijck et al., 2018), or even “platform capitalism” (Srniceck, 2017). This is especially true 
with respect to the governance of digital ecosystems and, more specifically, of the internet.  
Digital networks were originally analysed and understood as digital infrastructures, consistent with a 
long-standing tradition that conceived networks providing access to public service utilities as 
“infrastructures”.  This was true for the field of law (Frischmann, 2004 and 2012), economics (Valletti 
and Estache, 2001), communication policy (Musiani et al, 2016; Epstein et al, 2016), and information 
system (Ciborra et al., 2000; Edwards et al., 2007 and 2009; Tilson et al., 2010). This original focus on 
infrastructure was especially interested in the problems emerging from the interconnection of 
heterogeneous and situated actors, and from their open access and free use of the network, usually 
seen alternatively as a commons, essential facility, or common carrier. Since the mid-2000s, the 
concept of platform gained momentum in organization and management studies (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer, 2009a; Parker et al., 2016), in legal studies (Farrell and 
Weiser, 2003; Page and Childers, 2012; Speta, 2002; Weiser, 2002), economics (Evans, 2011), 
sociology and media studies (Gillespie, 2010 and 2018; van Dijck, 2013) and information systems 
(Tiwana et al., 2010; de Reuver et al., 2018; Yoo et al., 2012). Consistent with the general trend, the 
concept of platform started to emerge as the dominant concept driving our understanding of digital 
networks. This “platformization of the web” (Helmond, 2015) – “data platforms” (Alaimo and 
Kallinikos, 2017), or “platformized internet” (Flew, 2019) – is founded on the conflation of 
infrastructural and platform elements of the digital networks, with a pronounced prominence of the 
latter (Andersson Schwarz, 2017; Flew, 2019; Helmond et al., 2019; Plantin et al., 2016; van Dijck et 
al., 2018).  
The concept of platform has a relatively established and accepted meaning in organization and 
management studies (Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al, 2014), but this mainly derives from the fact that 
these disciplines usually do not need to contrast it to the infrastructural dimension of digital 
networks. When the study of infrastructures becomes core and essential, the situation becomes 
much more problematic. The academic literature has only very recently started to acknowledge that 
infrastructures and platforms are two distinct elements (or dimensions) of digital networks and that 
an analysis of the contribution of both dimensions is required (Constantinides et al., 2018; Plantin et 
al., 2016; Kazan et al, 2018; Plantin and Punathambekar, 2019). As a result, there is no clear 
understanding of what the platformization of an infrastructure precisely means in the context of 
digital networks, or what it entails. On the one hand, there is often no clarity on the way in which 
the two concepts shall be univocally characterised and distinguished from each other: 
infrastructures are very often intended and conceptualised as platforms (Benkler, 2006; Yoo et al., 
2010; Zittrain, 2008), while platforms are often defined as infrastructures (Gillespie, 2018; van Dijck 
9 
 
et al., 2018). This categorical confusion does not help in distinguishing the two concepts in the 
context of digital networks.  
This transition from infrastructure to platforms has, however, not been interpreted in a univocal 
manner by the literature. Different authors have interpreted the interaction between the 
infrastructural and the platform dimensions of digital networks in different ways. Various authors 
have originally interpreted the platformized and modular nature of infrastructures as one of the 
fundamental characteristics of the digital networks, at the very heart of their generative, open and 
distributed nature, while the recent literature has started to interpret the platformization of digital 
infrastructures as a problematic characteristics of the internet, enabling centralized control and 
supervision over the transmitted content (de Reuver et al, 2018).  
This divergence in opinions concerning the meaning and implications of the interplay between 
platforms and infrastructures certainly derives from the unclear nature of both concepts emerging 
from the paradoxical tensions inherent in both concepts of platforms (de Reuver et al., 2018; Tiwana 
et al., 2010; West, 2003; Yoo et al., 2012) and infrastructures (Edwards et al., 2009; Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2010; Tilson et al., 2010). Both platforms and infrastructures can be simultaneously seen as 
determinants of centralization and decentralization depending on the way in which they are defined. 
As a result, these irreconcilable understandings of the two concepts, and of the implications of their 
linkage, also reveal a fundamental uncertainty with respect to the meaning and nature of both 
centralization and decentralization of a digital network. Depending on the point of view adopted, it 
can either be the infrastructural or the platform dimension of a network that ensures its 
decentralized nature. 
Some authors, mainly rooted in the economic and legal approach, interpret infrastructures as 
natural monopolies and therefore as an inherent source of centralization. These actors regard the 
platformization emerging from the layered architecture of digital infrastructures as the necessary 
way through which decentralization can be introduced in digital networks. This is especially true for 
those approaches that focus on digital innovation and the generative potential of modular systems 
(Eaton et al., 2015; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Monteiro et al., 2013; Van Schewick, 2010; Yoo et 
al., 2012, Zittrain, 2006 and 2008), and on the “end-to-end” principle of the layered architecture that 
enables open innovation, collaborative production and diffused entrepreneurship (Autio et al., 2018; 
Benkler, 2006; Nambisan et al., 2018; Srinivasan and Venkatraman, 2018). Other authors perceive 
the platformization of the internet as a phenomenon fostering centralization of digital networks. 
According to this alternative interpretative approach platformization is a way to introduce 
centralized control points in the digital networks that can affect and influence the free and private 
use of the infrastructure and the free flow of data over it. In this case, platformization becomes a 
phenomenon breaching the end-to-end principle by shifting control away from the edges of the 
network, rather than a way to support it (Flew, 2019; Gilespie, 2018; Lemley and Lessig, 2001; Lessig, 
2006; Wu, 2010; Zittrain, 2018).  
The first stream of works — linking platformization to decentralization in infrastructures — mainly 
links the platform concept to the layered modular architecture of the internet (Greenstein, 2009; 
Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Van Schewick, 2010; Yoo, 2010), and conceives these as neutral and 
agnostic elements ensuring the decoupling between the structural and ontological characteristics of 
the underlying infrastructure and its use or functionalities (Kallinikos et al., 2013; Yoo et al., 2010). 
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The second stream of works views platforms as intermediaries or control points that not only enable 
interconnection, but purposefully organize, shape and influence social interactions within an 
ecosystem (de Reuver et al, 2018; Jacobides et al, 2018). The introduction of intermediating 
platforms became necessary with the emergence of Web 2.0 where the sharing, exchange and 
transaction of user-generated content among dispersed peers of a network had to be organized, 
rationalized, aggregated and coordinated (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). This centralized intermediation 
introduces new issues as it necessarily requires some form of surveillance, inspection, filtering and 
censorship (more generally, control) of the data and content transmitted over the infrastructure 
(Deibert el al., 2010; Fuchs, 2011 & 2013; Gillespie, 2010 and 2018; Nieborg and Poell, 2018; Srnicek, 
2017; Trottier, 2016 and 2019; van Dijck, 2013; van Dijck et al., 2018; Zittrain and Palfrey, 2008; 
Zuboff, 2019). Both the economic literature on two-sided platforms (Rochet and Tirole, 2003,2006; 
Evans and Schmalensee, 2005) and the managerial literature on business ecosystems (Adner, 2017; 
Baldwin, 2012; Gawer, 2009a; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Gulati et al., 2012; Jacobides et al 2018; 
Kapoor and Agarwal 2017; Thomas et al., 2014) mainly belong to this second interpretation of 
platform, conceived as a focal hub or intermediary that exercises some central organizing or 
coordinating function over the wider networked system.  
To summarize, the current literature on platforms and infrastructures has not provided a univocal 
answer to the question of whether the platformized nature of digital infrastructures is a centrifugal 
force fostering decentralization, or rather a centripetal trend towards an increasing centralization of 
digital networks. The first and original interpretation of platformization as the essence of the layered, 
agnostic, and decentralized internet infrastructure was essential for the development of the first 
Web in the early 1990s. The second, more recent interpretation, views the platformization of the 
internet a centralizing force of an otherwise decentralized network. This interpretation mainly 
emerged in the early 2000s, with the transition towards the “networked sociality” of the Web 2.0 
(van Dijck, 2013: chapter 1). A better understanding of the meanings of both concepts of platform 
and infrastructure will help in clarifying how to interpret the de/centralized nature of a digital 
network. 
It is precisely in light of this second trend, and in response to its novel problems that blockchain 
technology was developed as the technology supporting the exchange of bitcoin. Blockchain can be 
mainly interpreted as a response to the centralizing forces emerging from the platformization of 
digital infrastructures in Web 2.0. Consistent, the founding fathers of blockchain adopted an 
interpretative approach consistent with a Web 2.0 view of platformization of a digital infrastructure.  
2.2 Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies 
The 2008 global financial crisis has a lot to answer for in terms of, for example, the possible links to 
the rise of populism in the West. However, it also provided an anchor-point bringing together 
communities with divergent interests into a global movement seeking to use digital technologies to 
bring about a new financial system. When an individual or group of people under the pseudonym 
Satoshi Nakamoto (2008), published a whitepaper outlining such a new system, the subsequent 
efforts of establishing the Bitcoin blockchain unified people motivated by the desire for 
pseudonymous peer-to-peer cash, with those desiring for a deflationary financial system (Swartz, 
2018;  Kavanagh et al., 2019). The subsequent decade has seen a rollercoaster ride spawning the 
Bitcoin open source protocol into many new cryptoassets, the establishment of Ethereum as an 
infrastructure for smart contracts, the 2017 explosive growth in crowd financing of blockchain-based 
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startups through Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), and fluctuating cryptoasset prices. The 2017 price hike 
of bitcoin and other cryptoassets was followed by a rapid decline. Subsequently, much discussion 
amongst practitioners has been concerned with the viability of so-called “public permissionless” 
blockchains, such as Bitcoin, as opposed to equally so-called “private permissioned” blockchains 
offering possibilities for closed consortia of firms to engage in streamlined collaboration. In June 
2019, The Libra Association was announced. It is a consortium of just under 30 global firms 
coordinated by Facebook aiming at supporting Peer-to-Peer (p2p) transfer of funds through 
blockchain technology. 
Blockchain has been a buzzword for the past few years with few subjects drawing such a broad 
scope and diverse opinions and emotions. Blockchain seems to be both all things to all people with 
some being devotees and others deeply critical. One of the key reasons for the diversity of opinions 
is a poor public debate littered with preconceptions and misunderstanding.6 Only in the last few 
years the literature has started to take blockchain seriously and to grasp its peculiar nature.  
A brief look at all the main writings of the early supporters of bitcoin show clear concerns with the 
novel problems posed by intermediaries acting as centralized points of control prone to surveillance, 
censorship, filtering and manipulation: from cryptographer David Chaum’s first framework for an 
untraceable electronic cash in the 1980s,7 over Hal Finney’s Cypherpunks’ writings in the 1990s,8 to 
the inventor of the notion of smart contracts, Nick Szabo’s writings in computer science, law and 
economics.9  
The bitcoin blockchain was eventually developed in order to reintroduce decentralization in 
platformized networks subject to increasing centralization and to mitigate the potential associated 
risks. As stated by Satoshi Nakamoto in one of their letters to peers in the winter of 2008: 
“Governments are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled networks like Napster, but 
pure peer-to-peer (p2p) networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own” (Nakamoto, 
2008). Here, centralization emerges following the introduction of a platform acting as a third-party 
intermediary in a peer-to-peer network. Platforms and infrastructures have univocal meanings; they 
do not manifest an ambiguous dual nature. As a result, the original interpretation of platformization, 
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 References goes from authors claiming cryptocurrencies are pure speculative bubbles (https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/08/nouriel-
roubini-and-michael-novogratz-battle-over-bitcoin-and-crypto.html; https://cointelegraph.com/news/nouriel-roubini-at-salt-conference-
in-ny-crypto-is-the-mother-and-father-of-all-bubbles), to blockchain being completely useless (https://cointelegraph.com/news/nouriel-
roubini-cryptocurrency-as-a-technology-has-absolutely-no-basis-for-success), or a Ponzi scheme. 
7
 “The use of credit cards today is an act of faith on the part of all concerned. Each party is vulnerable to fraud 
by the others, and the cardholder in particular has no protection against surveillance. Paper cash is considered 
to have a significant advantage over credit cards with respect to privacy, although the serial numbers on cash 
make it traceable in principle.” (Chaum et al., 1988: 319; emphasis added).  
8
 “One concern I have is that the move to electronic payments will decrease personal privacy by making it 
easier to log and record transactions. Dossiers could be built up which would track the spending patterns of 
each of us … I think that the convenience of credit and debit cards will overcome most people’s privacy 
concerns and that we will find ourselves in a situation where great volumes of information exist about people’s 
private lives. This is a place that I could see digital cash playing a role … [as] still no central location is able to 
track everything I buy.” (Finney, 1993; emphasis added).  
9
 “Commercial security is a matter of solving the practical problems of business relationships such as privacy, 
integrity, protecting property, or detecting breach of contract … The invocation or assumption in a security 
protocol design of a "trusted third party" (TTP) or a "trusted computing base" (TCB) controlled by a third party 
constitutes the introduction of a security hole into that design. The security hole will then need to be plugged 
by other means.” (Szabo, 2001: 1).  
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intended as a layered modular architecture of an agnostic and generative network, is absent among 
early enthusiasts of the bitcoin’s blockchain technology, and it will only be partially recovered after 
the introduction of Ethereum).  
Yet, in the same way in which the evolution of digital networks has shown a confusing swing from 
centralization to decentralization due to the dual nature of platforms and infrastructures, the 
development of blockchain was also affected by the same fate. Starting with the 2013 hack of the 
Japanese cryptocurrency exchange Mt. Gox,10 it became clear that a technology that was specifically 
developed in order to counteract the centripetal trends of the platformized Web 2.0 concealed 
similar tendencies and the same incentives towards centralization. By the 2016 DAO (Distributed 
Autonomous Organization)11 hack it was apparent that the technology was in fact exhibiting the 
same type of tendencies towards centralization of the internet network (DuPont, 2019). This spurred 
a debate among practitioners and experts in the sector on the meaning of decentralization and on 
the way in which this concept should be intended in the in blockchain space (DuPont, 2018; Musiani 
et al., 2018). The launch of the Libra project lead by Facebook could only reinvigorate a debate on 
whether blockchain really addresses and counteracts the re-centralizing tendencies of platformized 
digital infrastructures, or if it will inexorably follow the same fate.12  
The global innovation effort seems to be seeking two different goals through blockchain technology. 
The first is to establish a distributed “internet of value” (Web 3.0) based on a mixture of “public 
permissionless” and “private permissioned” blockchain technology, and the second is comprised of 
efforts to establish blockchains for business use (Lacity, 2018; DuPont, 2019). The “public 
permissionless” community frequently relate to Baran’s (1964) architectural distinction between 
centralised, decentralised, and distributed systems in the emphasis on fully distributed p2p 
transactions. The “private permissioned” debate emphasises business-to-business interaction within 
closed consortia.  
The following will seek to establish a conceptual framework allowing for a more rigorous unfolding 
of these concepts characterizing de/centralization in digital networks in general, and blockchain 
networks in particular. As will be evident from our discussion, the issue of de/centralization is a good 
deal more multi-faceted than the mainstream academic and practitioner debate so far has 
acknowledged.  
2.3 Decentralization in Blockchain Literature  
This section reviews the blockchain literature in order to establish the foundational categories for 
the following discussion of de/centralization. 
2.3.1 Decentralization and Distribution Origins  
Blockchain, and the tokens transacted over it, are usually defined as a decentralized. The term 
“decentralization” does not appear in Satoshi Nakamoto’ 2008 white paper (Nakamoto, 2008: 1), nor 
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 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mt._Gox 
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 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_DAO_(organization) 
   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_and_blockchain#DAO_Hack 
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 A good summary of the debate over the decentralized nature of Libra is provided by this response article of 
the FT “Facebook fights back against Libra criticism” 
(https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2019/07/05/1562323175000/Facebook-fights-back-against-Libra-criticism/)   
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in any of the emails exchanged between Satoshi and friends between 2008 and 2009.13 Nevertheless, 
Nakamoto’s “peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server” (Nakamoto, 2008: 1) was developed in 
order to overcome centralization in digital payment networks and to devise an alternative to “the 
standard common solution […] to introduce a trusted central authority”. Building on the same 
concerns with centralized control points (or intermediaries) Ethereum was originally defined as a 
“Decentralized Application Platform” (Buterin, 2014; Wood, 2014) and bitcoin was defined by 
Buterin (2014: 1) as a “decentralized currency” even though Nakamoto never used the term. The 
term “decentralized” will also appear in the name of the most famous enterprise set up on the 
Ethereum network: the DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) (Jentzsch, 2016).  
Since then, the terms decentralization and distribution have mingled and the two have been 
originally regarded not just as a characteristic of blockchain, but probably as the fundamental 
characteristic defining blockchain: blockchain is decentralized (see for instance De Filippi and Wright, 
2018: chapter 1). Numerous works have emerged discussing how blockchain achieves 
decentralization and what this means and implies in the case of decentralized technologies (Wright 
and De Filippi, 2015; Reyes, 2016), architectures (De Filippi, 2016), infrastructures (Glaser, 2017; 
Pereira et al., 2019), platforms (Pereira et al., 2019; Wright and De Filippi, 2018: chapter 1), 
consensus protocols and mechanisms (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015; Tasca et al., 2017; Werbach 
and Cornell, 2017), governance (Atzori, 2015; Arrunada and Garicano, 2018), money and currencies 
(Gervais et al., 2014; Pagnotta, 2018; Tschorsch and Sceuermann, 2016), and even regulation 
(Nabilou, 2019). In all these works, decentralization represents the starting point of the analysis; in 
other words, decentralization is usually the given preliminary assumption from which the analysis 
develops. 
The definition of blockchain in function of the concept of decentralization creates evident 
conceptual, epistemological and analytical difficulties: if decentralization is the premise of the 
analysis, it becomes impossible (or even irrelevant) to test whether blockchain really is decentralized, 
or even what this means. As noted by Walch (2019a: 2) in a recent working paper, the logic becomes 
very similar to the argument that “blockchain system is decentralized because, well, blockchains are 
decentralized”. Moreover, the diversity of the interpretative approaches (which depend on the point 
of view adopted) also generates a lack of clarity and prevents a common understanding of the 
concept to be tested and analysed. As decentralization is the preliminary assumption from which the 
argument develops, the concept is very rarely defined.  
The lack of a clear and precise definition also generates other confusions and misunderstandings. 
One striking example is that decentralization (the newer concept used by the Ethereum founders) is 
commonly mixed up by the literature with the concept of distribution (the original concept used by 
bitcoin creators). As a result, blockchain as a decentralized technology is usually interpreted as a 
distributed ledger technology (DLT), even though decentralization and distribution refer to two very 
different things: distribution simply refers to the way in which something is dispersed, accessed or 
appropriated by various actors of a social system (usually resources, content or data), while 
decentralization is a relational concept that defines the way in which interpersonal relationships 
between these actors are structured, organised and governed. This same confusion is also present in 
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 There is just one single exception where the term decentralization appears. The full email exchange can be 
found at: https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/cryptography/threads/1/ 
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the broader literature on digital networks and the internet where distribution and decentralization 
are often conflated (Mathew, 2016; Möller and von Rimscha, 2017; Troncoso et al., 2017), and in the 
literature on digital infrastructures, where both the term distribution and decentralization is used 
(Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010; Tilson et al, 2010). 
2.3.2 Critiquing Decentralization in Blockchain Networks  
A series of events and general developments challenges the notion of decentralization, such as: 1) 
The hacking of Mt Gox in 2013 and its subsequent bankruptcy in 2014; 2) the development of 
specialised ASIC14 (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) cryptocurrency mining equipment allowing 
for the emergence of powerful mining pools15 that potentially would be able to reach the critical 51% 
of mining capacity for a specific cryptocurrency network and through this subvert the distributed 
consensus;16 and 3) the collapse of the DAO leading to the forking of Ethereum in 2016.17 These 
important events showed that decentralization cannot be treated as an inherent characteristic of 
the blockchain technology, of its tokens, or of the social communities adopting it. In the light of 
these events, an increasing amount of works have recently started to question the assumption of 
decentralization by showing that blockchain is far from the archetype of decentralization that is 
usually portrayed to be.  
As a result, some works have focussed on the collapse of Mt Gox and on the emergence of many 
other wallet providers and exchange platforms to show that the blockchain ecosystem abounds with 
central intermediaries that, most importantly, also represents single points of failure of the entire 
network (Beikverdi and Song, 2015; Gencer et al., 2018; Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2019). The 
emergence of very powerful mining pools showed that the blockchain protocol could be centrally 
controlled by a handful and maybe even one single actor (as for Ghash.io), and it was therefore 
prone to manipulation regardless of the will of the majority and the incentive mechanisms adopted 
(Eyal and Sirer, 2018; Kwon et al., 2019; Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2019).  
The hacking and bankruptcy of the DAO and the implications that this event had for the underlying 
Ethereum blockchain network has fostered what is probably the most interesting and prolific strand 
of critiques to the assumption of decentralization. An increasing amount of recent works have 
focussed on the governance of blockchain networks and on their inherent problems and failures 
(Arrunada, 2018; Beck et al., 2018; De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016; Dupont, 2018; Finck, 2019: chapter 
8; Hsieh et al., 2018; John and Pam, 2018; Miscione et al., 2018 and 2019; Musiani et al., 2018; 
Reijers et al., 2016; Reyes, 2019; Walch, 2015 and 2018; Zachariadis et al., 2019; Ziolkowski et al., 
2019). These works have mainly compared the problems emerging from blockchain governance to 
the governance of digital platforms and, especially, of digital infrastructures. This literature discusses 
how the way in which decisions are taken, adopted, and implemented always reflects some 
governance arrangement of the social community that is far from the ideal of pure decentralization 
as portrayed by the literature in economics, management and organization studies.  
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16
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This governance conundrum is not limited to the Ethereum community. Many other blockchain 
communities are currently experiencing “governance crises” derived from the need to update and 
change their respective protocols in response to a variety of urgent and pressing issues, such as: 1) 
ensuring sufficient performance when scaling the network; 2) ensuring that the blockchain 
consensus mechanism can resist the advantages of ASIC mining equipment; 3)  the environmental 
impact of cryptocurrency mining; 4) the interconnection and interoperability of different blockchain 
networks, and 5) the privacy in exchange of tokens (for a similar list of challenges, see Zachariadis et 
al., 2019). This has fostered an emerging fierce debate over the meaning and the nature of 
blockchain governance much beyond academia, and even among the various members of these 
communities (Buterin, 2017b and 2018). 18  These debates on blockchain governance among 
members of the blockchain communities inevitable mingled with, and result into, the debate on the 
nature and meaning of de/centralization in blockchain networks (Halaburda and Mueller-Bloch, 2019; 
Srinivasan and Lee, 2017).19 
2.4 Problems with the Current Literature 
Although these recent works do not up front assume that blockchain by assumption is a 
decentralized system, there are still fundamental problems with the current literature discussing the 
centralizing trends of blockchain networks. First, all works critically challenging the assumption of 
decentralization usually adopt a partial and mono-dimensional approach to decentralization by 
focussing on one specific aspect or dimension of blockchain technology, thus ignoring the 
multidimensionality of blockchain and the related inter-disciplinary nature of the concept of 
decentralization (Schneider, 2003 and 2019). By doing so these works mainly provide narrow and 
tailor-made definitions of decentralization for the very specific case of blockchain (or digital 
networks at most), while ignoring the fact that decentralization is a much more fundamental 
characteristic of any social (and socio-technical) system where actors and individuals interact in 
order to pursue their interests and enact their will in relationship (and often in conflict) with the 
interests and will of others. Secondly, these works usually fail to provide an analytical definition of 
decentralization, while they mainly focus on its antonym, centralization. The goal is usually to argue 
that blockchain is not decentralized by showing and verifying that blockchain networks present 
centralizing tendencies. But what centralization and, especially, decentralization precisely mean and 
how they should be conceptualised has so far remained vague, implicit, or completely unaddressed 
(Walch, 2019a). Let us analyse these two aspects in turn. 
2.4.1 Decentralization as a Lack of Centralization  
Even though many works now recognise that blockchain networks manifest centralizing tendencies, 
each work interprets centralization according to the interpretative lens provided by its own specific 
epistemological field and, as a result, each work only focuses on one single aspect of 
de/centralization.  At least four interpretative approaches to de/centralization can be inferred from 
the literature (see also Buterin, 2017a; Schneider, 2003 and 2019 on this issue): a technological (or 
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 This is particularly evident in the Ethereum community, where prominent members are discussing the way 
in which blockchain governance can be applied to the Ethereum blockchain. For a summary of the debate, see 
the overviews provided by CleanApp on Medium (CleanApp, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019). 
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infrastructural) one, an economic one, a political one, and a legal one (see table 2.1 for a summary of 
the four approaches)  
a. Architectural and logical approaches: technological centralization of networks 
First, a technological or infrastructural approach to centralization defines centralization by looking at 
the technological characteristics of a networked system and at the way in which the network is 
designed. Following Buterin (2017a), two different variations of this technological or infrastructural 
approach can be identified. 
The architectural approach defines centralization as a degree of redundancy of the system (Baran, 
1964: 1). For this reason, architectural decentralization can be intended as a measure of the number 
of nodes that can break down before the entire system breaks down (Buterin, 2017a). In this case a 
networked system is defined as centralized if the network presents a central point of failure, or 
bottleneck, in the form of an intermediate or focal node collecting, aggregating, organising, and 
rooting the traffic generated by other nodes. The architectural approach defines centralization as a 
function of the design of the network’s linkages. We define this approach as architectural as it 
focusses on the architecture of the network intended as the design of the network’s pipes and 
conduits connecting the various nodes.   
The works adopting an architectural perspective mainly focus on the role played by big wallet 
providers and exchanges and acquired an early prominence in the literature following the rise (and 
fall) of big exchanges (such as Mt.Gox). The architectural approach is also widely adopted by the 
managerial literature on platforms’ architecture and ecosystems (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; 
Langlois and Robertson, 1992), by the economic literature on networks (Economides, 1996; Shapiro 
& Varian, 1998; Shy, 2001), and by the sociological literature (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973 & 1985; 
Powell, 1990; Smith-Doher and Powell, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). In all these approaches the focus is on the 
structure or architecture of the relationships between the elements (nodes).  
The second sub-branch of the technological-infrastructural approach to centralization is represented 
by what can be called the logical interpretation of centralization (Buterin, 2017a). This second 
approach is the one more closely rooted in the computer science literature and is the one directly 
linked to the theory of distributed or peer-to-peer (p2p) systems (Tanenbaum and van Steen, 2007). 
In this case, centralization is still a static feature of the infrastructure, but the focus is shifted from 
the architecture of the pipes “in the middle” to the role of the nodes “at the edges”. A networked 
system in this case is logically centralized if the various nodes within the system behave as a unique 
and coherent entity, and cannot operate autonomously and independent from each other as this 
would breach the integrity and consistency of the system. Logical centralization implies some form 
of social coordination or collaboration, while the various elements in a logically decentralized system 
are potentially adversarial and might act inconsistently from each other (Troncoso et al., 2017).  
Logical centralization simply requires that all nodes are on the same page and share the same 
common vision of the world and of the state of the system so that they can cooperate and 
collaborate towards a common and coherent goal. Logical centralization implies an agreement 
among the nodes on some common state or goal. For this reason, some shared resource is necessary 
to retain the logical consistency and integrity of the overall system across all nodes as this facilitates 
the social coordination by ensuring the alignment of incentives. Obviously, this integrity can be 
ensured by means of centralized architecture through a shared access to a common intermediate 
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hub, but it does not need to. Coordination can simply be ensured by some form of logical 
centralization by ensuring sharing of information, or alignment of incentives or goals. For this reason, 
the focus of logical centralization is on the edges (the way in which common resources or data are 
distributed to, or shared by, the edges), not on the pipes (the way in which these data and resources 
can be transmitted and communicated).  
Peer-to-peer (p2p) systems can be logically decentralised and architecturally centralised in the case 
of p2p platforms or marketplaces such as Uber or Airbnb (Sundararajan, 2013), or more often 
architecturally decentralized but logically centralized, as in the case of standard distributed 
computer networks (Tanenbaum and van Steen, 2007). More generally, distributed systems are 
usually characterised by the architectural decentralization of the infrastructure but by its logical 
centralization. A distributed system is defined by Tanenbaum and van Steen (2007: 2) as “a 
collection of independent computers that appears to its users as a single coherent system.” 
Consistent with many other p2p networks, blockchains are always logically centralized (Buterin, 
2017a), where the common resources shared by all nodes and ensuring the integrity and consistency 
of the overall system is time or, more specifically, the blockchain timestamp. The presence of a peer-
to-peer distributed timestamp server ensures that all nodes synchronise transactions in the same 
chronological order and this ensures that a single version of a ledger is distributed among all nodes: 
the distribution of the timestamp server implies centralization of the system. As a result, a 
blockchain is logical centralized, which ensures the integrity of the system and its behaviour as a 
single coherent system even in the absence of architectural centralization.20  
The inherent centralization brought about by a distributed timestamp has not been sufficiently 
highlighted by the blockchain literature on blockchain and it has been discussed only indirectly with 
respect to the debates on the scalability problem of proof-of-work protocols, and the need for 
independent side chains (Croman et al., 2016; Gervais et al., 2016). In fact, decentralization and 
scaling have usually been understood by industry participants as potentially incompatible aspects of 
a distributed system such as blockchain.21  
More generally, it can be argued that it is the confusion of the logical aspect of a network (behaviour 
at the edges) with its pure architectural aspect (the organization of the pipes) that generates the 
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 The trade-off between logical and architectural de/centralization is well summarised by Nakamoto (2008: 2) 
in his discussion of the double-spending problem: “The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of 
the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or 
mint, that checks every transaction for double spending … The problem with this solution is that the fate of the 
entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through 
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owners did not sign any earlier transactions … To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be 
publicly announced, and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which 
they were received [logical centralization].” In sum, blockchain addresses the problems emerging from 
architectural centralization by introducing logical centralization and this is practically achieved by switching 
from point-to-point communication to broadcasting communication.  
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 For an overview of Buterin’s scalability trilemma, see Buterin (2014b), and the overviews and summaries in 
Medium: https://medium.com/@aakash_13214/the-scalability-trilemma-in-blockchain-75fb57f646df ;  
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confusing conflation of distribution with decentralization (see Troncoso et al., 2017). In Baran’s 
(1964) famous article, the distributed system lacks architectural centralization, even though a high 
degree of redundancy is precisely the way in which coherence and integrity of the overall system 
(logical centralization) can be ensured. A broad range of literature primarily conceives of 
centralization in terms of its logical dimension. The focus is on the set of common rules and 
principles shared by all participants ensuring cooperation and coordination among various 
independent elements (or nodes). This is the case for works on: Social (or peer) production (Benkler, 
2006), open innovation (West and Bogers, 2014), modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Langlois, 
2003), and platform ecosystems (Adner, 2017; Jacobidies et al., 2018) and, especially, the one 
dealing with digital infrastructures and the birth of internet governance (Ciborra et al., 2000; 
Goldsmith and Yoo, 2006; Tilson et al, 2010). 
Although it is possible to keep architectural and logical approaches distinct as done by Buterin 
(2017a), they both focus on some objective design features of the network’s infrastructure and for 
this reason we think that it is possible to consolidate them into one single common approach: the 
technological or infrastructural approach to centralization (this is similar to Scheneider (2019: 15-17) 
network approach).  
Buterin (2017a) completes his taxonomy with a last dimension, political centralization, defining the 
extent to which different individuals controls the various nodes of the network. This political 
dimension is also highlighted by Scheneider (2019). However, control can emerge in various ways 
and for different reasons, making it very hard to group all the social determinants of centralization 
into one single dimension. As a result, three other approaches can be identified from the literature.  
b. Economic approaches to centralization  
A second approach to centralization shared by many works discussing centralization in blockchain 
networks can be defined as the economic interpretative approach. In this case authors criticising the 
decentralization assumption of a blockchain highlight how a handful of mining nodes can control the 
entire system by escalating their investments and concentrating the mining power (Kwon et al., 
2019). This line of research mainly considers the dispersion of computing power intended as a proxy 
for the capacity of one or few nodes to unilaterally affect the way in which the network can evolve 
and behave. This can be defined as an economic approach as the dynamics according to which the 
processing capacity of the various mining nodes tend to coalesce and be concentrated into, and thus 
controlled by, a few or many nodes is usually studied through standard game-theoretic models of 
market dynamics: degree of competition, incentives to invest, market concentration, collusion and 
monopoly power (Abadi and Brunnermeier, 2018; Biais et al., 2019; Chiu et al., 2017; Huberman et 
al., 2017; Kwon et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2018). Consistent with the economic approach, these works 
adopt a social welfare perspective on centralization.  
While the architectural critique of decentralization was inspired by the emergence and failure of 
central intermediaries, the economic approach to centralization was clearly inspired by the 
centralization of hashing power (computing power) into few big mining pools (such as BTC.com or 
Antpool) following the development of ASCI appliances in 2011-12. This aspect became especially 
relevant considering that the biggest manufacturer of consumer appliances (Bitmain) is also the one 
directly managing one of the biggest mining pools (AntPool).  
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c. Political approaches to centralization  
A third approach considers political de/centralization. The degree of political centralization is usually 
interpreted by the literature as the way in which private preferences, or wills of single actors, are 
aggregated and represented at the public (or social) level (Torrisi et al., 2011: 10). Political 
decentralization measures and defines the rules governing participation to, and representation in, 
the public sphere: “The best way to summarize these functions might be in terms of representation, 
which refers to the way political institutions map the multiplicity of citizen interests onto policy 
decisions […]” (Schneider, 2003: 39). The political approach to decentralization characterises the 
degree of centralization of the governance of a social system, or the process through which 
collective decisions are taken.  
The political approach usually looks at centralization in terms of normative political categories, such 
as democracy or fairness. As the political approach focusses on the way in which private values are 
aggregated, weighted, and translated into public values, it is inherently evaluative and normative 
(Schneider, 2003). In this case, decentralized systems are democratic systems where all actors have 
the same “weight” and social influence, and therefore the same probability to see their instances 
represented and embraced. In this case, a centralized system becomes a hierarchy whenever few 
actors can take decisions in behalf of the others, such as in an oligarchy, or when the decisions taken 
by few actors weights more than the will and preferences of others, as in aristocracy or plutocracy.  
The political approach emerged fairly recently, following the governance problems characterising 
many blockchain networks, especially with respect to the responses to hacking, protocol change, 
and scalability. This approach is the one mainly followed by the works interested in the way in which 
blockchain communities govern themselves, and on the way in which rules governing blockchain 
networks are developed and established by their respective communities, especially with respect to 
the proof-of-stake consensus protocol (Buterin, 2017b; 2018).22 The focus is mainly on the various 
governance forms, such as hierarchy, market, network, and bazaar (see also Ziolkovski et al., 2018a 
and 2018b; Miscione, 2019). More generally, the literature analysing blockchain governance and the 
debates emerging out of it mainly adopt a political understanding of de/centralization. A similar 
approach is also adopted by the literature on open access and networked-production that compares 
network governance arrangements to hierarchies. Thus, Benkler (2006: 62) defines a system as 
decentralized whenever coordination can happen without hierarchy, and when “many agents cohere 
and are effective despite the fact that they do not rely on reducing the number of people whose will 
counts to direct effective action”. This is a political interpretation of decentralization (democracy) 
nested within a requirement of logical centralization (overall coherence and effectiveness of the 
system).  
d. Legal approaches to centralization  
The legal interpretation of centralization is a fourth and last to be found in the literature. This 
approach is similar to, yet distinct from, the political approach as it mainly looks at the legal 
dimension of centralization. A system is centralized whenever duties, obligations, responsibilities, 
accountabilities and liabilities can be clearly identified and clearly attributed to some actor. 
Decentralization in this case implies duties and liabilities equally shared or diffused among all 
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 See also Morris at https://breakermag.com/vitalik-buterin-is-embracing-a-new-role-political-theorist/  
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members, thus generating confusion with respect to who is responsible for what or impossibility to 
trace responsibilities back to a specific actor or a defined set of actors. Systems are legally 
decentralized whenever it is not possible to identify specific actors bearing special liabilities, duties 
and responsibilities vis-à-vis the others — claimants. 
This approach is closely linked to the political approach as it still focusses on the governance 
dimension of a blockchain, but also differs as it focuses on liabilities and responsibilities rather than 
on the relative “weight” of the various actors playing a role in the decision process and shaping the 
final outcome (even though the political and legal aspects may be strictly linked as concentration of 
political power often implies concentration of legal responsibility and liability and vice versa; see 
Østbye, 2019 and Zetzsche et al., 2018). At the same time, if the political approach focusses on the 
governance issues of the blockchain intended as hierarchies in the decision-making process, the legal 
approach is mainly interested in blockchain as corporate governance intended as a principal-agent 
problem between managers (administrators or validators) and owners (coin holders), sometimes 
also reflecting a coordination problem between on-chain and off-chain interests respectively (Finck, 
2019: 191-206; Reijers et al., 2018; Reyes, 2019; Walch, 2019; Yermack, 2017). Decision rights and 
responsibilities are often treated jointly as two separate aspects of blockchain governance (Beck et 
al. 2018).  
The recent problems faced by regulators with respect to the issue of crypto-tokens and Initial Coin 
Offerings (ICOs) are mainly rooted in this fourth approach (Van Valkenburgh, 2018a & 2018b). Legal 
centralization becomes particularly relevant in the case of hacks, scams, frauds, or damages where 
liabilities, duties and criminal responsibilities must be clearly identified, even in the case of smart 
contracts (Finck, 2019: 58-64; Werbach, 2018; Zetzsche et al., 2017). More generally, this legal 
approach to decentralization is particularly relevant in the case of autonomous systems, open source 
software and distributed communities. Table 2.1 summarizes the four approaches.  
Interpretative Approach Definition of centralization 
Aspect of blockchain interested by the 
approach 
Technological 
Infrastructural  
Architectural Presence of central intermediaries or 
bottlenecks (lack of redundancy in the 
linkages)  
Emergence of big wallet providers or crypto 
exchanges marketplaces serving lightweight 
nodes representing single points of failure 
Logical  Presence of some shared resource / logic 
/ incentives allowing for coherence and 
integrity of the overall system, which 
appears as a unique and coherent entity  
The essence of distributed systems such as 
blockchain: Distributed ledger and shared 
access to the same database   
Economic Accumulation of capabilities in single 
nodes generating concentration of power 
(market power) as an ability to 
unilaterally influence the system’s 
behaviour 
Development of crypto-specific ASIC mining 
hardware   Emergence of big mining pools 
and mining farms centralizing hashing power   
Political  Presence of special status individuals 
whose will and decisions weight or count 
more than others’ when deriving 
collective decisions on how the system 
ought to behave 
Governance problems emerging from 
problems requiring code upgrade / change 
(hacking of DAO, scalability, ASIC resistance, 
interoperability)    
Legal  Possibility to clearly attribute duties, 
obligations, responsibilities and liabilities 
to specific actors / possibility to held 
specific actors accountable  
Corporate governance problems emerging 
from the sale of tokens and services over the 
blockchain (ICOs) or from faulty code  
Table 2.1: Four interpretative approaches to de/centralization of centralization identified in the current blockchain 
literature. 
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As summarized in table 2.1, different approaches focus on different aspects of digital networks and, 
for this reason, they provide a different (yet complementary) understanding of de/centralization. As 
each captures a partial approach, all play a part, no single approach is sufficient in itself to provide 
an exhaustive understanding of de/centralization. The technological approach focusses on the way 
in which a socio-technical network is structured and operated. On the other hand, the economic 
approach focusses on the way in which on-chain consensus is reached and decisions are validated by 
the network’s nodes. The political approach can either focus on on-chain governance in case 
decisions are taken on-chain, or on the off-chain dimension of governance, in case the decision-
making process is undertaken off-chain. Finally, the legal approach defines de/centralization by 
looking at how decisions are linked to responsibilities, rights, duties and liabilities.   
In conclusion, although the recent emergence of such a rich and diverse scope of works overcomes 
the fundamental problems deriving from the assumption of decentralization in blockchain networks, 
they still reproduce a fundamental problem of the earlier works: by focussing on one single 
dimension, these “disciplinary” works can only capture single aspects of the technology, rather than 
the whole picture. However, decentralization is a multi-dimensional concept acquiring its meaning 
from the dynamic interaction and variable combination of its various dimensions. As argued by 
Schneider, 2003: 40), “What has not yet been discussed, but remains pertinent, is the degree to 
which these dimensions are interrelated. This interrelationship can contribute to conceptual 
confusion, as decentralization along one dimension may influence or cross over into decentralization 
along another dimension. Without accounting for this interrelationship, measures will over- or 
underestimate the amount of decentralization” (see also Schneider, 2019). 
2.4.2 Defining a De/centralization Framework  
The current blockchain literature rarely provides an operational definition of decentralization. The 
majority of the works criticising the decentralized ideology of blockchain are primarily descriptive 
endeavours that simply “verify” that blockchain networks in reality manifest some centralizing 
tendencies. Very often a lack of decentralization is indirectly inferred from the verification of some 
form of centralization. This generates two main problems.  
First, centralization lacks a univocal meaning and is implicitly defined in various ways, depending on 
the epistemological approach adopted. Centralization is sometimes implicitly understood as 
denoting the presence of some form of power (Walch, 2019a). However, power can either have a 
socio-political origin (the political approach), an architectural nature (the approach adopted by the 
sociology of networks), or it can derive from actors’ inherent capabilities shaping the resulting 
market structure in which these actors operate (the economic approach). Other times centralization 
is defined in terms of control, for example over other actors or resources: (Schneider, 2003). This 
interpretation mainly belongs to the economic and political approach and is especially adopted by 
the managerial and organizational literature dealing with the governance of platforms and 
infrastructures (Gawer, 2014; Tilson et al, 2010; Constantinides et al, 2018) and of digital networks in 
general (Zittrain, 2008). In the case of blockchain, centralization as control is mainly relevant in those 
works inquiring the governance and corporate governance of blockchain networks. Yet, the 
definition of centralization as control rarely emerges from the technological approach. Other times 
centralization is defined in terms of accumulation and appropriation and therefore in terms of 
property rights. The economic and logical approaches are the ones mainly adopting this 
interpretation: the focus in this case is mainly on the nature and amount of resources that the 
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various nodes can accumulate. The managerial literature reframes this problem as an access 
problem, where a lack of access derives from the impossibility to appropriate someone else’s 
property. Finally, the legal approach defines centralization in terms of rights and duties, but not 
necessarily as property rights.  Although the concepts of power, right, and control are intimately 
linked, they remain distinct concepts meaning different things, thus capturing different, interlinked, 
aspects or phenomena. 
The second problem derives from the fact that verifying that blockchain manifests clear tendencies 
towards centralization does not mean that the term decentralization is clearly defined, or that an 
operational framework to test and understand decentralization is provided. The definition of 
centralization is often somewhat easier than the one of decentralization. As stated by Schneider 
(2003: 34), “Researchers have multiplied the conceptualizations of decentralization; associated the 
various concepts with different meanings … By way of contrast, decentralization’s antonym, 
centralization, has a much more precise and accepted usage, which is the concentration of power, 
resources, and authority in a single head or center.” This is true also for the various works 
challenging the decentralization ideal of blockchain: a common aspect to all these works is the 
treatment of centralization as a form of concentration.  
The few works providing operational approaches usually measure the degree of centralization by 
looking at some measure of concentration, rather than defining decentralization itself (Kwon et al., 
2019; Srinivasan, 2017). This can be reasonable in some cases, but is not necessarily exhaustive in 
others. While appropriation and property rights nearly always generate some type of concentration, 
social power and rights do not necessarily manifest themselves in terms of concentration. In this 
case, the measure of qualitative or immaterial imbalances or inequalities might become more 
appropriate. Most importantly, it is not always entirely clear how decentralization should be defined 
if expressed and intended as a lack of centralization. What does complete lack of power, control, or 
rights mean? What does it mean for a complex and multidimensional social system such as a 
blockchain to be completely decentralized?  Based on Hohfeld’s (1913; 1917) fundamental legal 
taxonomy, it is possible to summarise the various interpretations of centralization provided by the 
literature as in table 2.2.23 Table 2.2 provides an attempt to link the generic legal categories to the 
four aforementioned epistemological approaches to de/centralization. 
With the exception of a handful of very recent works and articles (Arrunada, 2018; Schneider 2019; 
Troncoso et al., 2017; Walch, 2019a), the majority of the works do not critically enquire the concept 
of decentralization by asking what decentralization means in the context of blockchain, how it 
should be defined and conceptualised, and how it relates to or emerges from centralization.  Even 
among the ones that do critically examine the meaning of decentralization in very general terms 
(Walch (2019a) defines centralization as “power”), very few adopt a comprehensive and multi-
dimensional approach (Schneider 2019 is an example). 
 
                                                          
23
 Hohfeld (1913) distinguishes between rights, powers, privileges and immunities and their jural opposites. 
Differences in privileges and immunities among actors might be factors explaining centralization (differences in 
mining capabilities confer control over the network, but they are de facto differences in privileges, in Hohfeld 
terminology), but they are rarely used in the literature to define and characterise de/centralization.    
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Centralization 
intended as: 
Meaning Applied to Blockchain 
Primary 
Epistemological 
Approach  
Power  
Ability to affect, influence and 
modify the social status of others 
or the state of a thing 
Centralization of cryptocurrency 
mining power, of coding 
capabilities and decision rights  
Economic 
Political  
Architectural  
Control  
(privileges or 
capabilities)  
Ability to determine or command 
how a thing or actor should behave 
at will  
Centralization of mining power, 
hierarchical governance and 
corporate governance of 
blockchain  
Economic 
Political 
Legal 
Architectural  
Rights  
Legal capacity to limit or constraint 
the behaviour of others (by 
constraining the set of available 
options or opportunities of duty 
holders) 
Centralization of duties, 
obligations, responsibilities, 
accountabilities and liabilities in 
the corporate governance of 
blockchain  
Legal 
Political 
Property rights  
Very specific type of constraint or 
limitation: Legal capacity to exclude 
others from interacting with 
something (access or use)   
Centralization of mining 
through escalation of 
investment and appropriation 
of assets; centralization as 
private access to data and 
information (no shared 
database) 
Economic 
Political  
Table 2.2: Four epistemologies of centralization based on Hohfeld’s (1913; 1917) fundamental legal taxonomy and 
applied to blockchain   
2.4.3 Defining de/centralization: a framework for the study of socio-technical system 
There is arguably a common trait shared by all interpretative approaches to de/centralization: they 
all recognise that centralization and decentralization are social and inter-personal categories, in the 
sense that they only make sense whenever two or more actors (individuals, groups or organizations) 
inter-act and affect each other in some manner. Actions that are inter-personal (take place between 
persons) become inter-actions. This is also the basic role of any network (no matter whether in its 
platform or infrastructural form): to enable inter-action between different actors otherwise isolated 
and independent from each other (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). As 
recognised by the literature, platforms and infrastructures are also social entities or, more precisely, 
socio-technical artefacts (de Reuver et al, 2018).  
Inter-personal actions, or interactions, differ from actions done in isolation or autonomy in that they 
always create some form of inter-dependency. A mutual dependency between two or more actors, 
to be contrasted to the in-dependence characterising autonomous actions of isolated actors. Here, 
we critically characterise the centralization-decentralization dichotomy in terms of interdependence. 
There is interdependence whenever what can be achieved by one member of a social system 
depends more or less directly, and in a more or less conscious or purposeful way on the 
decisions/actions/will of others. Centralization might emerge from decentralization and vice versa, 
depending on the nature of the interdependencies among the actors.  
The work defines any social system composed by two or more members as “centralized” whenever 
there is an asymmetric24  interdependence between them. By contrast, we define decentralization as 
                                                          
24
 The concepts of symmetry and asymmetry has been applied across a range of academic fields for particular 
purposes as well as being studied as a foundational concept for our understanding of the Universe (Weil, 1983; 
Close, 2001; Stewart, 2007). Here, we apply the concept in a context of social systems in the context of 
interactions and relationships that can be externally agreed, as for example, opposed to the social-
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symmetric interdependence between actors. The interdependence can be symmetric if two 
members are able to influence each other in the same way as they are able to sort the same effects 
on the others whenever they take the same course of action. Symmetry defines a situation where no 
member can affect the other more than the counterpart can. Interdependence becomes asymmetric 
whenever this is not true, meaning that one member’s fate is more dependent on the decisions and 
actions of others than these are dependent on his or her. Asymmetric inter-dependence can also be 
intended as dependence of one member on the other, in the sense that the former’s fate depends 
on the decisions, choices and actions of the latter. 
As a result, we argue that perfect decentralization occurs in two ideal cases: absence of 
interdependence among members tout court (autonomy or freedom), and perfect symmetry in 
interdependency (absence of dependency). In both cases, perfect decentralization is characterised 
by equality of all the members vis-à-vis each other. A social system is characterised by some degree 
of centralization whenever there is interdependency among their members, and this 
interdependence presents some degree of asymmetry (“interdependence between” becomes 
“dependence on”). The degree of asymmetry defines the degree of dependence, which can be taken 
as a measure of the degree of centralization in a social system. This degree of asymmetry also 
characterises the level of inequality among the various members of a social system. Decentralization, 
symmetry, and equality all describe the same state of affairs in the same way in which centralization, 
asymmetry, and inequality do. The extreme case where one single individual always decides on 
behalf of everyone else represents the maximum degree of degree of inequality, and therefore also 
the maximum degree of centralization. The same concepts can be formalised according to Hohfeld’s 
(1913; 1917) fundamental legal taxonomy. First, when interconnection is absent, actors, which can 
be single individuals, organizations or collectives depending on the unit of analysis, operate in 
isolation and complete autonomy. This state corresponds to the a-social state of nature where inter-
dependence is inexistent. In Hohfeld’s terms (1913), a system where actors are independent is 
characterised by sole liberties or privileges. As perfect independence rules out any type of 
interdependence between the actors, the system can be treated as a perfectly decentralized one. As 
soon as socio-technical artefacts such as infrastructures or platforms are built, some form of 
interconnection between previously independent actors is enabled and interactions might appear. 
With interconnections and interactions, interdependencies emerge (Grisot et al., 2014; Hanseth et 
al., 1996; Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). These interdependencies can 
maintain perfect decentralization or generate centralization and can be de facto (emerging 
informally from actors’ abilities, opportunities of faculties) or de jure (formalised in social rules)  
Social systems are de facto perfectly decentralized whenever they are characterised by completely 
symmetric set of abilities, capabilities or opportunities. Whenever this is not the case, perfect 
decentralization of a social system might be established de jure, by completely symmetric set of 
rights, which define symmetric reciprocal possibilities and duties among all actors. Otherwise, social 
systems can present some degree of centralization de facto, due to asymmetries in capabilities, 
opportunities, abilities or faculties among the actors. In Hohfeld’s (1913) terminology, these 
centralized systems are characterised by power of some members on others (power relations are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
psychological aspects relating an inner individual psychological state to the outer social world, as for example 
explored by Goffman (1959). 
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always asymmetric, and can be de facto). Alternatively, asymmetries can be formalised in 
asymmetric rights among members (asymmetries de jure). Asymmetric rights also imply social power 
and control over other members’ behaviour (thus hierarchies) if referred to other individuals (rights 
in personam) or control over things (asymmetric rights in rem emerging from property rights –
exclusion and appropriation of things).  
Table 2.3 summarises our categorization of centralization and decentralization. 
Category  
Precondition,  
characteristic of 
the situation 
Definition provided 
Normative 
Political 
categories 
 
Hohfeld positive legal 
categories 
Perfect 
Decentralization 
A-social actions Independence Liberty De facto Capabilities / privileges 
Social   
inter-actions 
Symmetric 
interdependence 
Equality 
De facto 
Immunities / disabilities: 
Symmetric capabilities / 
opportunities / faculties 
(absence of power 
relations)  
De jure 
Symmetric rights (& 
duties) 
Centralization 
Social  
inter-actions  
Dependence 
(Asymmetric 
interdependence) 
Inequality 
  
De Facto 
Power relations 
(Asymmetric capabilities 
/ opportunities / 
faculties) 
 
De Jure 
Asymmetric rights  
In personam: Control 
over other members and 
hierarchies (power de 
jure) 
In rem: control over 
things (property rights) 
Table 2.3: A summary of the categories of centralization and decentralization.  
As shown in Table 2.3, by defining centralization and decentralization in terms of independence, 
symmetric interdependence, and dependence (asymmetric interdependence), it is possible to 
provide a comprehensive and coherent framework for the study of de/centralization that unifies all 
disjointed classifications and definition provided by the literature and provides some epistemological 
and analytical clarity. The role played by power, control, rights, and property rights can be 
completely characterised and derived by simply looking at the sources and nature of asymmetries.  
In summary, we argue that centralization and decentralization do not denote given and static 
characteristics of single given dimensions of a socio-technical system, such as the design of its 
architecture or the logic of its transmission protocols. Conversely, the framing of de/centralization in 
terms of asymmetries shows that a system can be either centralized or decentralized depending on 
the changing nature of the relationships and interactions between its members and elements in 
general. These relationships can be between elements of a single dimension or, most importantly, 
across dimensions. If this framework has to be applied to the blockchain, it is therefore first 
necessary to understand what the core elements of a blockchain are in relation to its various 
dimensions. In order to do so, it is necessary to understand how the platform and the infrastructural 
nature of any digital network (thus of blockchain as well) can be understood and interact.  
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3 A Digital Network De/centralization Framework  
The purpose of this section is fourfold with a subsection covering each: 1) Identify the deficiency of 
the literature to theoretically define blockchain in terms of platform and infrastructure, 2) identify 
the fundamental characteristics of digital platforms and infrastructures; 2) develop a conceptual 
framework for the study and understanding of digital networks in function of the key dimensions of 
platforms and infrastructures, and 3) provide a conceptual framework for the analytical study of the 
meaning of de/centralization in digital networks in function of the fundamental characteristics of 
digital platforms and infrastructures. 
3.1 Blockchain Decentralization: Literature Overview 
A third important shortcoming emerges from the literature examining the centralizing trends of 
blockchain technologies. No work makes any attempt to link the discussion on the degree of 
centralization of blockchain to the properties of platforms and infrastructures. A blockchain is first 
and foremost a digital network and it should be studied and analysed as such. Various works provide 
in-depth taxonomies of blockchain and provide extensive overviews of all their properties qua digital 
networks, but they are mainly descriptive works, and not really critical analyses of how specific 
features and dimensions of a digital network affect the nature and degree of de/centralization of a 
blockchain (for examples of such descriptive works, see for example: Ballandies et al., 2018; De Rossi 
et al., 2019; Okada et al., 2017; Rausch et al., 2018; Risius and Spohrer, 2017; Tasca and Tessone, 
2017; Tasca, Thanabalasingham and Tessone, 2017; Walsh et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017). Some works 
rooted in the computer science literature discuss problems or failures deriving from the 
centralization of some layers of the blockchain network (See, for example, Gervais et al., 2016; 
Neudecker and Hartenstein, 2018). However, these do not critically discuss the concept of 
decentralization and its meaning for blockchain. In fact, they often defined a blockchain protocol as 
“decentralized” by assumption (see also Kwon et al., 2019).  
We have not been able to identify any work attempting to establish a relationship between the 
inherent tensions generated by the interplay between the platform and the infrastructural 
dimension of any digital network and the tensions emerging from the centralizing forces in 
blockchain networks. Neither have we identified any work attempting to study the centralizing 
trends of blockchain networks in the light of the platform-infrastructure interplay even though an 
emerging literature in media studies (Helmond, 2015; Helmond et al., 2019; Nechusthai, 2018; 
Plantin et al., 2018; Plantin and Punathambekar, 2019), information system (Bygstad and Hanseth, 
2018; Costantinides et al., 2018; Lorenz and Stefan, 2018; Kazan et al, 2018) and legal studies 
(Zittrain, 2018; Flew, 2019; Flew et al., 2019) is beginning to address the issue.  
Blockchain is usually defined in the literature either as a platform (De Filippi and Wright, 2018: 
chapter 1; Glaser et al., 2019; Mattila and Seppӓlӓ, 2018; Perreira et al, 2019), or as an infrastructure 
(De Filippi and Wright, 2018: chapter 2; Finck, 2019: 11). The confusion might reflect the shift in 
attention from the original bitcoin use case, which tend to understand blockchain as an 
infrastructure as also originally envisioned (Nakamoto, 2008), to the rise of the new Ethereum-based 
use cases supported by general-purpose networks such as Hyperledger or Corda, which are often 
referred to as “platforms” (Lacity, 2018). But no work has so far attempted to define blockchain 
theoretically in function of the concepts of digital platform and infrastructure, and through this 
derive its necessary and sufficient characteristics in an analytical manner. Such a study of the 
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fundamental characteristics of digital platforms and infrastructures, through the case of blockchain, 
will also in turn enable a theoretical discussion of the degree of de/centralization of a given 
blockchain in terms of the infrastructural and platform aspects of a digital network.  
3.2 Defining the Access and Use Dimensions    
Even though platforms and infrastructures are two very different concepts, the two share some 
common traits. This makes it possible to identify some fundamental dimensions for the analysis of 
any digital network. The literature has recognised that both platforms and infrastructures have a 
dual nature and can be understood along two different dimensions: the one of access defining the 
scale of actors that can participate or interconnect to the network, and the one of use defining the 
scope of functionalities, services or purposes allowed by the network.    
3.2.1 Infrastructure Access and Use  
Digital infrastructure25 studies has long recognised the dual role of infrastructures. On the one hand, 
their primary role is to ensure interconnection among heterogeneous and diverse actors that are 
geographically dispersed and experience localised and situated needs. On the other hand, 
infrastructures also require standardized and customised rules of use in order to ensure inter-
operability among localised and heterogeneous actors. The presence of universal rules defining and 
regulating the way in which the various actors accessing, and interconnecting to the network can use 
and operate the infrastructure itself is a necessary condition in order to guarantee the coherence, 
consistency and integrity of the system. The dual role of digital infrastructures unveils their dual 
nature, which gives rise to various paradoxes of digital infrastructures (Tilson et al., 2010; Lyytinen et 
al, 2018), as highlighted by the information system literature  
Thus, Star and Ruleder (1996) discuss the tension between local and global concerns emerging from 
the duality between dispersed system access and centrally designed standards of use. Hanseth and 
colleagues (1996) explore the tension between interconnection of dispersed actors and the need to 
standardise the patterns of use of the infrastructure. Rolland and Monteiro (2002) inquire the 
tensions emerging between local adoption and use of infrastructures by actors operating in local 
contexts and the need for global and standardised control over the rules of use. Edwards et al (2007 
and 2009) highlight how any infrastructure grow and expand first by incorporating heterogeneous 
components through interconnection, access and participation of new users, and subsequently by 
developing common standards regulating the nature of services and uses that can be shared and 
transacted by the heterogonous users. Similarly, Tilson and colleagues (2010) note that the 
impossibility to confine infrastructures to specific functions or predefined nodes fosters the 
paradoxes of change and control. In the same vain, Costantinides and Berrett (2015) highlight how 
infrastructures are at the same time integrators of dispersed and heterogeneous information spaces 
(bottom-up), but at the same time require clear design rules governing their collective and shared 
use (top-down). Rodon and Hanseth (2015) and Bygstad and Hanseth (2016) summarise the dual 
nature distinguishing between the architecture of an infrastructure shaping interconnection and its 
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 We will, for the purpose of the arguments in this report, assume that the concept of a “digital infrastructure” 
can be treated in similar terms as an “information infrastructure”. While early works (for example; Gray, 1996; 
Hanseth & Monteiro 1997; Kahin, 1998) used the latter, contemporary work is increasingly based on the 
former concept (such as: Tilson et al, 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013).   
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governance, which deals with the behavioural rules defining control and coordination of the 
activities undertaken over the infrastructure.  
In sum, the aspects of access in the digital infrastructure literature characterises the inherent role of 
infrastructures in interconnecting heterogeneous actors over space, while the dimension of use 
denotes the inherent neutrality and convergence of digital infrastructures, which can be employed 
and allocated across a variety of uses, functionalities, services or purposes. The literature usually 
complements this picture by highlighting the problems and difficulties emerging from the growth 
and change of digital infrastructures over time along both dimensions of use and access (Bygstad 
and Hanseth 2016; Bowker et al 2010; Ciborra et al., 2000; Edwards et al. 2009; Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2004; Monteiro et al 2013; Tilson et al., 2010). The introduction of time completes the 
picture by generating a three-dimensional framework for the study of digital infrastructures: over 
scale or space (access or interconnection), over scope or functions (use), and their evolution over 
time (change in both dimensions) (see also Bharadwaj et al., 2013). 
3.2.2 Platform Access and Use  
Similarly to the literature on digital infrastructures, the platform literature has also studied and 
analysed the platform concept along the two independent dimensions of access and use, even 
though it adopts a slightly different terminology and conceptual framing. In this case the interplay 
between access and use is usually framed in terms of the dichotomy between governance and 
architecture, or through the tension between value creation and value capture, which closely 
reflects the infrastructures’ paradox of control (Ciborra et al., 2000; Tilson et al., 2010). On the one 
hand platform owners should open the platform to as many actors as possible, thus maximizing the 
adoption of the platform and the number of users able to access the platform and the number 
applications supported by it. Openness to interconnection (architecture) and participation 
maximizes value creation. On the other hand, platform owners are only able to capture some value 
by setting clear rules defining the way in which the platform can be used and how the various 
modules can interconnect and interoperate (governance) (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016).  
The tension between access and use has been reframed in various ways by the platform and 
managerial literature. Gawer and Henderson (2007) highlight the dichotomy between control of the 
ecosystem architecture and free entry to maximise the ecosystem reach. In their definitions of 
platforms, both Baldwin and Woodward (2009) and Gawer (2009b) highlight the tension between 
the need to control the core and the interfaces in order to ensure stability and predictability over 
the way in which the platform can be used, and the need to open the platform to third parties’ 
components and complements in order to pursue variety and variability.  The same tension between 
access and control is also discussed by Eisenmann et al (2009) in relation to the two dimensions of 
openness: openness as interconnection, interoperability and compatibility with other systems, and 
openness in terms of the scope of exclusive functionalities and services supported by the platform. 
This same interpretation of the duality is also discussed in Benlian et al. (2015). Boudreau (2010 and 
2012) distinguishes between two types of openness of a platform: openness deriving from granting 
access to it (permission to use it), and openness deriving from devolving control over how the 
platform should be used (definition of its functionalities). The same tension between access and 
interconnection and control over use is highlighted by the IS literature in Gulati et al. (2012), 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013), Eaton et al. (2015), and Tiwana (2015). Finally, Tiwana et al. 
(2010) employ the same distinction adopted by the digital infrastructure literature, distinguishing 
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between architecture (interconnection) and governance (rules of use), while De Reuver et al., (2018) 
note that the same paradoxes of control and adaptability characterising digital infrastructures also 
apply to digital platforms.   
In sum, the standardization and openness of interfaces ensuring the modularity and the wide 
adoption of the platform among a variety of actors can be applied and understood along two 
different dimensions. On the one hand, the platform can be open to other ecosystems, meaning that 
it ensures interconnection and interoperability across different ecosystem; in this case, the platform 
can be accessed by a multitude of users, meaning that the wide adoption of the platform is a 
function of the dimension of access — it is integratable (Kazan et al, 2018). Eisenmann et al (2009) 
and Benlian et al. (2015) define this as the “horizontal dimension” of openness (and modularity). On 
the other hand, the platform’s modular interfaces can be open to a variety of functions or services 
provided by third parties’ components and complements. In this case, the modularity brought about 
by standardised interfaces ensures an augmented set of functionalities and uses available to the 
platform’s users — the platform is integrative (Kazan et al, 2018).  The platform’s adoption is in this 
case a function of the dimension of use (rules defining control over its functionalities and services). 
In the words of Eisenmann et al (2009) and Benlian et al. (2015) this is the “vertical dimension” of 
openness (and modularity). 
3.2.3 Platforms and Infrastructure Duality  
The dual nature of digital platforms and infrastructures retraces their dual role within a network, as 
commonly highlighted in the academic literature. For instance, Gawer (2014) distinguishes between 
the economic approach and the engineering approach to platforms. The former interprets platforms 
as central intermediaries providing interconnection and coordination capabilities to independent 
actors operating on different sides of a market place. Cusumano et al (2019) define these types of 
platforms as “transaction platforms”. The engineering approach latter is closer to the digital 
approach to platforms, which interprets a platform as a core building block providing an essential 
functionality to a variety of other modules and components, thus acting as a common foundation for 
many other additional services and uses (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; de Reuver et al., 2018; 
Gawer, 2009b; Tiwana et al., 2010). Platforms defined along the vertical dimension of use have 
recently been called “innovation platforms” by Cusumano and colleagues (2019).  
The same holds for infrastructures as they fulfil both roles of interconnection tools among otherwise 
independent actors, and of general purpose or neutral tools for the flexible accommodation of 
unforeseen and diverse services or uses among actors having heterogeneous and evolving needs 
(Edwards et al 2009; Hanseth et al., 1996; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2004; Tilson et al 2010; Zittrain, 
2008).  
The dual nature and role of digital platforms and infrastructures implies that the concepts of 
modularity, standards and interfaces can also be intended along either dimension: as a way to 
enable seamless interconnection of heterogeneous modules and components along the horizontal 
dimension of access, and as a way to enable the implementation of heterogeneous services over a 
set of different physical supports. Modularity and interfaces along the vertical dimension constitute 
the layered stack of digital technologies (Fransman, 2010; van Schewick, 2010; Yoo et al., 2010; 
Zittrain, 2008).  
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The dual nature of digital platforms and infrastructures retraces a well-known argument developed 
in various fields, from the philosophical and sociological literature on institutions (Searle, 1969) and 
law (Smith, to information systems to science and technology studies (STS): any artefact can be 
employed in a variety of uses depending on who employ (access) them. This duality is especially 
prominent in the case of digital artefacts (Kallinikos et al., 2013). The dual nature of digital platforms 
and infrastructures emerges from a loose coupling between access and use.  The definition of who is 
able to employ the artefact is not informative of the way in which the same artefact will be used by 
those that are able to access it. Equally, vice versa, the definition of the way in which an artefact 
shall be used does not necessarily defines who will be able to do so (access it).  
While the literature tends to associate the horizontal (access or interconnection) dimension of a 
digital network to its infrastructural nature (infrastructures interconnect), and to link the vertical 
dimension of use to the modular nature of a platform (Alaimo et al., forthcoming; Costantinides et 
al., 2018; Flew, 2019; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010), this approach does not acknowledge the fact that 
both platforms and infrastructures have a dual nature and fulfil a dual role. Although our purpose in 
this paper is not to provide analytical criteria to distinguish the concept of platform form the one of 
infrastructure, we nevertheless remark that digital platforms and infrastructures both interconnect 
and coordinate independent actors (access), and both represent an underlying common support or 
functionality for the organization or transmission of data and can be devoted to a variety of uses by 
the part of the different interconnected actors for the provision of a variety of services and 
applications.  
For this reason, although we do not make any claim on the matter, we suggest that the difference 
between digital platforms and digital infrastructures might lie in the different way in which 
interdependencies along the two dimensions of access and use shape the nature and behaviour of 
digital networks.   
3.3 A De/centralization Framework  
From the previous discussion, it emerges that any digital network can be studied along two 
dimensions: the dimension of access and interconnection (space) and the dimension of use — can 
alternatively be characterised in terms of service, purpose, or functionality. Both platforms and 
infrastructures can be understood and studied along either dimension. Access defines the inherent 
capability of both platforms and infrastructures to interconnect different actors who would 
otherwise be independent, and to transform independencies into interdependencies among these 
actors. Use defines the inherent capability of both digital platforms and infrastructures to support a 
variety of applications and services and to be used for a variety of functionalities and purposes. This 
capability of a digital artefact to be employed across a multiplicity of uses is sometime intended as 
neutrality, other times it is referred to as its generativity (Zittrain, 2006; 2008) or reprogrammability 
(Kallinikos et al., 2013; Yoo, 2013; Yoo et al., 2010 and 2012) whenever these new uses emerge ex-
post and were not necessarily predefined or conceived ex-ante, when the network was originally 
deployed. In the case of generativity and reprogrammability the vertical dimension of use is 
inextricably linked to the temporal dimension.  
Given the dual nature of both platforms and infrastructures, it is possible to understand the 
de/centralization of a digital network by looking at the a/symmetric interdependencies emerging 
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along the two dimensions. Based on the definition of vertical and horizontal dimension, each 
dimension is characterised by the interdependencies between two different elements.  
The horizontal dimension is characterised by a plurality of social actors willing to interact with others 
by accessing the physical network and interconnecting to it. The latter can be intended as the sum of 
the underlying physical and logical elements enabling and supporting these interactions. The two key 
elements of the horizontal dimension are therefore the set of actors of a social community willing to 
access the networked community and interact with each other, and the set of elements constituting 
the physical network and enabling these interactions, or “network topology”. The network topology 
includes both the way in which the elements are spatially located, organised and physically 
interconnected to one another (the architectural dimension), and the rules defining the way in 
which the various elements can interact, interconnection is established, and the way communication 
can flow between them (logical dimension). The logical dimension is usually taken care by 
transmission and communication protocols, standards and communication interfaces. In other 
words, the network topology represents what has been previously defined as the technological 
dimension of a network, while the interactions among the various members of the social community 
define the social, or inter-personal, dimension of the networked system.  
The vertical dimension is characterised by a plurality of services or functionalities conveyed, 
supported and delivered by the physical network to its various nodes through the transmission of 
data (and ultimately enjoyed and consumed by the various members of the interconnected 
community). The two key elements of the vertical dimension are therefore the set of data 
transmitted and supported by the physical network, and the set of rules and components of the 
physical network supporting and enabling the transmission of these data or, once again, the 
“network topology” (architectural and logical). Data, on the other hand, constitutes the symbolic 
dimension: as digital data is neutral, homogeneous and ontologically amorphous (Kallinikos et al., 
2013; Yoo et al., 2010), their nature, valence and meaning depends on the specific symbolic 
framework adopted to interpret it and translated it into services, applications, and useful 
functionalities for those who employ and use them.  
Horizontal and vertical dimensions can then be decomposed into their three core elements: 1) the 
social community, 2) the digital network (architectural and logical topology), and 3) the digital data. 
Each dimension characterises the interactions and interdependencies between a pair of elements. 
The horizontal dimension (access) can be understood as the locus of the dynamic interactions and 
interdependencies emerging between the members of the social community (SC) and the network, 
while the vertical dimension (use) becomes the locus of the dynamic interactions and 
interdependencies occurring between the network and the data exchanged and transmitted on it. 
These data are employed in order to provide useful service or applications that will be eventually 
used, consumed, and enjoyed by the various members of the social community interconnected to 
the network. This last linkage closes the circle of interdependencies between social community, 
network technology, and, data, even though it does not belong to anyone of the two dimensions.  
The same framework can be better understood by decomposing the technological dimension (NT to 
be intended as network technology, or network topology) into its architectural component A, and its 
logical component L. The network architecture A represents the physical organization of the network, 
while the logic L represents the protocol rules regulating the behaviour of the network and its 
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components, such as the rules defining the way in which the signal is transmitted or defining how 
communication and interconnection between the elements is established. In a general protocol suite, 
A would correspond to the physical (maybe link) layer, while L to the internet (network) and 
transport layers (see Tanenbaum and Wetherall, 2011). 
In this case the vertical dimension comprises the three basic elements of the digital layered stack, 
the physical layer, the transmission protocol layers (TCP and IP protocols of the internet and network 
layers), and the data or application layer (D) (Fransman, 2010; Tanenbaum and Wetherall, 2011: van 
Schewick, 2010; Yoo et al., 2010), while access and interconnection along the horizontal dimension 
depend on both the physical architecture of the network and its logic. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: A topological overview of the conceptual model of inter-dependencies between Data (D), Network 
Technology (NT), and Social Community (SC) across the dimensions of Access and Use in digital networks. 
These dynamic interactions and interdependencies between pairs of elements are also dynamic 
interactions and interdependencies between pairs of ontological and analytical dimensions. While 
the horizontal dimension of access links the technological dimension of the network to the social 
dimensions of the social community, the vertical dimension includes the interactions between the 
technological dimension of the network technology and the symbolic dimension of (digital) data. 
This reveals two different types of dimensions playing a role in the analysis of digital platforms and 
infrastructures. There are dimensions of first-order (fundamental dimensions) that are characterised 
by the interactions and interdependencies among homogeneous elements (components or actors) 
within a single institutional layer or ontological domain. Second-order dimensions (super-dimensions) 
are characterised by the dynamic interactions and interdependencies occurring between first-order 
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dimensions — thus across heterogeneous institutional layers and ontological domains. This is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 4.2 below. 
The decomposition of the two dimensions of platforms and infrastructures into its four core 
elements shows that digital platforms and infrastructures are composed of four fundamental 
dimensions, which we from now on will group into three as we consider the physical network 
architecture (A) and network logic (L) of the network technology as one theoretical category — 
Network Technology (NT). The technological dimension captures the interdependencies between 
interacting technological components from both an architectural and logical perspective. The 
symbolic dimension of the data layer covers the symbolic interactions and interdependencies among 
different types of data and information signals. The social or interpersonal dimension is itself a socio-
political system that includes the relationships, interactions and interdependencies between various 
actors and individuals. Each of the three fundamental dimensions is characterised by a certain 
degree of a/symmetric interdependencies among its homogeneous elements.  
At the same time, the acknowledgement of the dual nature of digital platforms and infrastructures 
shows that these three fundamental dimensions are linked to each other and interact along the 
super-dimensions of access and use.   
The decomposition of digital platforms and infrastructures into first-order dimensions (defining their 
fundamental building blocks) and second-order dimensions (defining the two axes along which these 
fundamental building blocks are linked) shows that interdependencies in digital networks occur at 
two different levels. Exactly for this reason they have a dual meaning: interdependencies among 
homogeneous elements within a given dimension, and interdependencies among heterogeneous 
dimensions along the dimensions of access and use. Consistent with the terminology adopted before, 
we name these first-order and second-order interdependencies. Both first- and second-order 
dimensions are systems of interacting elements; they are just defined at two different analytical 
levels of aggregation.  
For this reason, while each of the basic building blocks of any digital network can be defined as a 
first-order system, a digital platform or a digital infrastructure can be regarded as a second-order 
system, or a system of systems.  The fundamental characteristic of a secondary system is that 
interactions and interdependencies occur across institutional layers and have to be defined across 
ontological domains. For this reason, second-order systems are also multi-dimensional. For instance, 
the definition of infrastructures as socio-technical systems (Edwards et al, 2007; Henfridsson and 
Bygstad 2013; Karasti et al, 2010; Star and Ruhleder, 1996) makes the multidimensional nature of 
infrastructures explicit deriving from the interactions between the social and the technical 
dimensions. We illustrate this in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.2: Topological illustration of the dual nature of digital platforms and infrastructures along the three 
fundamental dimensions along the super-dimensions of access and use. 
Accordingly, it is possible to define de/centralization at two different analytical levels: at the first-
order level and at the second-order level. The latter builds on the former, but plays a very different 
role in understanding de/centralization in digital networks.  
De/centralization at the level of the single dimension (first order) emerges as the result of 
a/symmetric interdependencies among the homogeneous components belonging to that dimension. 
The analysis of de/centralization at this level considers each dimension (the analytical and 
ontological locus) separately and independently from the others — as an insulated and autonomous 
system. For this reason, the nature of the interactions and interdependencies among the elements 
within each dimension are taken as given. The interactions are exogenous characteristics of the 
single dimension that are merely verified and described. In order to explain de/centralization at the 
systemic level (second order), it is fundamental to understand how first-order interdependencies 
among elements in one dimension both affect and are affected by the first-order interdependencies 
among elements in other first-order dimensions.  
De/centralization in second-order systems emerges as interdependencies of interdependencies. 
These interdependencies of second-order characterise the way in which interdependencies of first 
order within one ontological domain are interdependent on the interdependencies of first order 
among the components within another ontological dimension.  
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Figure 4.3: An illustration of the distinction between first order and second order systems.  
Differently from the case of first-order systems, the concept of decentralization in the case of digital 
networks does not characterise the particular state of a dimension, nor a mere sum of states of the 
different independent dimensions, but the peculiar way in which various dimensions of a system 
interact among themselves and influence each other’s states and behaviours. While the study of 
first-order interdependencies provides a snapshot of the relationship of dependence for each 
dimension, the study of dependencies across dimensions provides a perspective on the temporal and 
logical causality of the interdependencies by showing how the degree of a/symmetric 
interdependencies in one dimension depends on the extent of a/symmetric interdependencies in 
other dimensions, and vice versa. Stated differently, second-order levels define the way in which 
relationships of dependence among elements within each first-order dimension are in turn shaped 
by the relationships of dependence across first-order dimensions.  
For this reason, an analysis of second-level interdependencies is the only way to endogenously 
derive the degree of de/centralization in each first-order dimension as a function of the degree of 
de/centralization in the other first-order dimensions it interacts with. It is, precisely, an analysis of 
de/centralization of second order that recognises the interdependencies are themselves the 
outcome of higher-level interdependencies.  
We argue that when dealing with multidimensional systems such as digital platforms and 
infrastructures, interactions at all levels must be considered. Any digital network (no matter whether 
it is intended as a platform or an infrastructure) is a multi-dimensional system (a system of systems) 
composed of three fundamental dimensions of first order (defining the four core elements of data 
(D), social community (SC), and the network architecture (A), and logical architecture (L) from Figure 
4.1) dynamically interacting along the two dimensions of access and use. As digital platforms and 
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digital infrastructures are multidimensional concepts, the concept of de/centralization also becomes 
multidimensional, as also remarked by other authors (for example; Schneider, 2003; 2019).  
As a result, once the single elements are characterised, the nature of any digital network (including 
its degree of de/centralization) can only be understood by looking at the nature of the 
interdependencies between these elements across disciplinary fields and ontological dimensions. 
Treating the degree of de/centralization of a digital network as a mere sum of independent 
dimensions or elements might not generate the appropriate understanding of the degree of 
de/centralization in digital networks.  
3.4 De/centralization in Digital Networks  
3.4.1 First-Order Interdependencies  
The extent of de/centralization of each fundamental dimension defines the extent to which the 
nature or state of one element depends on the nature or state of others. At this level, 
de/centralization for each dimension can be defined as the extent to which the state, nature or role 
of any element of that primary dimension is dependent on the states, natures or role of other 
elements in that same dimension for given interdependencies occurring in the other two dimensions. 
In other words, at the primary level the degree of de/centralization in each dimension is defined as a 
feature of the dimension itself, independently from what is happening in the other dimensions.     
a. First order dimension 1: Technological de/centralization 
A digital network might be more or less centralized from a technological point of view if the ability of 
a network element to fulfil its role within the network and to perform its expected functions depend, 
in a more or less a/symmetric fashion, on other elements performing their functions and fulfilling 
their roles. The study of interdependencies characterising the network topology adopts a 
technological approach to de/centralization whenever the interdependencies among the elements 
of the network are understood and evaluated adopting a normative framework that relies on 
technological interpretative categories.  
De/centralization from an architectural point of view is defined by looking at the nature of 
interdependencies among elements that emerge as a result of the way in which components are 
spatially arranged and organized. Asymmetries are present whenever the ability of a component to 
perform its functions depends on its location within the network and on its interconnection with 
other specific components. Whenever the ability of a network component to perform its functions is 
independent from the way in which the network is designed, or whenever there is mutual 
interdependence among the various components, interdependencies are symmetric from an 
architectural point of view. As already remarked, the architectural approach to de/centralization 
emerged in computer science (Baran, 1964), and then spread to a multiplicity of other fields, 
especially the one developing network analysis. The presence of a hub-and-spoke architecture based 
on a central intermediary is a straightforward example of architectural asymmetries as the ability of 
any peripheral component to fulfil its role within the network depends on the state or the behaviour 
of the hub. A distributed network where all components can communicate in equal measure with 
every other component (full redundancy) characterises a perfectly symmetric situation.  
On the other hand, from a logical perspective, technological centralization occur whenever there are 
asymmetries in the way in which communication is transmitted or, in other words, in the respective 
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roles that different nodes have in running the protocol or routing the information. More generally, 
any decentralized architecture can become logically centralized whenever there are asymmetric 
roles and capabilities among the network elements. A client-server design is a centralized solution 
from a logical point of view as different nodes perform different roles within the network. Peer-to-
peer networks are logically decentralized as they require the equality of all nodes with respect to the 
way in which the content can be transmitted, but they do not necessarily need to be architecturally 
decentralized (Agre, 2003).  
b. First order dimension 2: symbolic de/centralization 
Data belongs to the symbolic sphere. The study of the asymmetries emerging between data might 
follow a variety of normative and interpretative approaches (social, economic, legal, political) 
depending on the specific perspective adopted to evaluate and treat these data. The data can be 
endowed with a social valence (they might be evaluated based on their contextual utility and 
benefits deriving from the use or consumption of the service generated), economic value (data 
evaluated based on their monetary value in exchange), legal valence (data having value as property, 
as in the case of privacy), or even political value (data used to influence opinions and shape public 
discourse).  
De/centralization in the symbolic dimension can be understood by looking at their symbolic 
interdependencies, which we define as the degree in which the meaning, value, and nature acquired 
by a digital data within a broader communication conveyed by the network depends on the meaning, 
value, and nature acquired by other data, and vice versa. Data are interdependent whenever 
different data have different value, nature, and meaning —when they have to be organised and 
managed in an ordered and coherent way based on their different contribution to the meaning and 
value of the final outcome to be provided (service or application). This generates rankings, priorities, 
or discrimination among different data. This interdependence can be symmetric whenever changing 
the symbolic meaning and nature of any data corrupts the overall meaning of the final outcome, 
thus affecting the meaning of all other data involved and vice versa. Asymmetries among data 
emerge whenever the knowledge of the symbolic meaning or value of one data is necessary in order 
to make sense of other data, but the former is not affected by a corruption of, or a change in, the 
meanings of the latter. In this case the meaning and value acquired by some data depend on the 
nature of some specific data. In this situation the independence between data emerges whenever 
the symbolic meaning acquired by a data becomes irrelevant for another one — the meaning of the 
latter does not depend on the value of the former and vice versa.  
Asymmetric interdependencies among data might generate centralization as the meaning of some 
data can only be known, interpreted, or accessed by few actors. Whenever communications have to 
be encrypted or codified, the symbolic dimension of data is certainly characterised by strong 
interdependencies as it is necessary to know the value or meaning of some data to decrypt the 
whole message and retrieve the meanings and values of all other data. Asymmetries in these 
interdependencies among data signals generate centralization at the symbolic level. Problems linked 
to the private treatment of data, profiling, and identification of the underlying meanings and values 
of certain digital data generated online (usually addressed through encryption) are all linked to the 
degree of de/centralization of the symbolic dimension.  
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More generally, whenever the symbolic dimension manifests interdependencies, there is a need to 
agree on some shared rules of communication defining meanings, nature, and value of data (how 
data should be interpreted, treated and understood). De/centralization in this case emerges from 
the emergence of some form of control in the way in which data is organised and the message is 
transmitted. This is evident when data can assume different nature: different patterns of 
interdependencies are generated by different types of data and this might require different rules for 
the organization of the transmission of this data. A straightforward example might be the transition 
from the “best effort” approach in data transmission of the original internet when only 
“downloadable” content had to be transmitted, to the transmission of media content or financial 
data, where a certain degree of organization of the message becomes fundamental. In the first case, 
whenever all data can be treated as pure content to be downloaded, such as in the case of a web 
page on the internet or an email, digital data can be treated as homogeneous and substantially 
symbolically independent from each other. In the second case, whenever data represents financial 
rights or economic value, their degree of interdependence is definitely higher as the value and 
meaning of one might depend on the value assumed by another one. When the nature and value of 
a data are strongly interdependent on others, jitter, latency, and errors in the order or transmission 
might all be fundamental network problems corrupting the meaning and value of the overall 
transmission. Temporal interdependence in this case plays a fundamental role, while it does not in 
the case of pure content. 
c. First order dimension 3: social de/centralization 
Finally, a digital network might be more or less centralized depending on the nature of the 
interdependencies characterising its social dimension. Similar to the definition given for the other 
two dimensions, de/centralization in this case can be defined as the extent to which the role played 
by a member of the community when accessing or using the network depends on the decisions or 
actions of other actors of the social community and vice versa.  
Similar to the case of the symbolic dimension, the asymmetries emerging among the members of a 
social community can be analysed and understood adopting a variety of perspectives, depending on 
the nature of the factors that generate inequalities and asymmetries among the members accessing 
and using the network. Inequalities might be purely geographic whenever the ability of some 
member to access and use the network depends on their location vis-à-vis others. Inequalities might 
have a legal origin due to different rights to access or use the network. Alternatively, asymmetries 
can have a socio-economic or cultural nature as different actors might have different needs, 
capabilities or reasons for using the network. In this case, inequalities among members derive from 
the fact that some might derive greater benefits than others from accessing and using it, or from the 
fact that some members depend on others in order to enjoy the services and benefits provided by 
the network. Finally, asymmetries in accessing the network might be interpreted through a political 
lens, as in the case of concepts as the ones of universal service, public service, essential facility, 
privacy, and so on.  In this case, interdependencies among members have a legal origin. Table 4.1 
summarizes de/centralization in interdependencies across the three dimensions. 
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First-order 
dimension 
Unit of analysis 
(element)  
Interpretative approach 
adopted 
Definition of de/centralization 
Technology  Network 
Technology (NT)  
Architectural (A) Technological interdependencies:  
The extent to which the ability of a network 
element to fulfil its role within the network and to 
perform its expected functions depend, in a more 
or less a/symmetric fashion, on other elements 
performing their functions and fulfilling their 
roles, and vice versa. 
Logical (L) 
Symbol Digital Data (D) Political / economic / legal / 
cultural 
(depending on the normative 
framework adopted to 
conceptualise the nature of 
data as fundamental 
informational elements of a 
symbolic system)   
Symbolic interdependencies:  
The extent to which the meaning, value and 
nature acquired by a digital data within a broader 
symbolic information transmission conveyed by 
the network depends on the meaning, value and 
nature acquired by other data, and vice versa. 
Social Members of the 
social community 
(SC) 
Political / economic / legal / 
cultural / spatial 
(depending on the normative 
framework adopted to 
conceptualise the nature of 
actors as fundamental 
members of a social 
community)   
Social interdependencies:  
The extent to which the role played by a member 
of the community when accessing or using the 
network depends, in a more or less a/symmetric 
fashion,  on the decisions or actions of other 
actors of the social community and vice versa. 
Table 4.1: A summery of de-centralization across the network technology, symbolic, and social dimensions. 
 
3.4.2 Access and Use Interdependencies 
The study of first-order dimension interdependencies is necessary but not sufficient to understand 
de/centralization of digital networks as such analysis provides a snapshot of the current states of 
each dimension, independently from each other. As a result, inter-dimensional dependencies are 
ruled out or ignored. This mono-dimensional approach to de/centralization is the one adopted by 
the overwhelming majority of the literature in the study of de/centralization in digital networks (and 
blockchain): de/centralization is treated as a sum of the characteristics of a set of independent 
dimensions. For this reason, this also implies a static, or exogenous, approach to institutions.  
The understanding of first-order interdependencies is, however, a necessary precondition in order to 
have a full characterization of de/centralization in digital networks. It is first necessary to understand 
what defines de/centralization at the level of the single dimensions in order to be able to define 
de/centralization at the second-order level. This can be defined as follows: the extent to which the 
degree of asymmetric interdependencies in one first-order dimension is interdependent (in a more or 
less symmetric fashion) on the degree of asymmetric interdependencies in other first-order 
dimensions, and vice versa. This is a definition of interdependencies of interdependencies (second-
order interdependencies) that defines de/centralization of a system as the ability of a fundamental 
dimension to influence and affect other dimensions’ characteristics, and vice versa.  
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Figure 4.4 (identical to Figure 4.1 and included for easy reference): A topological overview of the conceptual model of 
inter-dependencies between Data (D), Network Technology (NT), and Social Community (SC) across the dimensions of 
Access and Use in digital networks. 
A fundamental difference between first-order interdependencies and second-order 
interdependencies derives from their different temporal nature: first-order de/centralization 
characterise a-temporal (static) interdependencies in force in a certain dimension, while second-
order de/centralization reveals the causal (temporal) relationships behind first-order 
interdependencies. Symmetric interdependencies (mutual dependence) between two primary 
dimensions reveal a situation of endogenous (reciprocal) change between the two. Asymmetric 
interdependencies (relationships of dependence) denote a situation where asymmetries in one 
dimension are causally shaping and driving asymmetries in other dimensions — independence 
characterises a situation of no causality. For this reason, the study of how different dimensions of a 
complex system endogenously interact and influence each other’s states and characteristics is also a 
theory of endogenous institutional change, understood as an endogenous and dynamic interplay 
between different institutional planes (Abdelnour et al., 2017). 
The intuition here is that a/symmetries in one dimension do not merely affect the way in which the 
elements of that specific dimension interact, but they also have “spillover effects” in other 
dimensions. They are also affecting interdependencies among the elements of these other 
dimensions. For this reason, a mere analysis of de/centralization within single dimensions might be a 
partial one, providing a distorted understanding of the extent of de/centralization of a digital 
network. 
Based on our definition of de/centralization as a/symmetric interdependencies, it is possible to 
analyse the role played by both the platform and the infrastructural nature of digital networks by 
looking at the a/symmetries emerging along both dimensions of access and use.  
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a. Socio-Technical interdependencies in digital networks: de/centralization along the 
horizontal dimension of access  
The horizontal dimension (see Figure 4.4) can be defined as the set of interactions between the 
members of the social community (SC) and the technological dimension of the network broadly 
defined (NT). The interdependencies occurring along the NT-SC linkage capture the way in which the 
nature and characteristics of a social community shape the nature and characteristics of the network 
topology (SC  NT) and, vice versa, how the nature and characteristics of the network in turn affect 
and shape the nature and characteristics of the social community (NT  SC). This second-order 
interdependence captures the fact that the nature of interdependencies among the actors of the 
social community might depend on the specific interdependencies in force between the elements of 
the network and, vice versa, the latter might be the result of the former.  
Interdependencies between the social and the technological dimension can be symmetric, 
asymmetric or inexistent, depending on the causality of interaction. On the one hand, these 
interdependencies emerge because the way in which the social community is spatially organized and 
geographically dispersed affects, and is affected by, the physical organization and location of the 
network’s elements (SC  A). On the other hand, interdependencies arise because the way in which 
signals and communication is transmitted online affects, and is affected by, the patterns of 
communication and interaction among the actors of the social community offline (SC  L). While 
the social community-physical layer (SC  A) relationship mainly captures spatial (static) 
interdependencies in access, the social community-logical layer (SC  L) relationship mainly 
captures dynamic interdependencies between the way in which interactions are organised and 
conducted offline (among the members of the social community) and the way in which interactions 
are organised and conducted online (among the nodes and components of the physical network). 
For blockchain, the dynamic interdependencies emerging between the logical dimension of network 
topology (P) and the social dimension of the social community (SC) is usually framed as the interplay 
between “code as law” (L  SC) and “code of law” (SC  L) or, similarly, between “code is law” and 
“law is code” (De Filippi and Hassan, 2018; Yeung, 2019). 
Centralization along the horizontal dimension emerges whenever these interdependencies between 
the social community and the network topology are asymmetric. Asymmetries in this case emerge 
whenever the interdependencies within one dimension is causally dependent (determined) by the 
specific nature of interdependencies in force in the other dimension (and vice versa). These 
asymmetries can of course be of different nature, have different origins and come in different forms 
along the architectural, logical, political dimension. The next section will engage in an in-depth 
analysis of how de/centralization in blockchain arrangements can be characterized in terms of these 
dimensions.  
Second-order centralization along the horizontal dimension can be architectural or structural (A  
SC). In this respect, centralization emerges whenever the dependence of a member of the social 
community on other members in order to access, interconnect and use the network depends on the 
specific architectural dependencies shaping the spatial organization of the elements of the network. 
This is the typical case of path dependency of a digital infrastructure (Arthur, 1989), where the 
ability of a member to access, interact or interconnect to the given network depends on the pre-
existing peculiar relationship between the nodes of the network. Alternatively, the causality can 
work the other way around, whenever asymmetries in the social dimension generate asymmetries in 
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the architecture of the network (SC  A): centralization along the horizontal dimension emerges 
whenever the chosen architectural configuration of the network depends on the specific way in 
which the members of the social community can interact. This is the case of a local network where a 
specific configuration or characteristic of the network becomes preferred to others depending on 
where the actor willing to access and use the network is located.  
The same considerations hold for the logical dimension of the network. Asymmetries emerging 
because the different social roles, status, or identities among the various actors of the social 
community can determine the protocol rules defining the way in which the various elements of the 
network can behave, interact, and interconnect (SC  L). In this case, a given socio-political context 
shapes the way in which a network is designed: communication rules online might reflect the 
specific patterns of interactions offline. Alternatively, it is possible to conceive a situation where the 
social status or roles of the members of the social community is determined by the specific logic of 
the network (L  SC). In this case asymmetries emerge among the members of the social 
community because a certain network topology favours a certain kind of actor to the detriment of 
other kinds of actors. This is also a form of technological path dependency: asymmetric 
interdependencies among network’s components shape the interdependencies among the actors of 
the social community. 
In all cases, centralizing tendencies emerge because asymmetries and dependencies among 
elements in one dimension foster and generate asymmetries and dependencies among elements in 
the other dimension. Centralization in this case denotes univocal causality from one dimension to 
the other. On the other hand, decentralization along the horizontal dimension denotes a situation 
where there is no univocal causality form one dimension to the other.  
In the case of symmetric interdependencies, decentralization along the horizontal dimension 
denotes a situation where the specific technological solution emerges as the preferred choice of the 
members of the social community, but does not necessarily reflect or retrace the asymmetries 
characterising the social community. This misalignment between online and offline 
interdependencies enables new interactions and new social interdependencies among the actors of 
the social community. The latter might, in turn, decide to change the network topology. Differently 
form the asymmetric case, the specific network topology in this case does not univocally reflect the 
specific asymmetries of the social community, and interdependencies work both ways: the specific 
network topology can now, in turn, influence future community arrangements.  
As a result, while the network topology depends on the specific dynamics of the social dimension, 
the latter, in turn, also depends on the former in a self-reinforcing cycle. As the asymmetries in one 
dimension are not necessarily consistent with the asymmetries in the other dimension, the 
interdependencies are mutual, and the influence works both way generating an endogenous 
dynamic cycle, which really is the essence of symmetry in interdependencies between two elements 
(SC  NT) along the horizontal dimension. Symmetric interdependencies between the social 
dimension and the technological dimension can be understood as an endogenous coevolution 
between the social community and the network topology.  
This dynamic interaction where the nature of one dimension endogenously affect the nature of the 
other and vice versa can also be intended as a process of institutional change (Abdelnour et al., 
2017). A simple example of endogenous institutional change in the case of symmetric 
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interdependencies between the social and the technological dimension is the one of technological 
innovation, whenever the process guiding the adoption of new technological solutions is neither 
codified nor properly regulated by the current social structure or political process in force in a social 
community. In this case, the solution adopted in terms of network topology might still reflect 
particular interests of the members of the social community, but is also misaligned with the current 
rules regulating the organization of the social community, thus generating new opportunities for 
dynamic change. The definition of standards and new regulatory rules generates new social 
interdependencies, but also requires adaptation and adjustments in the network technology.    
Finally, the case of independence is simply the one developed earlier with respect to first-order 
de/centralization. In this case decentralization along the horizontal dimension denotes a situation 
where the way in which the elements of the network are organised (from an architectural (A) and 
logical (L) standpoint) is irrelevant for the way in which social interactions are arranged among its 
members. This means that the specific technological solution has no effect on the way in which 
these members interact and arrange their social relationships offline, and vice versa. This horizontal 
independence might be understood in two specular ways depending on whether the focus is on the 
independence of the social community from the technological solution or the other way around. It 
can be viewed as a case of technological neutrality (the topology of the digital network is neutral in 
the sense that it does not affect, or have any impact on, the specific socio-political context) or as a 
case of technological determinism (there is an objective technological solution that is unaffected by 
the specific socio-political context). In either case, second-order decentralization along the 
horizontal dimension defines a condition where the technological solution adopted is unaffected by 
the specific way in which the various members of a social community interact or, vice versa, a 
condition where the specific characteristics of the social community are completely unaffected by 
the way in which the various elements of the digital network are organised and designed.   
As this decentralization occurs across elements (it defines second-order decentralization), this does 
not imply that there are no first-order asymmetric interdependencies among the members of the 
social community or among the various components of the digital network. It is possible to define 
independent first-order asymmetric interdependencies. In this case, we define independence to 
underline the situation where the nature of the interdependencies characterizing first-order 
elements is uninformative to define decentralization along the second-order dimension as one is not 
affected by the other and vice versa: second-order decentralization becomes independent from the 
nature of the interdependencies within first-order elements. 
Although it is not clear whether it is possible to conceive a situation where technologies are 
politically neutral, or one where social arrangement operate in a technological vacuum, the 
conditions characterising second-order independencies are precisely the one usually (implicitly) 
assumed by the literature in the study of digital networks. A mono-dimensional approach to 
decentralization that only focusses on a/symmetries of first order can only be justified under the 
assumption that inter-dependencies of second-order across ontological dimensions are inexistent 
(or negligible at least).  
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b. Techno-symbolic interdependencies in digital networks: de/centralization along the vertical 
dimension of use  
The vertical dimension (see Figure 4.4) is defined by the interactions between the network (NT) and 
the data transacted over it (D). In this case, the interdependencies occurring between NT and D 
capture the way in which the nature and characteristics of the network shape the nature and 
characteristics of the data supported and transmitted by it (NT  D) and, vice versa, how the nature 
and characteristics of the data transmitted shape and affect the nature and characteristics of the 
network in turn (D  NT). A specific network topology can be chosen in function of the specific 
nature of data to be transmitted and in function of the type of service or functionality to be provided 
or, vice versa, the communication and transmission of data can change and modify its symbolic 
meaning in function of the specific network topology in force. This second case is especially true in 
the case of digital data, given its amorphous and neutral ontology (Kallinikos et al., 2013; Yoo et al., 
2012).  
Even in this case two sub-types of interdependencies can be identified. Interdependencies between 
NT and D might emerge because the meaning of data depends on the geographical dispersion and 
distribution of the various data and this might affect, and is affected by, the physical organization, 
arrangement and location of the network’s elements (A  D). This interdependence captures the 
way in which the asymmetries in the way in which the network is spatially organised and structured 
affect, and are affected by, the symbolic meaning of data distributed and dispersed offline. In this 
case asymmetries in the dispersion of relevant information might generate symmetries in the way in 
which the network’s elements are arranged and located. The opposite can also be true: the specific 
asymmetries in the architectural topology of the network might affect the way in which data are 
collected and generated, and therefore the overall meaning and significance of the communication 
and information transmitted. The case of symmetric interdependencies defines a situation where 
the symbolic nature of data and the architectural organization of the network’s elements 
dynamically and endogenously coevolve.   
At the same time, interdependencies along the L-D link emerge as the meaning, value and nature of 
different types of data affect, and are affected by, the way in which these data are organized, 
combined and transmitted online among the various nodes of the network. This is the case where 
the symbolic meaning of data depends on the specific protocol rules adopted (L  D). This specific 
interdependence captures many aspects associated to the neutrality and convergence of digital 
networks, due to the fact that the type of transmission protocol can depend, and be dependent on, 
the symbolic nature of the various data transacted.  
The way in which a certain digital network can support different uses, services, or functionality and 
can allow for their implementation and performance can also be characterised by higher or lower 
degrees of asymmetry. Asymmetries in this second case arise whenever the nature of the service or 
functionality that can be supported or provided is more or less dependent on the specific nature or 
characteristics of the underlying physical support network and vice versa. If the nature and 
characteristics of the underlying network favours one use over another one (the nature of the latter 
depends on the nature of the former) or, vice versa, whenever the nature and characteristics of the 
underlying physical network depends on the nature of a specific chosen use, the network manifests 
asymmetries over the dimension of use. Even in this case, asymmetries can emerge for different 
reasons and can have different origins: architectural, logical, economic, and so forth.  
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For instance, a particular configuration of a network (originally devised for the transmission of a 
particular service or set of services) might become outdated or impractical whenever a new, 
different, service is supported by the network. In this case, the specific peculiarities of the different 
uses create symmetries among different network configurations, meaning that the provision of a 
certain service depends on a specific network configuration and vice versa. This is the case of the 
reconfiguration of the open internet from the peer-to-peer transmission of data and information to 
the transmission of digital value through the introduction of centralized intermediaries based on a 
client-service configuration. Alternatively, asymmetries might emerge in the way in which different 
types of services are treated and supported by a given network’s configuration. The introduction of 
deep packet inspection and the breach of the neutrality principle based on the discrimination among 
different services is an example of emerging asymmetries among uses for a given network 
configuration and characteristics. Even in this case, decentralization along the vertical dimension 
denotes either a situation of mutual coevolution between the technological and the symbolic 
dimension, or a situation of independence between the two. The latter is particularly interesting as 
complete independence between data and the underlying network is exemplified by the neutrality 
of the original internet, where the Internet network protocol (the IP protocol) could ensure a 
complete decoupling between the technological layer and the data layer (Zittrain, 2008).   
c. Second-order interdependencies and de/centralization of digital networks: summing up  
The goal of this paper is to theoretically investigate the issue of centralization and decentralization in 
digital platforms and -infrastructures. The purpose is neither to theoretically define platforms and 
infrastructures, nor to provide a comprehensive framework distinguishing digital platforms from 
digital infrastructures. However, what emerges from this discussion is that centralization and 
decentralization are not peculiar and exclusive characteristic of either platforms or infrastructures. 
The dual nature of platforms and infrastructures implies that both platforms and infrastructures can 
be at the same time a source of de/centralization as both centralization and decentralization can 
simultaneously emerge along both dimensions of access and use. We can summarise the present 
discussion in four categories of cases depending on whether asymmetries emerge: 1) along the 
vertical dimension (asymmetries in use); 2) the horizontal dimension (asymmetries in access and 
interconnection); 3) along both dimensions at the same time; or 4) along neither. 
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4 Blockchain as a Digital Network   
The aim of this section is to apply the theoretical framing from the previous section to the case of 
blockchain through relating the extant blockchain literature to our conceptualization of 
de/centralization in digital networks, and discussing how the literature has largely failed to address 
the issue of de/centralization of blockchain arrangements comprehensively. 
4.1 Blockchain Dimensions in the Literature 
Blockchain has been defined in various ways by the current literature. Three main approaches can be 
identified, in line with the three fundamental dimensions of a digital network discussed in the 
previous section. One common approach adopted by the literature is to define blockchain in 
function of its main technological features and characteristics, such as, for example, these five 
aspects: 1) distributed; 2) transparent; 3) anonymous — or in most cases more precisely, 
pseudonymous; 4) tamper-resistant; and 5) peer-to-peer (p2p) nature. Thus, Rodrigues (2018) 
adopts the first four concepts to describe the blockchain, while Reyes (2018) defines blockchains as 
distributed ledger technologies characterised by a distributed architecture with tamper-resistant 
and transparent records. Wright and De Filippi (2015) identify four key features of the blockchain: 1) 
the p2p architecture; 2) the decentralized storage of records; 3) the reliance on cryptographic 
algorithms; and 4) the operation of a decentralized consensus mechanism (see also De Filippi and 
Wright, 2018: chapter 2). Davidson et al. (2018) identify two key characteristics of the blockchain: 
p2p connections and cryptography. These characteristics, the authors argue, enable trust-less 
consensus in order to achieve decentralized consensus. Many other examples can be found in the 
literature, which usually represent a variable combination of the five aforementioned concepts.  
The shortcoming of many of these works is that they fail to distinguish the necessary technological 
conditions that univocally characterize a blockchain network from other superfluous or accessory 
ones. As a result, very often means are confused with ends. The transparent and tamper-resistant 
characteristics of the blockchains are means to achieve an end (the distributed time stamp among all 
nodes) rather than goals in themselves, while anonymity (or pseudonymity) certainly is an “end” of 
the system. It is important to distinguish a necessary property of a blockchain technology from the 
variable and contingent solution adopted in order to guarantee that technological property.  
Other works define blockchain mainly in function its institutional properties, by looking at how 
blockchain can coordinate different social actors, rather than its technological characteristics 
(Davidson et al., 2018). These works mainly focus on either the nature of the consensus protocol, or 
on the nature of the blockchain’s governance mechanisms. Both strands define blockchain in 
function of the characteristics of its decision-making process and of the way in which the 
interactions among the various actors are regulated. While the former mainly look at the formation 
of the decision-making process among nodes on-chain,26 the latter defines blockchain in function of 
the decision-making process occurring among the members of the social community . The concept of 
“decentralization” is used to characterise the on-chain consensus protocol among the network’s 
                                                          
26
 The distinction between on-chain and off-chain basically denotes what data is stored and managed directly 
through the combination of data and network technology along the vertical dimension in Figure 4.4, while off-
chain denotes activities beyond this arrangement, which are organized within a social context, or via socio-
technical arrangements, such as on-line discussion forums, but not directly embedded within the blockchain –
 more on this later in the document. 
47 
 
nodes (De Filippi, 2016; Kwon et al., 2019; Reyes 2016; Tasca et al., 2017; Xu et al 2017; Wright and 
De Filippi 2015), the off-chain decision-making process among the members of the social community 
(Arrunada and Garicano 2018; Azouvi et al, 2018; Dupont, 2018), or both (Abramowicz, 2016; 
DeFilippi and Loveluck 2016; Gervais et al., 2014; Hsieh et al., 2018; Walsh et al 2016).  
When blockchain is defined in function of its “decentralized” consensus mechanism, other problems 
emerge, as already remarked above. The definition of blockchain in function of the term 
“decentralization” is here analytically unverifiable and logically unsustainable. Also, decentralization 
is usually conflated and confused with distribution, even though the two terms have two completely 
distinct meanings characterizing two different aspects of digital networks (Rauchs et al., 2018: 44-45; 
Troncoso et al., 2017). Moreover, the literature often fails to recognize the importance of the 
distinction between on-chain and off-chain consensus and coordination. This confusion is 
particularly evident in the numerous debates on the utility of blockchain that fail to distinguish 
between a productivity approach and a coordination approach to blockchain (Davidson et al., 2018). 
There is still a fundamental confusion in the literature between the adoption of blockchain as: 1) A 
productive technology used by firms as a strategic resource to increase the efficiency and 
productivity of the existing business practices and the speed and reliability of the settlement of 
inter-firm transactions; and 2) blockchain as a socio-institutional technology, which enables new 
ways in which unknown and independent actors can cooperate in the mutual provision and 
consumption of services. Efficient “decentralized” coordination on-chain does not necessarily imply 
decentralized coordination off-chain. 
A third strand of works characterises blockchain by mainly focusing on the characteristics of the data 
transacted and exchanged over the blockchain network and on the nature of the incentives 
generated by the acquisition or access to this data. The works belonging to this third interpretative 
strand highlight the fact that the blockchain should be intended as an “internet of value” (Kewell et 
al., 2017; Swan, 2015; Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017). In this case, the feature that mainly 
distinguishes blockchain from other digital networks is the fact that blockchain allows for digital 
scarcity and therefore for the transaction of economic value and for the enforcement of economic 
incentives (Miscione et al., 2018).  
Many of these works do not adopt a mono-dimensional understanding of blockchain, but adopt a 
multiplicity of perspectives, and define blockchain in function of a combination of different 
characteristics (Abramowicz, 2016; Hsieh et al., 2018; Pereira et al., 2019; Reyes at al 2017; Swan 
and De Filippi, 2017; Ziolkowski et al., 2018b). What is missing is a general understanding of how 
these various dimensions (and approaches) interact, how they should be conceptually linked and 
what their respective roles are within a broader coherent picture. On the one hand, the various 
aspects of a blockchain are often conflated. For example, the consensus protocol conflated with the 
technological characteristics of the underlying network, or the properties of the coordination 
mechanisms on-chain with the ones of-chain. On the other hand, it is not clear in this strand of 
literature, how the definition of blockchain should depend on the dynamic interplay between these 
various approaches and dimensions.  
Yet other works provide a more comprehensive, unified, and coherent overview of blockchain by 
focussing on its modular layers: the blockchain stack. There are various approaches and 
interpretation of the blockchain stack, all slightly different. Some authors merely distinguish 
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between a “fabric” layer (enabling network transmission) and an “application” layer (Glaser, 2017). 
Many more identify three different layers, which are variously defined based on the approach 
adopted by the authors but that commonly distinguish between a hardware or network 
(infrastructural) layer, a protocol or consensus (platform) layer, and a data or application layer (Chu 
and Wang, 2018; De Rossi et al., 2019; Glaser et al., 2019; Neudecker and Hartenstein, 2018; Rauchs 
et al., 2018; Werbach 2018).  
As remarked by many authors, blockchain is not a digital network per se, but represents an 
additional protocol, data, and application layer over the TCP/IP stack (see for instance De Filippi and 
Wright, 2018: 46-49). As a result, the blockchain protocol (the consensus rules) are often added as 
an additional layer of the stack and kept separate from the network protocol rules (network logic) 
regulating transmission and transactions among the nodes of the network (Gervais et al., 2016; 
Monegro et al, 2014; Rauchs et al., 2018; van Wirdum, 2016). For this reason, some approaches add 
extra-layers to the basic three, and sometimes they also including the external technological or 
social context (Ballandies et al, 2018; Notheisen et al, 2017). 
The layered approach to blockchain provides a unified overview of the logical elements of a 
blockchain, but it does not try to understand how the different nature of these layers impact the 
way in which a blockchain should be understood. Most importantly, no model tries to understand 
how the dynamic interactions of these various elements impact the nature of the blockchain.  
In this section, we provide a unified framework for the definition of blockchain in function of the 
framework developed in the previous section, and we discuss the conditions that make a digital 
network a blockchain based on the nature of the first-order dimensions. The following section will 
then discuss how the changing nature of these elements and their dynamic interdependencies affect 
the nature of blockchain and its most fundamental characteristic: its de/centralized nature.  
4.2 Defining Blockchain as Digital Network  
Based on the analytical framework developed in the previous section, we argue that any digital 
network becomes a blockchain whenever it addresses the following three necessary and sufficient 
requirements: 1) it enables for peer-to-peer transactions among users that are broadcasted to all 
nodes (NT); 2) it is used in order to transact social institutions in digital forms (i.e. digital 
representations of rights and value), here denoted a Coin (C), and is equivalent to data (D) in the 
general model in Figure 4.1; and 3) it does so by employing cryptographic algorithms in order to 
ensure at the same time the privacy (freedom to transact unhampered by surveillance, supervision 
and consent of political authorities) and the equality (identical roles and capabilities) in transactions 
of all its members vis-à-vis each other (social community SC). Figure 5.1 provides an overview of this 
and is unfolded in the following discussion. Consistent with the common understanding of a 
blockchain layered stack, it also adds a fourth element, the blockchain (cryptographic) protocol (CP), 
which operates as a logical intermediary between the various dimensions by ensuring their mutual 
consistency.  
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Figure 5.1: The general conceptual model translated to the context of blockchain with the addition of the consensus 
protocol (CP).  
4.2.1 (C) Coin: Data as Social Claims  
One of the most idiosyncratic features of a blockchain as compared to any other digital networks 
derives from the fact that the data transacted over it represent social institutions or, more 
specifically, claims valid against all other members of the blockchain.  
While digital data can be indefinitely copied, duplicated or modified across libraries (digital data are, 
in principle, public goods), a fundamental characteristic of a blockchain is its capacity to forbid the 
double-spending of any digital data, and this means that transacted data in the blockchain is not 
copied and duplicated, but transferred. As noted by many other authors (Miscione et al., 2018, 2019; 
Ziolkowski et al 2018b), as a direct result, data on the blockchain ceases to be a public good, and 
becomes rivalrous and excludable among nodes. The capacity to enforce property rights in digital 
forms introduces scarcity in the digital world and ensures uniqueness of digital data. This also means 
that blockchain data not only have legal value as titles of ownership, but they also acquire economic 
value in exchange (monetary value).27  
Money and property rights are social institutions and can both be intended as claims against society, 
or as rights. A claim against society is a claim that holds indiscriminately against all members of the 
social community regardless of the fact that any specific bilateral relationships between the title 
holder and any other member of the social community exists. It is an impersonal “right in rem” in 
                                                          
27
 As it has been effectively described by some authors, the blockchain provides the necessary digital 
infrastructure for the “internet of value”, “internet 3.0”, “Web 3.0”, or an “internet of money” (Kewell et al., 
2017; Swan, 2015; Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017). 
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Hohfeld’s (1913) terminology. In this case the society corresponds to the circle of members of the 
particular blockchain community holding and transacting the specific coin endowed with the agreed 
legal and economic significance. The shared or distributed ledger ensures that all claims enjoyed by 
all member of the community can be accessed and known to all other members of the social 
community, and is therefore ideally enforceable against the whole society (Arrunada, 2012, 2018). 
The autonomous and impersonal enforcement of these claims against all other members is the 
essence of a so-called “smart contract” (Werbach and Cornell, 2017)28.  
As the symbolic meaning of the blockchain data is legal or economic, the symbolic dimension of a 
blockchain network should be understood adopting a legal and economic interpretative approach. 
As a result, while a digital data can in principle acquire a variety of symbolic meanings depending on 
its functionality and use as a bit of communication, content, video, information, and so on, the 
symbolic dimension in the case of a blockchain really has a legal or economic significance. The digital 
data (D) in Figure 4.1, is here in the context of a blockchain, a coin (C in Figure 5.1), or token, 
representing a title, a right, or in other words, a social claim endowed with economic and legal 
meaning. While blockchain coins were originally endowed with economic meaning and defined as 
“digital money”, “virtual money”, or cryptocurrencies (Birch, 2017; Gleeson, 2018; DuPont, 2019).  
Starting from 2018, even the concept of cryptocurrency will be abandoned and replaced first by 
“token”, then by the one of “asset” (digital or tokenised asset) (FCA, 2018), and finally by the much 
more general concept of digital right (property or contractual right) (US congress 2018 H.R. 7356) 
(See Blandin et al., 2019). This progressive conceptual movement away from the concept of currency 
or money came full circle with the conceptual shift from the original physicalist and metallist 
interpretation of the coin’s economic value (Maurer et al., 2013; Swartz, 2018) towards a modern 
“legal” interpretation of exchange value (and money) intended as a redeemable claim (or right) on 
the social community or part of its members (Simmel, 2004; Dodd, 2014; Gleeson, 2018). The coin 
becomes socially valuable within the blockchain network as it represents a legal claim (right) against 
the members participating in the network.    
4.2.2 (NT) Network Technology: Interactions among Equal Nodes 
From a technological standpoint, a blockchain is a transparent p2p messaging system that allows 
each node to directly transact these titles with all the other nodes. Although there are various ways 
in which a p2p system can be defined, we here adopt the most accepted interpretations and define 
a p2p network as a system where any node of the infrastructure can at the same time operate as a 
client of other nodes and as a server for other nodes (Tanenbaum and Wetherall, 2011: 6-10). As a 
result, p2p is as much an architectural as a logical property of a digital network, which ensures 
symmetry in roles of all nodes over the blockchain. Because of the p2p logic, each node is at the 
same time an enforcer of a claim on other nodes and subject to the claims of other nodes. 
Alternatively, each node is at the same time a seller and a receiver of a title. The peculiar nature of 
the coin transacted over the network also involves another peculiar feature of the logical aspect of 
the technological dimension of a blockchain and of its network protocol: all transactions changing 
the state of the network have to be broadcasted to the whole network and this ensures that the 
same copy of the blockchain can be accessed and shared by all nodes and that any claim or title can 
                                                          
28
 The concept of a “smart contract” was first coined by Szabo (1996). 
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be known, accessed and enforceable by any node against any other node. This ensures on-chain 
symmetry in information among all nodes and makes the network logic of a blockchain different 
from standard p2p networks where communication operates point-to-point, rather than 
broadcasted.29  
While the symbolic dimension of the coin ensures that claims apply to the whole social community 
off-chain, the technological dimension ensures that these social claims are transmitted and known 
to the entire community on-chain. The network technology then defines the way in which various 
nodes can communicate and share information among themselves and the way in which 
transactions among these nodes occur.     
A digital network where all nodes can play the same role within the network and where the 
information on the state of the system can be freely accessed and commonly shared and stored by 
all nodes with no distinction (so that the overall system behaves like a unique and coherent entity) is 
usually characterized as being distributed (Baran, 1964). As a result, from a technological (or 
network topology) point of view, a blockchain is de facto a distributed digital network, where all 
nodes behave as independent elements, but the system retains overall integrity and behaves as a 
unique system. This coherency and integrity is guaranteed by the common timestamp that also 
ensures that all nodes share the same common ledger containing the updated state of the claims 
enjoyed by each node vis-à-vis the others. Thus, while a blockchain is sometimes defined as a 
“distributed ledger”, this is a narrow and partial understanding of the blockchain as it only 
characterises one dimension of the blockchain out of three: its technological one. Any blockchain is 
necessarily also a distributed ledger, but not just a distributed ledger.   
4.2.3 (SC) Social Community: Privacy (Liberty) and Equality in Transaction  
A blockchain is not just a shared collection of data among different nodes and a shared 
understanding of the rules governing transactions on-chain. It also represents shared ethical and 
political principles that inform and shape the nature of those rules and meaning of this data: liberty 
to transact unhampered by third-party consent or supervision, and the equality in treatment and 
social status among all participants (meaning that no party has a preferential role). These political 
ideals ensure that the validity of the social claims represented by the coin does not depend on the 
geographical boundaries of a State’s rule of law (liberty), or by the peculiar institutional arrangement 
in force (equality), but only by the consensual agreements of the members of a social community. 
May (1994) calls these land-less and law-less communities where members are simply linked by “a 
shared ideology or particular interests” — in effect virtual communities. As a result, the third 
element (SC in Figure 5.1), the social community, represents the set of members sharing these moral 
and political principles and agreeing to abide by these rules of transaction automatically enforced by 
the blockchain protocol. 
The moral and political ideals of liberty (and privacy), and equality emerged in different stages as 
they represent the two sets of normative principles inspiring the two main groups that conjointly 
contributed to the development of the bitcoin’s blockchain.  
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 For a good discussion of the architectural consequences of traditional p2p file-sharing networks, see Chapter 
7 in (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). 
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The first contribution came from the writings of crypto-anarchists and cyperpunks (Hammill, 1987; 
Hughes, 1993; May, 1988a; 1988b; 1994). Both these movements were inspired by anarco-
libertarian ideals, and focussed on the role of cryptography as a way to enable individuals to freely 
interact, transact, and communicate with anyone they wish to, without an external entity or 
authority being able to identify, censor, interfere, spy, tax, or deny permission altogether. These 
ideals were shared by a set of close friends, mainly cryptographers, such as David Chaum (1981; 
1982; 1988) and by hackers, such as the Anonymous community. 
The second contribution mainly came from computer scientists and coders, following the lead of Dai 
(1998) and Szabo (1997, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005), and, eventually, Nakamoto (2008). While the first 
wave of writings mainly stressed the importance of cryptography in order to preserve privacy and 
liberty for all members of the social (virtual) community, the second wave of contributions tried to 
“operationalise” the crypto-anarchist ideals and to make sure that liberty and privacy did not come 
at the expense of equality. They did so by addressing the problem of how to design the right 
incentives mechanisms and protocol rules in order to make sure that privacy and liberty in 
transactions should not necessarily rely on central intermediaries validating and settling the 
transactions among unknown nodes on-chain. In sum, the work of this second wave of ideologues 
ensured that political freedom among members off-chain did not necessarily require asymmetries 
and inequalities among the nodes on-chain. This conundrum (in technical terms, the solution to the 
“byzantine general’s problem”30) was solved by creating self-enforcing incentives to maintain the 
integrity of the network by endowing the coin with economic value (and making sure that the 
members agree on that) (Narayanan et al., 2016). As a result, the economic value of the coin is as 
much an end of the blockchain as it is a means to fulfil its political precepts: in order to solve the 
privacy-equality conundrum, one cannot be achieved without the other and vice versa. 
The combination of these two set of contributions ensures freedom and privacy among all members 
of the social community on the one hand, and equality of all actors on the other hand. Both waves of 
contributions inform the nature of the other two dimensions — coin (C) and network topology (NT). 
But while the former mainly focussed on the ideological problems associated to the nature and 
content of the data transacted (what is being transacted), the latter took this problem further and 
mainly focussed on the ideological problems associated to the way in which the content should be 
transacted and the network should be designed (how this specific data is being transacted).  
The motives for any social community to join a digital network can be driven by different reasons, 
such as geographical proximity, national identity, cultural background, social status, professional 
associations, behavioural routines, and a variety of other drivers. As a result, the social dimension 
characterising the interactions and interdependencies among the members of a virtual community 
can be understood and interpreted from a variety of perspectives. In the case of blockchain, the 
actors were originally motivated to join and develop the blockchain predominantly by the ethical, 
ideological, and political ideals and principles of classical liberalism (Locke, 1947; Mill, 1867) 
embodied in the blockchain. For this reason, the social dimension of a blockchain network should be 
understood and interpreted adopting a political and ethical perspective: the social interactions and 
bonds among the actors of the blockchain community should be understood as the political or 
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 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_fault 
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ethical precepts informing both the nature of the coin and the way in which these transactions take 
place on-chain (protocol). Both coin and protocol respect these political principles and represent the 
way in which privacy and equality ideals off0chain are reproduced on-chain and vice versa.  
4.2.4 (CP) Consensus Protocol: Holding Everything Together  
The three core elements of a blockchain are (See Figure 5.1): 1) the social community (SC) 
characterised by the political and ethical precepts shaping the interactions and interdependencies 
among its members; 2) the digital network and its topology (NT); and 3) the coin (C), which 
represents the social claims transacted over it. Any blockchain needs a consensus protocol (CP) 
providing the right incentives to ensure that all three dimensions can hold together and can interact 
in the right way.  
Each blockchain is univocally associated to a cryptographic protocol and its native cryptographic coin 
— originally called a cryptocurrency. There is a multiplicity of consensus protocols adopting a 
multiplicity of cryptographic algorithms.31 Both the coin (C) and the blockchain protocol (CP) provide 
the necessary logical instructions to the nodes on-chain, and the right incentives to the members of-
chain, to make sure that social claims can be transacted and enforced on-chain in a p2p manner 
while also respecting the equality and liberty (privacy) political principles.  
As a result, both the coin and the blockchain protocol can be treated as interfaces between the 
interactions occurring among the blockchain nodes off-chain (offline) and the ones occurring among 
the members of the social community on-chain (on line). The coin represents digitised social claims 
transacted and enforced on-chain, but retaining their legal and economic validity among the 
members of the social community off-chain, while the blockchain protocol represents protocol rules 
defining the way in which different nodes can interact and communicate consistent with the political 
and ethical principles that also regulate the way in which the various members of the social 
community can interact and coordinate off-chain (Lessig (1999) “code is law”). The dual role of the 
blockchain’s coin and protocol makes blockchain an institutional, rather than a productive, 
technology, as remarked by Davidson et al. (2018). Moreover, as digital data now represent social 
institutions with a non-modifiable32 meaning regulating incentives and social coordination among 
the members of the social community. The coupling between data and social community is now 
much more meaningful than in the case of standard digital networks, where digital data are perfectly 
reprogrammable, reproducible and editable.  
More generally, the blockchain protocol can be understood as the fundamental logical intermediary 
between the three core elements of a digital network along both dimensions of access and use (See 
Figure 5.1 above). Firstly, the blockchain protocol regulates the way in which coins can be transacted 
                                                          
31
 Consensus algorithms, such as; proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, proof-of-authority, and proof-of-burn, apply a 
range of cryptographic algorithms, such as, SHA-256, X11, Dagger Hashimoto. The mechanics of these is not 
the focus of this document but can be studied elsewhere, such as in and so forth are discussed widely, for 
example by (DuPont, 2018).  
32
 This is a different issue than whether or not blockchain arrangements are “tamper-proof.” Once established, 
the agreement of what value the coin constitutes and by which means this is secured through the protocol, 
cannot be changed unless 1) the community as a whole decides so, or 2) the community split and continues in 
separate directions. The fact that blockchains are seeking to be tamper-proof but rather should be seen as 
tamper-resistant is a separate issue related to the ability to uphold the protocol-coin binding agreed upon.  
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on-chain on-the-top of the network (C <-> NT) and accumulated and created by its nodes. Secondly, 
it regulates the on-chain/off-chain interfaces between the relationships among the members of the 
social community and their digital claims transacted, stored and enforced on-chain (SC <-> C). Thirdly, 
it also represents the interface between the political rules of the social community off-chain and the 
topological rules of the network on-chain (SC <-> NT). In other words, the blockchain protocol 
provides overall coherence and consistency to the three dimensions of a blockchain. For this reason, 
it will also play a fundamental role in shaping the nature and the degree of de/centralization of a 
blockchain network, as discussed below.  
4.2.5 Blockchain as a Digital Network 
Based on the previous discussion, it is possible to modify our tripartite framework characterising 
digital networks as represented in figure 5.1. Differently from the standard framework for digital 
networks, both the blockchain protocol and the coin sit at the interface between the social 
interactions of the members occurring off-chain and the on-chain technological interactions of the 
network elements. The new element, the blockchain consensus protocol (CP) sit on the top of the 
network’s physical and logical layers and operates as an intermediary and a “buffer” between the 
three elements, by regulating the way in which they interact and the way in which the characteristics 
of one dimension affect, and can be transmitted to, the other dimensions.  
The vertical “use” axis in figure 5.1 reproduces the four typical layers of the blockchain stack. Some 
authors also add a fifth application layer (Monegro et al, 2014; van Wirdum, 2016), while others 
ignore the physical layer and only focus on the core three layers of network logic, consensus 
protocol, and data layer (Rauchs et al., 2018). Both the network transmission layers and the 
blockchain consensus protocol define the logic according to which the nodes and elements of the 
system can communicate and interact. But while the network logic regulates the way in which nodes 
can transact the coin among themselves, the consensus logic regulates the way in which the nodes 
are incentivised to verify, validate and append these transactions to the ledger, consistent with to 
the equality and privacy principles.    
In conclusion, there are two ways in which a blockchain can be studied and understood. One way is 
to focus on the single elements and on the static first-order characteristics of the single dimensions, 
while an alternative way is to focus on the dynamic interactions and interdependencies among these 
dimensions. As we will argue below, a static characterization of the single dimensions and their first-
order interdependencies is only sufficient in order to define a blockchain, while an analysis of the 
dynamic second-order interdependencies between these dimensions becomes necessary in order to 
characterise a blockchain and understand its nature and degree of de/centralization.  
4.3 First-Order Blockchain Dimensions 
The decomposition of a blockchain into its core components shows that any digital network can be 
defined as a blockchain whenever all its fundamental dimensions are characterised by static first-
order symmetries among their respective elements. This does not mean that a blockchain is 
decentralized, but only that a digital network characterised by first-order decentralization for all 
dimensions is a blockchain. We will explore this aspect this aspect by considering each of the three 
first-order dimensions in turn.  
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4.3.1 (NT) Architectural and Logical A/symmetries 
The distributed logic that supports the p2p architecture ensures symmetric interdependencies 
among all nodes from a topological point of view. The fact that any node can act at the same time as 
a beneficiary of a data transaction (recipient), or as a repository of information for other nodes 
(sender), generates interdependencies as any node is able to affect the others. The fact that the 
same set of information is broadcasted to all nodes and is identically stored by all nodes in the 
network ensures that these reciprocal influences are in principle identical, and therefore perfectly 
symmetric. Moreover, the way in which the consensus protocol was originally conceived also 
ensured perfectly symmetric capabilities among nodes in their ability to verify transactions and set 
incentives.  
From a topological point of view each node is perfectly equivalent (and therefore symmetric) to any 
other node, consistent with the precept of privacy and equality. As a result, the technological 
dimension is characterised by first-order decentralization among its elements. This means that a 
breach of this symmetry implies that a digital network fails to be a blockchain. However, this does 
not mean that the blockchain is technologically decentralized: blockchain is a distributed system and, 
as such, it is logically centralized. Centralization in this case derives from the fact that all nodes share 
the same data within the common resource (the ledger) and cannot behave independently from 
each other. Logical centralization in this case emerges over time and derives from the fact that all 
nodes share the same distributed time stamp that logically links them all. As a result, while 
symmetry emerges as a static characteristic of the technological first-order dimension, asymmetries 
emerge in a dynamic setting, due to the way in which the various nodes can dynamically interact 
among themselves over time.  
4.3.2 (C) Legal and Economic A/symmetries  
The symbolic dimension is usually characterised by independence among its elements. Digital data 
usually do not generate interdependencies because of their public good nature: any data can be 
copied and reproduced, and therefore used independently from all others. Conversely, scarcity and 
rivalry always generate conflicts and, as a result, interdependencies. For this reason, differently from 
standard digital networks, the symbolic dimension of a blockchain is characterised by 
interdependencies among its data, meaning that the value or significance of one data depends on 
the value assumed by others.  
The definition of data as social claims (titles of property) implies symmetric legal and economic 
interdependencies between the data belonging to the symbolic dimension. On the one hand, all 
rights or titles are, by definition, interpersonal institution that only makes sense in relationship to 
each other: any claim generate a duty on all other claims and vice versa (Hohfeld, 1913; 1917). For 
this reason, the value and nature of each claim can only be understood in relationship to all other 
claims. On the other hand, claims against society such as money or property rights are impersonal 
and universal, meaning that they equally affect all members of the social community indifferently. In 
the most basic case in which each coin is symbolically identical to all other coins (symbolic 
homogeneity or equality), interdependencies among coins are completely symmetric, in the sense 
that any coin is affected by the others in the same measure in which it affects the others.  
From a legal and economic point of view interdependencies among homogeneous coins are always 
perfectly symmetric. As a result, the symbolic dimension of a blockchain manifests first-order 
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decentralization from a legal and economic point of view. However, this does not mean that a 
blockchain is symbolically decentralized. The presence of a distributed time stamp introduces 
temporal (dynamic) asymmetries among coins transacted and enforced in different moments in time: 
the value and significance of newer coins depends on the value and significance of older ones. In 
other words, the blockchain cannot be reverted as a change in the value of past coins necessarily 
affects the value of more rent ones. Temporal asymmetries among coins ensure the tamper-
resistance of a blockchain and derive from the fact that the value and significance of any coin in a 
specific point in time cannot be understood independently from (depends on) the value and 
significance of past coins. Even in this case, symbolic centralization emerges over time and derives 
from the fact that all coins in a specific point in time share the same history that symbolically links 
them all. As a result, while the symbolic dimension of a blockchain is characterised by first-order 
symmetries among its coin for any specific point in time, symbolic asymmetries emerge in a dynamic 
setting, due to the way in which the various coins depend on the previous ones over time. 
4.3.3 (SC) Political and Ethical A/symmetries  
Finally, the political and moral precepts of liberty and equality ensure first-order decentralization 
among all members of the social community for two distinct reasons. In the crypto-libertarian and 
cypherpunk ideal, liberty can either imply pure independence whenever a member is not willing to 
engage in a transaction (liberty as a lack of coercion), or it implies symmetry in knowledge and 
reciprocal information whenever two members decide to interact (liberty as privacy in transaction). 
This second case implies that no member has any advantage over the other due to its greater 
knowledge of the state of the system. On the other hand, the definition of a cryptographic 
consensus algorithm ensures that, at least in principle, all nodes can play the same role and have the 
same capabilities in accessing, validating, verifying and appending a transaction. This implies that not 
only are all nodes symmetric when it comes to their role as repository of information (p2p 
symmetry), but also when it comes to their role as verifications, settlers, and validators of 
transactions (political symmetry). In all three cases (liberty as independence from transactions, 
liberty as privacy in transactions, equality in roles, status and capabilities), the social dimension of 
blockchain ensures symmetric interdependencies among all its members and therefore it manifests 
first-order decentralization from a political and ethical point of view.  
The fact that the blockchain protocol ensures and enforces first order symmetries among the 
members of the social community does not mean that a blockchain is a politically decentralized 
system. The dynamic evolution of the value and nature of the claims over time and of the 
motivations and incentives shaping the decisions of the nodes can generate temporal asymmetries 
among the members of the social community over time. Similarly, to the other two dimensions, 
even in this case political centralization can emerge over time and derives from the status and 
capability of a member can evolve and change based on its past decisions. As a result, while the 
social dimension of a blockchain is originally characterised by first-order symmetries among all its 
members, social asymmetries emerge in a dynamic setting, due to the different ways in which the 
various members adjust and update their decisions over time. 
57 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Characterization of the first-order dimension characteristics within Coin, Network Technology, and Social 
Community. 
 
4.3.4 First-Order Decentralization 
Based on our framework, we argue that first-order decentralization in all three dimensions of a 
digital network is both necessary and sufficient to characterise a blockchain. Whenever one feature 
is dropped, the same outcome can be easily replicated adopting a different, and potentially more 
efficient, technological solution. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 as well we Figure 5.3 provide overview of this 
discussion. 
First-order 
dimension 
Unit  Approach  Characteristics of the element  
Alternative configuration in case 
of asymmetry  
Technological NT 
Architectural / 
Logical 
Distributed system:  
P2p and Broadcast transmission of 
transaction to all nodes  
Client-server database for exclusive 
access to encrypted valuable data 
Symbolic C 
Legal / 
Economic  
Social claim:  
Digitised institution representing a 
claim against all members of the 
social community (unique, non-
replicable, thus valuable) 
Standard p2p file sharing systems 
Social  SC 
Political / 
Ethical  
Classic liberalism “natural rights”: 
Privacy (liberty) in transaction and 
equality in role and status among all 
members of the community 
Two-sided market place run by a 
two-sided platform characterising 
the current platform (or sharing) 
economy 
Table 5.1: Overview of situations where one of the three necessary and sufficient first-order dimension blockchain 
definitions fail 
The open internet has proven particular effective in the direct p2p exchange of data through file 
sharing protocols, such as, BitTorrent and eMule. Such p2p file sharing software are fully distributed 
systems that can ensure the secure and potentially completely private p2p transmission of 
encrypted data between two equal nodes. The use of encrypted and anonymised distributed 
systems has been historically regarded by hackers and crypto-anarchists as the only way to 
safeguard complete liberty and privacy on the web, while their distributed p2p nature also ensures 
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complete equality and symmetry among all actors.33 Standard p2p file sharing systems, however, 
cannot support the exchange of anything scarce as they cannot enforce property rights. They merely 
provide easy means by which data can be duplicated across a network of servers. For this reason, 
these files and data do not have any economic value in exchange. This is the case of a p2p 
community without a coin acting as an enforceable claim against the members of the digital 
community. This arrangement does not introduce rivalry among peers and for this reason it cannot 
generate on-chain symmetric interdependencies among the various data in the symbolic dimension.  
Alternatively, it is possible to exchange objects that have economic value, such as paying for a 
second-hand piano on eBay. The p2p transmission of valuable data that does not need to ensure 
privacy and/or parity of status of all nodes can be easily achieved through the operation of a central 
platform acting as a central intermediary in a symmetric p2p marketplace, where all nodes can be 
either clients or servers. Such preservation of value in exchange, however, necessitates trade 
through a central intermediary in charge for the validation and settlement of transactions: it is the 
well-known double-spending problem. In this case not only is the equality principle always violated, 
but the necessity to verify the validity of transactions also requires actors to trade in some of their 
private data. When purchasing an item from a merchant via Amazon.com in exchange for money, 
the interacting parties are not all equal. The central digital mediator, Amazon.com, has a different 
status than the surrounding buyers and sellers, and will, furthermore, become the owner of all data 
pertaining to the transaction and can potentially therefore subsequently monetise it (Zuboff, 2019).  
This is the case of a classic distributed business model, or digital market place, run by a two-sided (or 
multi-sided) platform, which characterises the current platform (or sharing) economy (de Reuver et 
al, 2018). In this case the first two requirements of a blockchain are respected, but not the third: the 
political and ethical preconditions of privacy and equality of all members operating over the 
infrastructure. For this reason, this solution cannot ensure symmetric interdependencies (from 
either an informative and structural point of view) among the various members of the social 
community.  
The previous two configurations highlighted a choice between a situation of p2p anonymity for the 
free sharing of plentiful digital objects, and one where members pay with their privacy when trading 
anything socially scarce and valuable, such as goods, money, or rights of ownership. Lastly is the case 
of a classic client-server database, where all members of a social community can request exclusive 
access to encrypted valuable data upon request from a common repository. This is the case of the 
access economy where claims and transactions are one-sided, rather than two-sided as in the case 
of p2p marketplaces characterising the sharing economy. As the transaction is one-sided, there is no 
need to verify the legitimacy and validity of a transaction between unknown parties, so privacy can 
be ensured much more easily than in the case of a distributed two-sided configuration. By granting 
temporary and exclusive access to a protected and non-duplicable file or data, digital claims might 
be enforced, and privacy and equality of all members might be preserved, but the symmetric p2p 
architecture is substituted by the asymmetric hub-and-spoke one. Asymmetries in this case are both 
                                                          
33
 As summarised by Satoshi Nakamoto in one of its email exchanges with James A. Donald: “Yes, [You will not 
find a solution to political problems in cryptography] but we can win a major battle in the arms race and gain a 
new territory of freedom for several years. Governments are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally 
controlled networks like Napster, but pure p2p networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own.” 
(at https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/cryptography/threads/1/) 
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logic and architectural and, for this reason, this solution cannot ensure symmetric interdependencies 
among the nodes of the digital network in the technological dimension. 
 
Multidimensional 
systems  
Architectural and logical 
decentralization of the 
technological dimension 
Legal and Economic 
decentralization of the 
symbolic dimension  
Political and ethical 
decentralization of the 
social dimension   
 
Client-Server database  X √ √ Pre-Web 
Web 1.0 
p2p file sharing  √ X √ Web 1.0 
Multi-sided platform / 
marketplace 
√ √ X Web 2.0 
Blockchain √ √ √ Web 3.0 
Table 5.2: Overview of the combinations of symmetry requirements across the technological, symbolic, and social 
dimensions. 
4.3.5 Summarizing the Framework  
In this section we have argued that a blockchain is a specific type of digital network characterised by 
the p2p transmission of digitised (tokenised) social claims through the execution of a cryptographic 
protocol that ensures the equality and privacy (liberty) of all parties off-chain is also enforced and 
respected on-chain.  
The previous three necessary and sufficient conditions retrace a common way to define blockchain 
in the literature as a: 1) distributed system, 2) for the transaction of digital value, and 3) employing a 
decentralized consensus protocol (or cryptographic algorithm). These three conditions are usually 
associated to the three modular layers of the blockchain stack (Rauchs et al., 2018: section 3; 
Blandin et al., 2019: section 2): 1) network layer, 2) data or application layer, and 3) protocol layer. 
However, some remarks are in order with respect to this understanding of blockchain.  
Firstly, our framework shows that the use of the concept of decentralization to characterize a 
specific element or layer (the blockchain protocol) is not completely satisfactory and can be the 
cause of various misunderstanding and misleading conclusions. All layers and dimensions can be 
understood through the lenses of de/centralization (see also Rauchs et al., 2018: 44-46). When the 
present framework is adopted, blockchain does emerge as a decentralized digital network. However, 
decentralization should characterise all dimensions. We argue that a digital network becomes a 
blockchain only when decentralization characterises the first-order interdependencies among the 
elements for all dimensions, not just one.  
Secondly, to merely focus on the nature and characteristics of the three digital layers on-chain 
overlooks the characteristics of the social dimension of a digital network and the role played by the 
members of the community off-chain. Consistent with the point above, a blockchain is a blockchain 
if and only if the social interdependencies among the members of the community can also be 
characterised as “decentralized”.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, we argue that any digital network is a system of systems, or a second-
order system. The identification of the characteristics that make each individual dimension 
decentralized is necessary and sufficient to characterise a digital network as a blockchain. However, 
it is only necessary and never sufficient to characterise the entre blockchain system as decentralized. 
Whenever a system is multidimensional, decentralization is not merely a function of the 
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characteristics of the single dimensions, but a dynamic and relational characteristic of a system as a 
whole, which also takes into account the dynamic interdependencies between layers and 
dimensions (Schneider, 2003, 2019). As a result, the mere focus on the static symmetries 
characterising each dimension underestimates the degree of centralization of the entire system as it 
does not capture the asymmetries emerging from the dynamic interactions between different 
dimensions over time. In order to characterise a multi-dimensional system as decentralized, dynamic 
interdependencies among dimensions should be considered too.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Topological overview of failures to establish symmetry on one of the first-dimension aspects 
 
In the case of blockchain, this distinction should be understood as follows: the fact that a digital 
network can only be defined a blockchain if and only if all its first-order dimensions manifest static 
decentralization does not mean that a blockchain network is also decentralized. Stated differently, 
first-order symmetries in all dimensions of a digital network are a necessary and sufficient condition 
to conclude that a digital network is a blockchain, but we argue that they are only necessary and 
never sufficient to conclude that the blockchain is also decentralized. A blockchain is a term that 
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should be used to characterise the static nature of a digital network (and its dimensions). Yet, a 
blockchain can be more or less de/centralized due to the dynamic (causal) interdependencies of its 
dimensions over time.  
While it is true that the blockchain protocol represents the logical interface between the three 
dimensions, we argue that it is not the blockchain protocol per se to be more or less de/centralized, 
as it is frequently argued in the literature. Rather, de/centralization emerges from the peculiar ways 
in which the blockchain protocol shapes the dynamic interactions and interdependencies among 
these dimensions.   
In conclusion, to understand whether a digital network can be defined a blockchain, it is necessary 
(and sufficient) to look at the characteristic of each first-order dimension, while in order to 
understand degree of de/centralization of a blockchain it becomes necessary (and sufficient) to 
analyse the degree of de/centralization across dimensions (horizontally and vertically). In order to do 
so, the focus of the analysis should be shifted from the interdependencies of first order within each 
dimension to the interdependencies of second-order across dimensions. This also implies a shift 
from the analysis of the static characteristics of each dimension to the analysis of the dynamic causal 
interdependencies between dimensions.   
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5 De/centralization and Blockchain Networks   
This section takes up the task of mapping and discussing de/centralization in second-order 
dimensions, i.e., dynamic a/symmetries between the three fundamental dimensions (symbolic, 
technological, and social) rather than static a/symmetries within each dimension of the first-order 
system. Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the interdependencies discussed. 
5.1 Second-Order Blockchain Symmetries  
The three dimensions of a blockchain assume three very specific analytical meanings and play three 
very specific roles within the broader blockchain system.  
The technological dimension represents the locus of on-chain rules regulating and shaping the 
interactions among the various nodes; it is where the set of technical rules codified in the “code is 
law” formula operate, are implemented, and enforced. The technological dimension is a mix of 
architectural (spatial) and logical (procedural or organizational) rules.  
The coin belongs to the symbolic dimension from where value and incentives come and where legal 
claims are defined. Depending on the nature of the institution represented, on the source of value, 
and on the nature of the claim. This dimension can assume a chiefly economic significance whenever 
the coin is purely intended as a means of exchange whose value is backed by social conventions. 
Alternatively, it can take on a legal significance if the coin is intended as a legal claim or title, which is 
enforceable against some other legal institution such as a court, a central bank, a government, and 
so forth.   
The social community is the element embodying the political and ethical dimension ruling the 
agreements among the members of the real world. From an analytical point of view, it represents 
the normative precepts that inform the way in which the network rules and protocol are defined and 
interactions among the members of the social community occur. By sharing the same motivations 
and principles, the members of the social community establish the rules of the cryptographic 
protocol and agree on the necessary decisions facilitating the exchange of coins without the need to 
trade in private data, under the condition of equality and personal liberty. If the technological 
dimension represents the positive set of rules defining “code is law”, the political and ethical 
dimension represents the normative precepts that inform the rule of code in the first place: “law is 
code” (De Filippi and Hassan, 2018; Reijers et al., 2018).   
Given the significance of the three dimensions, it is possible to study the degree of 
centralization/decentralization of the blockchain by looking at how asymmetric dependencies in the 
form of powers and rights emerge and are shaped by the various patterns of interdependencies 
between these three dimensions. Differently from standard digital networks, second-order 
interdependencies in the case of blockchain do not merely emerge along the two “orthogonal” 
dimensions of access and use, but also along the new linkage between the coin and the social 
community. This third interdependency characterises the way in which value and incentives on-chain 
shape, and are shaped by, principles, beliefs, and agreements on value and incentives off-chain, and 
it is what distinguishes the blockchain from standard digital networks.  
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the second-order interdependencies between the first-order dimensions. 
As a result, three interpretations and sources of blockchain de/centralization can be identified, 
which we classify as follow (See also Table 6.1): 1) the political-economic (or political-legal) 
dimension of de/centralization focusses on the asymmetries emerging from the coin-social 
community relation in function of a given technological design; 2) the techno-economic (or techno-
legal) dimension of de/centralization focusses on the asymmetries emerging from the network-coin 
relation in function of a given political design; and 3) the techno-political interpretation of 
decentralization focusses on the asymmetries emerging from the network-social community relation 
in function of a given coin. 
Second-order interdependencies  Second-order asymmetries in rights and powers emerging from: 
Political-Economic/ Political-Legal Dynamic interdependencies between the coin and the social community  
Techno-Economic/ Techno-Legal Dynamic interdependencies between the network technology and the coin  
Techno-Political 
Dynamic interdependencies between the network technology and the 
social community  
Table 6.1: Overview of the three second-order interdependencies  
All these second-order interdependencies occur through the blockchain protocol that acts as a 
logical intermediary between the dimensions, regulating the way in which these can interact and 
affect each other.  
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5.2 SCC: Social Community and Coin 
As far as we have been able to trace, the first academic publication on Bitcoin was in 2013 following 
the revelations of the Silk Road on-line marketplace. This also marked the start of the academic 
debate on decentralization, and this debate was in the first couple of years focused exclusively on 
Bitcoin and not on the blockchain, which remained a little-known concept. This changed around 
2015, which was the year the Ethereum infrastructure started its operations. Researchers started to 
enquire the meaning and nature of decentralization as applied to currencies: whether a virtual 
currency could be treated as money, whether a decentralized currency such as bitcoin could have 
any value if not backed by any legitimate institutions, where this value comes from (in case it did 
have some value), and how its decentralized nature could affect its value.  
In other words, the first serious attempts to understand the concept of decentralization, to try to 
define and characterise its nature in the crypto-world, mainly centred on one element of the 
blockchain triad, the valuable coin. It did so mainly by treating the coin as an economic or financial 
tool. More specifically, the literature initially addressed the interesting problems raised by a 
decentralized currency. It did so by looking at the way in which the concept of decentralization is 
shaped and affected by the relationship between the coin and the social community using it. These 
first inquiries then adopted a political-economic (or political-legal) approach to define 
de/centralization that mainly looks at how the political precepts of the social sphere and its resulting 
institutional arrangements affect the significance of the coin and the nature and origin of its value. In 
other words, this first line of works tried to understand how the value of the various coins (and 
therefore their symbolic interdependencies) is affected by, and interact with, the specific 
interdependencies and relationships between the members of the social community.  
Under this political-economic approach the technological dimension plays an important role but it 
often remains in the background. The network technology and protocol are usually given parameters 
of the problem that support and enable the interaction between the symbolic and the social 
dimension. Yet, technological considerations are usually taken for granted and rarely enters the 
analytical considerations of how centralization should be interpreted or how they might 
endogenously affect the very meaning of de/centralization. It is the de/centralized nature of the coin 
and the social origin and meaning of its value that spawned interest, not necessarily the nature of 
the underlying technology supporting its transactions.  
If one looks at the way in which the literature in this branch developed, one will note that two 
different subsets of works can be distinguished: a “metallist34” and an “informational” interpretation 
of decentralization. Both treat the coin as a fungible35 entity that can be used to conduct bilateral 
and private transactions and both try to understand how the value and significance of the single 
coins depend on social asymmetries among the members of the social community. However, the 
                                                          
34
 The term “metallist” has been chosen as the proponents generally subscribe to the notion of bitcoin as 
“digital gold” and sees the 1970s collapse of the gold-standard (The Bretton Woods Agreement) as negative 
since it resulted in inflationary national currencies and is discussed further in the following sub-section. 
35
 The discussion of the extent a cryptotoken coin can be fungible is beyond the direct scope of this report. As 
all coins/tokens are enumerated, the coins are not fungible in a strict sense. However, the social community 
may still treat coins as though they are. Also, some arrangements, such as Zcash, allow completely anonymous 
transactions and thus rendering the coins fungible. 
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two approaches adopt two different perspectives and two different interpretations of 
de/centralization.  
5.2.1 Metallist De/centralization: Coin as Digital Commodity   
The first approach defines a cryptocurrency as decentralized whenever it is neither governed, 
created, nor owned by any identifiable entity. In the physical world, this entity would be a central 
bank or a central government. In the crypto-world, this entity is probably a member of the social 
community or an identifiable organization claiming ownership over the coin. As a result, this 
interpretative approach defines decentralization by looking at the extent to which asymmetries 
among the members of the social community are reflected in the value of the coin for the whole 
community.  
In this case a decentralized currency is characterized by the fact that no special member of the 
community is endowed with special powers or rights to own, control, or redeem the supply of the 
coin and therefore, by doing so, to directly and unilaterally affect its value for the whole social 
community. In other words, a decentralized system is one where the value and significance of the 
coin do not reflect the asymmetries in status, powers and rights among the various members of the 
social community. On the other hand, a centralized currency is characterised by the presence of a 
single actor (or a subset) endowed with the special powers or rights to directly control the economic 
value, supply, existence, validity and significance of the coin. These members would have the same 
powers and rights that central bankers or national governments enjoy.   
In sum, the metallist interpretation of the political-economic approach to de/centralization looks at 
how asymmetries (inequalities) in the social powers, or legal rights, of the various members of the 
social community affect the dynamic evolution of the social value and significance of the coin (for all 
members of the social community) over time.  In a decentralized system, there are no such powers 
or rights. These changes affect all identical coins and all members in the same (symmetric) way. 
Asymmetries therefore emerge either over time, or across coins. Whenever there are different coins 
appertaining to different communities, asymmetries in the social values and significance among the 
various coins emerge as a result of different asymmetric interdependencies among the members of 
the different communities.  
The metallist interpretation of de/centralization looks either at the a/symmetries in the way in which 
the different preferences and wills of the various actors are aggregated at the social level and 
incorporated into the coin’s value (focus on the political-economic aspect) or, alternatively, at the 
way in which single actors (or a group of actors) are responsible and liable for backing the value of 
the coin (focus on the political-legal interaction). The two correspond to, respectively, the political 
and the legal understanding of de/centralization provided previously. In both cases decentralization 
is understood along the lines of Austrian monetarists such as Hayek (1976), as a lack of central 
institution responsible to set (and back) the value of the coin on behalf of all other members of the 
social community. As highlighted by various authors, the independence of bitcoin from the control of 
socio-political institutions such as central banks and national governments represented precisely the 
fulfilment of the political and ideological goal of crypto-anarchists and Austrian monetarists 
consistent with Hayek (1976) writings (Ametrano, 2016; Corradi and Hofner, 2018; Dodd, 2018; 
Swartz, 2018; White, 2015). This is also consistent with the cross-border and trans-national essence 
of virtual social community. For this reason, the extra-legal and extra-institutional origin of value of a 
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cryptocurrencies generated some interest in the economic and financial literature inquiring what 
could sustain the value of a coin that is neither backed by any social institution, by any commodity 
off-chain, nor has some intrinsically useful properties itself.36 
Regarding the meaning of decentralization applied to a coin’s value and nature, there is a difference 
between “setting the value” of a coin (mainly the political-economic perspective) and “backing the 
value” of a coin (political-legal). The members of a social community can agree that a certain coin 
has a certain value. However, in the absence of some recognised authority, they might be unable to 
back it up or ensure that this will always be the case regardless of the decisions and convictions of 
the participants. In the first case, decentralization along the symbolic-social linkage characterises the 
absence of asymmetric interdependencies among actors affecting the value of the coin. In the case 
of political-economic decentralization, the value of the coin remains socially-determined, even 
though it is not determined by a subset of unequal actors with special rights or powers. In a 
decentralized system the value of the coin must remain the indirect outcome of the collective and 
uncoordinated actions of equal and anonymous members of the community, not the direct outcome 
of a purposeful decision of one member (or group of members) of the social community endowed 
with special powers or rights over the coin itself. As symmetry in interdependencies work both ways, 
this also means that uncoordinated changes in the value of the coin provokes unplanned and 
uncoordinated changes in the way in which the different members of a social community interact 
among themselves. The metallist interpretation of decentralization represents Hayek’s (1978) world 
of perfect competition applied to monetary theory. Any member of the social community can react 
and adjust its behaviour in response to a free-floating value and no special member can univocally 
and unilaterally determine this value based on its preferences or goals. In this case decentralization 
denotes a situation of symmetric interdependence between the value assumed by the coin and the 
interactions between the members in the social sphere, other than a situation of symmetric 
interdependence between different decentralized coins (floating exchange rate). 
From a political-economic point of view, value in a decentralized system is then a social agreement 
among equal social actors. This does not explain what backs, enforces, and ensures the social value 
and significance of this coin. An important implication deriving from this peculiar approach is that a 
decentralized currency cannot represent a legal claim or liability of the owner against any specific 
entity as there is no special entity issuing, owning, or backing it. But this means that, while the value 
of a centralized currency can have a legal nature due to the presence of centralized institutions (it 
can be enforceable on all members as a legal tender), the value of a decentralized currency can 
never have a legal origin. The presence of a value rooted in the legal system would already denote 
                                                          
36
 The first works that started to inquiry the decentralized nature of bitcoin, decentralization focussed their 
efforts in trying to understand how the lack of control over the supply of coins would generate inherent 
volatility and instability of the coin’s prices, and how this would affect the general welfare of society. (Ali, 2014; 
Ammous, 2018; Cheah and Fry, 2015; Li and Wang, 2017). Other works tried to understand and inquiry where 
the value of a decentralized coin comes from and how it should be understood (Cheah and Fry, 2015; Dwyer, 
2015; Hayes, 2017; Li and Wang, 2017; Peters et al. 2015; Phillip et al. 2018; Schilling and Uhlig., 2018), 
whether a decentralized coin can be theoretically regarded as “money”, or at least fulfil some the function of 
money (Ammous, 2018; Carney, 2018; Corbet at al., 2018; Corbet et al., 2019; Guesmi et al., 2019; Klein et al., 
2018; Kubat, 2015), how decentralized digital currencies should be understood and what type of asset class 
they are (Burniske and Tatar, 2018; Dyberg, 2016; Nabilou and Prum, 2018; Wei, 2018), and how central banks 
and governments should respond (Barrdear and kumhof, 2016; Raskin and Yermack, 2016). 
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some form of asymmetries and therefore of centralization of the monetary system. Decentralized 
cryptocurrencies are necessarily lawless coins and titles. The inherent lawlessness nature of 
decentralized currencies represents its core essence and one of the fundamental original 
motivations for their development as State-less and law-less currencies.  
In the case of decentralized coins, the backing derives from the computer protocol running the 
network. As remarked by Swartz (2018), what was particularly appealing to the early crypto-
enthusiasts was the fact that the supply and the creation of bitcoin is only governed by the protocol 
of the network, and is subtracted from the direct control of a central authority. This protocol-based 
value not only decouples value from the legal system, but it also gives the illusion that the coin has 
an intrinsic and a-social value, which only depends on the specific technology employed to generate 
it and run the system. It is the network itself and the rewards associated to the costly operation of 
its protocol that provide the backing for the value of the coin.   
In the eyes of crypto-anarchist, a decentralized coin is therefore very similar to gold (or to 
commodity money): it has an intrinsic value that does not (necessarily) depend on the institutional 
and social context, but might only depend on its given scarcity, and on the effort or costs sustained 
in order to “mine” it. As a result, as noted by Swartz (2018), when decentralization is interpreted by 
adopting the crypto-anarchist perspective, the coin resembles more a store of (intrinsic) value (like 
gold) and less a currency (Ammous, 2018). Maurer and colleagues (2013) and Swartz (2018) call this 
approach “digital metallism” (see also Dodd, 2018; and Musiani et al., 2018). For this reason, we 
here define this peculiar political-economic understanding of decentralization in function of the 
coin-social community linkage the metallist approach to decentralization.  
In conclusion, the metallist approach understands the centralization-decentralization dichotomy by 
looking at the extent to which the value of the digital coin derives from (and is dependent on) the 
peculiar nature of the social interdependencies among the members of the social community. 
Perfect decentralization implies that there is no central institution with the special rights or power to 
unilaterally redeem and enforce the social claim embodied by the coin on all members of the society, 
as this would generate asymmetries. Under this perspective, fiat money is always generating some 
centralization (especially if it becomes a legal tender) as its value among the members of the social 
community depends on the peculiar way in which social institution operate to back the value of the 
digital coin and ensure trust among the various members of the social community. In the case of fiat 
currencies, the nature of social interdependencies among the social actors off-chain does matter and 
has direct effect on the coin value. This situation denotes political-economic (political-legal) 
centralization as any change in the nature of the interdependencies among the members of the 
social community (such as a change in the power or legitimacy of a particular member in 
guaranteeing trust) necessarily also affects the value of the coin transacted and its social significance.  
As a result, the symmetric interdependencies between the social and the symbolic dimensions can 
explain how value is set, but not how the coin can retain any value at all, or what gives the coin any 
binding force within the social community.  
Decentralization from a political-legal point of view characterises a situation where not only no 
individual (or group of individuals) has the power to unilaterally affect the value of the coin, but 
where the value of the coin does not depend on the specific nature of social interdependencies at all. 
In a metallist perspective, decentralization does not merely require symmetric second-order 
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interdependencies between the symbolic and the social dimension, but independence between the 
two dimensions. The absence of any legitimate institution able to back the value of the coin and to 
enforce it over the whole community (as a claim against society) implies that the origin of the value 
of the coin must be independent from the social dimension altogether. For this reason, a 
decentralized coin can retain any value only if it is understood as a commodity-money.  
In the extreme metallist ideal, a decentralized cryptocurrency is characterised by the fact that the 
value of the coin is only “intrinsically” determined by the given technological dimension that 
supports it. According to this perspective, commodity-money is always decentralized, while fiat 
money will always generate a causal dependence of the coin from the peculiar interdependencies of 
the social dimension. This is also consistent with the anti-inflationary stance of Austrian monetarism 
regarded as a precondition of liberty and equality along the lines of Hayek (1978).  
This also implies that in case of a decentralized coin there is little need for any mechanisms ensuring 
trust among the members of the community, as the only form of trust that is really needed is the 
one in the technology running the system, which also provides the ultimate backing and 
enforcement of the social claims embodied in the coin. The nature of trust supporting the value of 
the coin in the metallist approach is the trust in the correctness and reliability of the code. This is the 
essence of the so-called “trust-less trust” (or decentralized trust) of decentralized currencies. As the 
metallist understanding of de/centralization is only interested in disentangling the linkage between 
the social and the symbolic dimensions, all outstanding issues emerging from the problematic 
relationship between the technological infrastructure and the social community are completely 
neglected at this stage (and relegated to the techno-economic interpretation).      
Bitcoin is the most obvious example of a decentralized coin from a metallist point of view: it behaves 
like a scarce commodity whose supply (and intrinsic value) is regulated by the cryptographic protocol 
run by the network. Its commodity-money nature derives from the fact that it is neither minted nor 
owned by any authority and, as such, no special member of the social community can redeem it or 
back its social significance. On the other hand, Ripple’s coin XRP is usually accused of being a 
centralized cryptocurrency by crypto-metallists as the coin depends on asymmetric relationships 
within the social dimension: the coin is owned and can be redeemed by a central authority. For this 
reason, XRP is also more similar to a fiat currency (a pure means of exchange) rather than a 
commodity-money endowed with some a-social intrinsic value. The same is true for cryptoassets 
released through ICOs as their value can be controlled by a central authority that is also responsible 
for their creation and redemption. Finally, stable coins such as that proposed by the Facebook-led 
consortium Libra, are much more similar to fiat money as they are anchored to the value of other 
fiat currencies that, in the metallist view, are centralized forms of payment. Centralization in this 
case derives from the fact that their value directly depends on the decisions of the consortia or 
organization releasing them and deciding the benchmark they should be anchored to (and therefore 
directly setting and influencing their value). However, some findings suggest that the price of bitcoin 
might be strongly correlated to the price of the stable-coin Tether (Griffin and Shams, 2019; Wei, 
2018), thus implying that the value of bitcoin might be substantially backed by the US Federal 
Reserve, as any other fiat money, and far away from the metallist ideal of bitcoin as a decentralized 
(in the sense of un-backed) digital commodity. 
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5.2.2 Informational De/centralization: Coin as Digital Fiat Money  or Social Claim 
In the ideal world of cryptoanarchists and Austrian monetarists, perfect decentralization along the 
second-order coin-community interaction dimension can only be achieved by a coin behaving like a 
deflationary commodity: intrinsically useful, transnational, whose value is only dependent on a-
social characteristics of the technological and ontological context. For these reasons, among the 
three or four37 key characteristics of money (Ali, 2014; Birch, 2017), a decentralized coin becomes a 
store of value, similar to gold. Decentralization in this case denotes a situation where the coin value 
is independent from the specific and contingent institutional arrangements of a particular social 
community and from the specific (asymmetric) status of some of its members. 
According to the metallist definition of decentralization, only bitcoin and all cryptocurrencies 
following the original Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus protocol can fit the definition of a purely 
decentralized coin. The fierce debate over the bitcoin block size and its scalability that led to the fork 
of bitcoin in 2017 showed that not all bitcoin enthusiasts intended the decentralized nature of 
bitcoin in the same way cryptoanarchists and Austrian monetarists did (De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016; 
Hsieh et al., 2018; Walch, 2018). Although much of the debate focussed on the problems associated 
to the centralization of the nodes on-chain (see the techno-economic approach), the quarrel also 
revealed a different understanding of bitcoin: advocates of smaller blocks intended bitcoin more as a 
means of exchange rather than a commodity for the store of value (Swartz, 2018).  
As a result, the other way in which decentralization can be understood and defined along the coin-
community relationship is by considering the informational content of a coin qua means of exchange. 
Differently from the metallist interpretation, the informational approach does not define 
de/centralization by looking at the origin of value. The informational approach characterises the 
de/centralization of fiat money with a social value, rather than commodity money with an intrinsic 
value. The degree of centralization of a cryptocurrency in this case can be understood in function of 
its privacy-preserving characteristics and on its discriminatory properties. This interpretation of 
decentralization appealed especially hackers (such as Wikileaks members) and software developers, 
all particularly concerned with the threat that intermediation poses to individual privacy and 
freedom of expression (Swartz, 2018).  
Consistent with the political-economic approach adopted by digital metallism, the informational 
approach also understands the degree of centralization of a currency by looking at the way in which 
asymmetries characterising the social community affect the value of the coin transacted and, more 
generally, generate symbolic asymmetries among the coins (and vice versa). However, differently 
from the metallist case, the interdependencies between the coin’s value and the social community 
are interpreted differently, and so is the concept of de/centralization.   
While in the metallist approach a decentralized coin becomes valuable because it is somehow 
intrinsically useful, deflationary, and intrinsically scarce, in the informational approach the coin 
becomes valuable to the extent in which it can convey the strictly necessary amount of information 
                                                          
37
 Money serves the purposes of: 1) a unit of account — can be measured; 2) a medium of exchange by being a 
commonly acceptable currency in exchange for goods or service; 3) a store of value as can be held as an 
investment and contain value as a result; and as added by Birch (2017), 4) a means of deferred payment 
supporting contractually arranged provisionf or future payment even subject to inflation or other changes. 
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to the counterpart in order to enable trade and social coordination, while preserving privacy and 
freedom of transaction and communication. In the same vain, the decentralization of the coin is not 
interpreted as a way to tackle the special status of the central bank or central government and their 
legal monopoly over its supply. A “decentralized” coin mainly becomes a tool for free, open, 
disintermediated, and privacy-preserving social coordination among independent and equal 
members of the community. In this case, coordination, open access, and social interdependencies 
are valued above independence and a-social autarky fulfilled through the personal accumulation of 
an objectively and intrinsically useful commodity.  
In the informational approach value is not univocally linked to the mechanism regulating the supply 
and creation of the coin (and the control over it), but it is linked to the informational content of the 
coin: it depends on the opportunities and options in which the coin can be used and which can be 
claimed by the coin holder while the coin is used as a means of exchange. The coin then plays a dual 
role: on the one hand it conveys information about what is possible and what opportunities are 
available to its holder before it is used and, and on the other hand, the specific way in which the coin 
is used by a member also reveals information about the coin holder status and preferences to the 
other members of the social community and in relation to them. The former defines the fungibility 
of the coin as a means of exchange, the latter defines the neutrality of the coin or, in other words, its 
capacity to discriminate one member from the other and to generate asymmetries among these.  
The coin is therefore a dual informational tool endowed with informational value and for this reason 
we call this second political-economic approach the “informational interpretation”. As a result, 
under the informational approach the distinction between centralization and decentralization 
becomes as follow. 
In a decentralized system all actors transact the coin under the same informational setting and the 
coin has the same symbolic significance of fungible and neutral cash for all members. On the one 
hand, the coin has the same informational value for everyone (neutrality) and provides the same 
opportunities and capabilities to anyone (fungibility) regardless of how it is spent and who spends it: 
no special actor can obtain more value and enjoy more opportunities than the others while 
exchanging the coin. No subset of actors can benefit from unilaterally affecting the way in which 
others can use the coin. For this reason, in a decentralized system the symbolic value of a coin is 
perceived identically by all actors of the community independently from their relationships and 
asymmetric interdependencies, and no member can decide and constraint how others can use the 
coin. At the same time, all identical coins are symbolically indistinguishable, and this means that they 
are endowed with the same informational value, provide the same opportunities, and convey the 
exact same information to all social members (absence of discrimination). For this reason, in a 
decentralized system the symbolic value is identical for all identical coins, in the sense that all 
identical coins are endowed with the same symbolic content.  
From an informational stand point, a coin is decentralized whenever second-order symmetries 
between the symbolic and the social dimension emerge: symmetries in the social dimension are 
reflected into symmetries in the symbolic dimension and vice versa. These two conditions reveal the 
dual nature of symmetries characterising the coin-social community relationship: decentralization in 
the informational approach implies symmetry in the value of a coin among all members (social 
symmetry) and symmetry in value among all identical coins (symbolic symmetry). The first implies 
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symmetries in the social sphere: no actor has the right or power to benefit more from the 
transaction of a coin more than others, and therefore to benefit from it in an asymmetric fashion. 
The second implies symmetries in the symbolic dimension: no coin is special and is endowed with 
more (or less) informational value than all other identical coins. For this reason, it is not possible to 
discriminate among identical coins simply based on who employs them or how they are employed.  
In conclusion, while a decentralized coin in the metallist interpretation is an intrinsically useful 
commodity endowed with a-social value (coin-community independence), a decentralized coin in 
the informational interpretation is a neutral and fungible means of exchange (or social claim) 
endowed with the same social value for all its users (coin-community symmetric interdependence), 
such as fiat money or cash. Differently from the metallist case, informational decentralization cannot, 
however, explain or justify what backs the value of the coin and what guarantees that this does not 
collapses to zero.  
Conversely, a centralized system is characterised by informational asymmetries in the coin-
community relationship, which work both ways. Centralization can be understood as a situation 
where the informational content generated by any transaction of the coin spreads unevenly among 
the various members of the community. In this case, asymmetries derive from the fact that the 
symbolic significance of the coin (its informational content) is higher for some members than for 
others. This means that the value of the coin is higher for some members than for others: some 
benefit more than others from a transaction of the coin as a result of the fact that they know more 
than others.  
This informational imbalance among the various members of the community reveals some form of 
(asymmetric) social power among the various members and the potential capability of these 
powerful members to control or purposefully shape the value of the coin at their advantage. In 
virtue of their social status or identity some members can extract more value from a coin than 
others, meaning that the coin is not neutral and offers an asymmetric set of opportunities or options 
to its different users. In this case, the fact that some actors have the privilege to better understand 
the social significance of a coin than others violate the equality principle of the social dimension and 
therefore the symmetry among all members of the social community. The same is true in the case of 
legal claims: having more information of who is exercising some claims and why can put some 
members in a position to influence the significance and the value of these claims.  
In all these cases, some members might have a better overview or understanding of the value of the 
coin (or significance of the claim) compared to the other members of the social community in virtue 
of their special status within the community. As a result, some members with a better understanding 
of the symbolic significance of the coin might be able to purposefully and asymmetrically affect the 
value of the coin for other members. 
On the other hand, asymmetries can operate the other way around: asymmetries in the symbolic 
dimension can be used in order to discriminate among members and therefore to generate 
asymmetries in the social dimension. In this case informational centralization characterises a 
situation where some coins can be distinguished and discriminated from others even though they 
are seemingly identical. In this case different coins have different informational value than others 
and for this reason they present different opportunities and fungibility to their holders. Asymmetries 
among coins in the symbolic dimension can be used to discriminate one member (coin holder) from 
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the other: the social community is able to discriminate against some of its members by 
discriminating against some coins.  
A typical example is one where a part of the community decides that certain coins identified by 
certain identifiers or serial numbers should be discriminated against, and therefore be regarded as 
“inferior” or “superior” social claims as compared to the other originally identical coins. The goal of 
this discrimination is clearly to place the holders of these coins in different social positions vis-à-vis 
the others members of the social community. Asymmetries in the symbolic dimension are used to 
purposefully generate asymmetries in the social dimension.  
 
Metallist Approach Informational Approach 
 Decentralization 
Meaning of 
decentralization 
Interdependence between the symbolic 
dimension and the social dimension 
Symmetric interdependence between the 
symbolic dimension and the social dimension 
Condition for 
decentralization 
Socio-symbolic Independence: the coni can retain 
an intrinsic value independently from the 
contingent arrangements and interdependencies 
in force among the members of the social 
community    
Symbolic and social symmetries: identical coins 
are endowed with identical claims (fungibility of 
the coin) and the same coin gives identical claims 
to any member (privacy and equality)  
Causality / Directionality 
Absent or 
from the symbolic dimension to the social  
Bidirectional / Symmetric  
Nature of the coin Digital commodity (commodity money) 
Digital social claim (fungible and neutral fiat 
money such as cash) 
Nature of value  Objective and a-social Objective and social  
Implications for the social 
sphere 
Lack of central banks or government  
Lack of identification-based (account-based) 
payments  
 Centralization 
Meaning of centralization 
Interdependence of the symbolic dimension from 
the social dimension 
Asymmetric interdependence between the 
symbolic dimension and the social dimension 
Condition for 
centralization 
Social interdependencies among social members 
driven by social claims 
Symbolic and social asymmetries: Asymmetric 
claims among identical coins (no fungibility or 
neutrality of the coin) and among actors (no 
privacy or equality) 
Causality / Directionality From the social to the symbolic dimension Bidirectional / Asymmetric 
Nature of the coin 
Digital social claim (fiat money backed by a social 
institution) 
Individualised / personalised / specific digital 
social claim (voucher, ticket or coupon) 
Nature of value  Objective and social Subjective and social  
Implications for the social 
sphere 
Presence of central banks or government  
Presence of a social tool for members’ 
discrimination and identity revelation  
Table 6.2: Summery of differences between decentralization and centralization in terms of the metallist and 
informational perspective on the coin-social community second-order dimension interdependencies. 
The history of cryptocurrencies is abundant with these kinds of coin-community asymmetric 
interdependencies where symbolic asymmetries have been used purposefully and instrumentally in 
order to discriminate against certain members. Standards examples of this case are the decision to 
invalid certain coins that have been stolen or counterfeits in order to punish those holders that 
broke a social rule, or a decision to put some coins out of circulation as they belong to an old social 
order that is not recognised any more (for instance a fork). The case of the hacking of the Distributed 
Autonomous Organization (The DAO) investment fund is a very well-known example (Zachariadis et 
al, 2019). Here, the Ethereum community and its funders decided to invalidate and nullify the value 
of all the stolen coins. In this case, discrimination among coins was operated in order to generate 
asymmetries among different members of the social community (the hackers vs. the others): while 
some coins still represented valid claims against the Ethereum society, others could not be enforced 
as social claims, thus creating a duality in the social meaning and value of the same coin. Eventually, 
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this duality also generated a fork (split) in the social community, each coalescing around a different 
social significance of the coin. In all these cases asymmetric symbolic meanings among the coins 
reflect social asymmetries among coalitions of members of the community and in the authority of 
certain members or institutions over others. A discrimination of the social meanings of the various 
coins necessarily benefits some members at the expenses of others or, vice versa, penalizes some 
compared to others.  
In conclusion, while a decentralized coin in the informational interpretation is something like cash or 
a banknote (it is neutral, fungible, and retains the same value for all its holders), a centralized coin in 
the informational interpretation is more like a voucher or a personalised ticket or coupon: it allows 
to discriminate among members as it attaches to a specific member (it is not neutral as its value 
depends on the specific identity of the holder), and/or it can only be employed for a specific subset 
of purposes or uses (it is not fungible). Table 6.2 summarizes the differences between 
decentralization and centralization in terms of the metallist and informational perspective on the 
coin-social community second-order dimension interdependencies  
5.3 NTC: Network Technology and Coin 
Soon after the first works discussing the decentralized nature of bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, and 
contextually with the first conceptualization of Ethereum in 2014 (Buterin, 2014; Wood, 2014), the 
literature started to realise that bitcoin could just be one possible coin exchanged on the blockchain 
and one possible use case among others. This was realised as the attention gradually shifted from 
the economic nature and significance of the coin to the role of the underlying network technology in 
enabling the “trustless trust” of decentralized currencies or, in the case of digital metallism, their 
“society-less value”. Starting from 2015, an increasing number of publications and reports conclude 
that the essence of a blockchain does not depend on the characteristics of the coin transacted over 
it, but on the underlying network technology enabling its transactions and supporting its value and 
meaning (Economist, 2015; Underwood, 2016; UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, 2016; 
Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016). The focus shifts from the interdependencies between the coin and 
political rules of the social community to the interdependencies between the coin and the protocol 
rules of the network technology.  
Considering the second-order interdependencies illustrated in Figure 6.1 above, it possible to 
identify six different interpretations of decentralization in the second-order interdependencies 
between the two first-order systems of Coin (the legal-economic system), and Network Technology 
(the technological first-order system). These six approaches fall within two distinct categories; a 
techno-economic, and a techno-legal approach: 
 
Techno-economic 
1) protocol-logic: the decentralized protocol as a risk-free lender of last resort; 
2) permission-logic: the decentralized protocol as a neutral validation mechanism; 
3) market-power: the decentralized network as an egalitarian distribution of capital; 
 
Techno-legal 
1) platform-logic: the decentralized network as a neutral and open general-purpose technology. 
2) code-is-law: the decentralized network as an on-chain governance mechanism; 
3) principal-agent: the decentralized network as coordination mechanism for the on-chain division 
of labour. 
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In the following we will briefly contextualize these six perspectives before the following six sub-
sections discuss each in turn in more detail. 
In all six perspectives the concept of de/centralization is used to define the network rather than the 
coin. De/centralization ceases to define the coin and the decentralized nature of its value and starts 
to define the underlying network and the decentralized nature of its technology. De/centralization 
becomes a characteristic of the technological dimension, rather than a characteristic of the symbolic 
dimension: from cryptocurrencies as decentralized currencies (or money) to blockchain as a 
decentralized technology.  
The expression “network technology” is quite broad and refers to various important aspects that are 
useful to distinguish. The two components of a network technology, its logic and architecture, 
perform two fundamental roles as they define: 1) the way in which coins can be transacted among 
nodes; and 2) the ways in which these transactions are verified and validated by the network, and 
subsequently appended to the common ledger. The characteristics of the network topology strictly 
defined directly deal with the former, while the ethical and political precepts of the social dimension 
inform the way in which the blockchain cryptographic protocol carries out the second set of 
activities (verification, validation and updating). Thus, the original bitcoin blockchain is characterised 
by p2p transactions among nodes and by a cryptographic protocol that ensures equality and privacy 
of all nodes not only off-chain, but also on-chain in the validation and verification process.  
The techno-economic and techno-legal interpretations of de/centralization recognise that the value 
of the coin is endogenously shaped by both aspects of the network technology through a change in 
the way in which: 1) the nodes can communicate and transact on-chain and directly affect the 
economic value and significance of the coin, and 2) the various nodes can verify, validate, and 
append transactions with direct implications for the economic value and significance of the coin. The 
interdependencies might be symmetric so that the reverse also holds: transaction and validation 
rules can be directly affected by the specific value assumed by the coin and by its symbolic meaning 
and significance.  
Although the three approaches following a techno-economic interpretation of de/centralization, and 
the three approaches following a techno-legal interpretation share the same general view with 
respect to the interdependencies between the symbolic (Coin) and the technological dimension 
(Network Technology), each approach focuses on one specific aspect of this interaction.  
First of all, these six different approaches can be distinguished based on whether the focus is placed 
on the coin or on the network technology. Some approaches study centralization by looking at the 
way in which the de/centralized nature of the network technology shapes the value and significance 
of a coin, while others study de/centralization by looking at the way in which certain values and 
significance of the coins shape the degree of de/centralization of a network. Obviously, both 
mechanisms can play a role even though each approach usually only focuses on one specific 
causality. 
Secondly, these six different approaches can also be distinguished based on whether the coin is 
interpreted as an economic or a pure legal entity. The first group of works belong to the political-
economic approach were heavily influenced by bitcoin and, for this reason, are mainly interested in 
the economic nature of the coin, which was regarded either as commodity money or as fiat money, 
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but always as digital money or digital (crypto)-currency. Works belonging to the second stream 
realise that the focus on the monetary nature of the coin is misplaced and a very narrow 
interpretation of the meaning of the coin and its value (Hayes, 2019). Starting with Ethereum, the 
coin becomes a digital token for the provision of services over the blockchain and, more generally, a 
legal claim (right) transacted over the network. As a result, the six distinct approaches focussing on 
the technology-symbolic interaction can be divided into two broad groups (of three approaches each) 
based on their understanding of the coin.  
Three techno-economic approaches: One set of approaches mainly retains the interpretation of the 
coin as digital currency or money adopted by the political-economic approach to de/centralization, 
but extends and complements their intuitions to the technological dimension. For this reason, they 
can be labelled as techno-economic (or, sometimes, crypto-economic). Differently from the political-
economic approach, the three techno-economic approaches recognise that the coin’s value and 
significance is not only affected by the political precepts (and institutional arrangements) shaping 
the interdependencies among social members off-chain, but also by the architectural and logical 
rules shaping the interdependencies among the nodes and elements of the network on-chain. In 
other words, the three techno-economic approaches recognise that the social value and significance 
of the coin depends on the specific logic and architecture adopted in order to transact, distribute 
and exchange the coin among the various nodes of the network on-chain.  
Three techno-legal approaches: A second set of approaches departs more or less explicitly from the 
original understanding of the coin as an economic tool and treat it as a legal claim. These other three 
approaches, which we can call techno-legal, are mainly interested in the way in which the validity 
and the enforcement of a claim such as a tokenised property or a contract depends on the specific 
technological solution adopted. The techno-legal approaches all recognise that the meaning, validity 
and significance of a legal claim strongly depend on the architectural and logical rules shaping the 
interdependencies among the nodes and elements of the network on-chain. The shift from an 
economic to a more general legal understanding of the coin opens up new perspectives on the way 
in which de/centralization can be understood from a techno-legal perspective (and not merely 
techno-economic). These second set of techno-legal approach are sometimes also defined as 
institutional cryptoeconomics.  
In sum, the techno-economic interpretation of de/centralization looks at how the technological 
characteristics of the blockchain network shape and affect the significance of the coin and the 
nature and origin of its value and vice versa. Decentralization is therefore defined in function of the 
changing network-coin relationship, while keeping the political and ethical dimension of the social 
community fixed.  
The following three sub-sections will each discuss a techno-economic perspective with a fourth 
subsection summarizing the discussion: 1) protocol-logic: the decentralized protocol as a risk-free 
lender of last resort; 2) permission-logic: the decentralized protocol as a neutral validation 
mechanism; and 3) market-power: the decentralized network as an egalitarian distribution of capital; 
5.3.1 Protocol-Logic: Protocol as Risk-Free Lender of Last Resort   
The value and significance of a coin does not only depend on its interactions with the social 
dimension, but also on its interaction with the technology of the network. This is particularly evident 
in the case of digital metallism (the original understanding of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin) 
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where the coin’s value is exclusively dependent on, and backed by, the network protocol and the on-
chain incentives generated by it, independently from the dynamics occurring in the socio-political 
dimension off-chain.  
The bitcoin Proof-of-Work represents the original way to introduce economic incentives to ensure 
on-chain cooperation among all nodes and network integrity. The inherently costly and energy 
intensive process required for the solution of the cryptographic puzzle and the verification and 
validation of the transactions represents the way in which it was ensured that the coin could be 
perceived as an intrinsically valuable commodity by all those actors willing to participate in the 
process and therefore to incur in those costs. For this reason, the value of bitcoin was originally 
benchmarked to, and is still directly affected by, the costs to run the hardware performing the PoW 
algorithm. 
The bitcoin PoW is usually defined a “decentralized” consensus protocol as it allows (in principle) any 
node to perform the verification and validation operations, while blockchains operating a 
“decentralized” consensus protocol are usually defined as “permissionless”. However, the PoW is 
not the only example of “decentralized” consensus. Other consensus protocols ensure 
permissionless verification and validation of transactions, such as proof-of-stake (PoS), proof-of-
authority (PoA), and others (Narayanan et al., 2016: chapter 8). These alternatives become more and 
more appealing as some fundamental problems linked to the decentralized nature of the original 
PoW algorithm emerge, such as the: Extreme inefficiency and slowness; difficulty in scaling 
transactions;  environmental impact and extreme energy consumption; tendency for on-chain 
concentration. Many blockchains are therefore abandoning PoW and are moving towards the 
adoption of PoS. Both are defined as “decentralized” and this creates some confusion on the 
meaning of decentralization in the case of consensus protocols, and on whether PoS is more or less 
centralized than PoW.  
One way to distinguish the various protocols in function of their degree of de/centralization is to 
look at the nature of the interdependencies between the protocol and the coin that is univocally 
associated to the protocol run by the network. As discussed in section 5.2.1 above, the goal of many 
“decentralized protocols” is to disentangle the value of the coin from the social sphere, and to 
univocally link it to the technological dimension of the network. Based on that, here we define the 
protocol-logic approach as that specific subfield of the techno-economic interpretation of 
de/centralization that complements and extends the metallist interpretation of de/centralization, 
and defines de/centralization by looking at the way in which the value of the coin (intended as a 
digital commodity) is generated, set, and sustained in function of the interdependencies between 
the symbolic dimension of the coin and the technological dimension of the consensus protocol.  
Consistent with a metallist approach to de/centralization, a network is more or less centralized 
according to a protocol-logic approach depending on whether the value of the coin depends on the 
contingent state of the network and on the way in which the various nodes decide to participate in 
the solution of the consensus protocol, or whether the value of the coin is independent from these 
and only depends on predefined protocol rules.   
In the protocol-logic case centralization and decentralization are both defined in the case of so-
called permissionless networks in order to distinguish degrees of de/centralization among 
permissionless protocols (among so-called “decentralized” protocols). A decentralized network 
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protocol in the protocol-logic case does not characterise a permissionless network as opposed to a 
permissioned one (this will be the task of the permission-logic approach to de/centralization), nor it 
distinguishes centralization from decentralization based on the degree of asymmetric capabilities 
between nodes in validating transactions, We will define this later in the market power approach to 
de/centralization).  
As a result, a decentralized protocol is characterised by the fact that the intrinsic value of the digital 
commodity only depends on the pre-established rules of the consensus protocol and is completely 
independent from the decisions, roles and capabilities of the single nodes participating in the 
consensus protocol. This means that in the case of a decentralized system value is independent from 
the specific and contingent state of the network and the way in which the various nodes decide to 
cooperate or compete in order to solve the consensus protocol, but it is established ex-ante by the 
protocol rules. In the protocol-logic approach the value of the coin is always intended as an objective 
and predictable property of the protocol independently from the network nodes. The coin value in 
this case becomes an intrinsic characteristic of the protocol itself, consistent with the spirit of digital 
metallism. Stated differently, decentralization implies a technological value of the coin defined by-
design. On the other hand, centralization in the protocol-logic approach emerges whenever the 
technological value of the coin is not set ex-ante and it is not a predictable and predefined property 
of the network protocol, but can change and fluctuate based on the contingent state of the network 
and on the contingent decisions taken by the nodes participating in the consensus mechanism. In 
this case the coin value is not independent from the decisions of the single nodes and therefore 
cannot be understood as an intrinsic characteristic of the network protocol.  
Given the distinction between centralization and decentralization in the protocol-logic approach, a 
PoS protocol in which the rewards to nodes “staking” their coins in the consensus process are set by 
the protocol rules independently from the contingent state of the network is more decentralized 
than a PoW consensus protocol where rewards to miners (in the form of fees and mining rewards) 
can change and adjust based on the contingent state of the network and on the contingent decisions 
and conditions of the various nodes. This does not mean that a PoS consensus protocol is necessarily 
more decentralized thank a PoW consensus protocol, it only means that this is true limited to the 
protocol-logic definition of de/centralization. Alternatively, a peculiar PoW where all mining nodes 
only get a pre-established reward for their service based on the predictable amount of energy 
consumed in the process will be as decentralized as a PoS protocol. 
The protocol-logic approach to define de/centralization has various similarities to the metallist 
approach. Both define decentralization as independence, rather than in terms of symmetric 
interdependence. In both the value of a coin does not depend on the specific interactions and 
organization of the elements of a system but only on pre-established rules that are immutable and 
independent from (thus exogenous to) the elements themselves.  
Both perspectives, furthermore, intend decentralization by looking at the extent to which the value 
of the coin is independent from the contingent ebbs and flows of the system considered (either 
social or technological). In both cases the coin value becomes an exogenous and risk-free benchmark 
of value within the system in cases of decentralization. Centralization, on the other hand, denotes a 
situation where the coin value endogenously depends on the state of the system, and is therefore 
endowed with some risk and, consequently, with some variable and unpredictable return dependent 
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on the specific interdependencies of the system actors (metallist) or network nodes (protocol-logic). 
While the coin in a decentralized PoW has the characteristic of an intrinsically valuable safe-haven 
asset (it behaves like a digital store of value), some authors are noticing that the coin in a 
decentralized PoS behaves more like a risk-free government bond, or a (risk-free) central bank base 
rate (Roda, 2019).  
In conclusion, what characterises decentralization in the metallist and protocol-logic case is precisely 
the fact that the network is able to act as a lender of last resort and to guarantee a risk-free base 
rate on the coin, without the need for any central institutions managing it and baking it. This makes 
the value of the coin independent from the potential asymmetries of the system (social and 
technological). This characteristic of decentralized PoS has triggered new ways to benefit from the 
coin’s risk-free “intrinsic” returns, notably the so-called “stake-as-a-service”, which however looks 
dangerously similar to private banking (Casey, 2019). This is a plastic example of the fact that the 
approach adopted by the protocol-logic approach (as for the metallist approach) can characterise 
de/centralization according to one specific understanding of the coin-network interaction. A system 
decentralized according to the protocol-logic approach might not necessarily be decentralized 
according to other perspectives of the techno-economic interpretation, to which we now turn. 
5.3.2 Permission-Logic: Protocol as a Neutral Validation Mechanism    
While the protocol-logic approach is the equivalent of the metallist approach for the technological 
dimension, the permission-logic approach is the equivalent of the informational approach applied to 
the coin-network relationship on-chain.  The first two define de/centralization by looking at the ways 
in which the coin can acquire social significance and social value independently from the presence of 
special actors endowed with asymmetric privileges, powers or rights to control, back and redeem 
the coin. The metallist and the protocol-logic define de/centralization by looking at the origin of the 
coin’s value (off-chain and on-chain respectively) and conclude that decentralization characterises a 
condition of independence of the symbolic dimension from the underlying social (metallist) or 
technological (protocol-logic) dimension. This independence implies that the coin must be 
understood as a digital object having some form of intrinsic, fundamental, risk-free value that 
precedes and remains independent from, the social interdependencies among the members of the 
community (metallist) and/or the technological interdependencies among the network elements 
(protocol-logic). Value can be subjective and have an a-social origin. 
Both the informational and the permission-logic approaches understand decentralization in terms of 
second-order symmetric interdependencies, rather than in the terms of independence. They are not 
interested in explaining where the coin value comes from, and both approaches assume that the 
coin can be intended as fiat money endowed with some social value. Differently from the protocol-
logic and the metallist approach, the permission-logic (and informational) approach assumes that 
the coin has a certain floating value that is determined by the contingent state of the networks (of 
social community) and can fluctuate and change in response to the decisions taken by the nodes of 
the network (or members of the social community). De/centralization is defined by looking at the 
asymmetries in the symbolic meaning and value of the coins at any given point in time emerging 
from the discrimination of the various members of the social community (informational approach), 
or elements of the network (permission-logic approach).  
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In both approaches, a coin is decentralized whenever it is endowed with the same social value and 
significance independently from the identity of the actor transacting it (fungibility), and this makes it 
impossible to discriminate among its owners (neutrality). A coin is decentralized whenever its value 
and significance for anyone possessing it only depends on the collective and uncoordinated 
decisions of the various members, and does not depend on the unilateral decisions and identity of 
any specific actor.  
There are two ways in which asymmetries here can be introduced in the symbolic dimension of the 
coin. Firstly, in the informational approach symbolic asymmetries can be used in order to generate 
social asymmetries by distinguishing one coin from the others and linking the value and significance 
of each coin to the specific identity of its holder. These symbolic asymmetries can be introduced in a 
token-based payment method, by simply verifying the nature of the coin and therefore ensuring that 
coin holders are favoured or penalised vis-à-vis the others. The informational approach is usually 
employed in order to discriminate and distinguish one member of the community form another one 
(Coin  Social Community) and in the blockchain space is usually employed in the case of utility 
tokens whenever the subjective value and symbolic significance of a coin for a certain member must 
be different form the value that the same coin can have for another member: the social claims 
attached to a certain coin are subjective and asymmetric.  
Secondly, symbolic asymmetries can also emerge as a result of architectural and logical asymmetries 
among the elements of the networks on-chain. In this case, the fungilibity and neutrality of a coin 
can be restricted by acting on the protocol of the blockchain: Centralization in the permission-logic 
approach denotes a situation where informational gatekeepers oversee transactions and can 
discriminate among nodes by verifying their status. These gatekeepers can decide which node can 
do what with its coin, whether a certain transaction should be authorised or not, and whether the 
social claim of a certain node is legitimate or not. Permission-logic centralization denotes a situation 
where the blockchain protocol allows for some special nodes endowed with special on-chain 
privileges or rights and having special on-chain capabilities. These are especially informational 
capabilities deriving from the fact that some nodes have a better understanding and overview of the 
state of the network and the status of the nodes than all other nodes.    
Differently from the informational branch of the political-economic approach, the focus in this case 
is not on the asymmetry of powers among the members of the social community, but rather on the 
asymmetry of informational capabilities among the various nodes of the network. In this case a 
blockchain is decentralized if information can circulate freely and social coordination can be 
achieved without any need for a third party to reconcile private information and validate 
transactions. A centralized system is one where information capabilities are not evenly spread and 
social coordination among independent members can only be achieved if information has to be 
consolidated, reconciled and validated by a selected subset of nodes. Asymmetric information opens 
the door to asymmetric evaluations of the coin (lack of perfect fungibility) and therefore makes on-
chain discrimination among different nodes possible (lack of neutrality).     
Informational asymmetries operate a token-based payment system where discrimination is based on 
the verification of the coin (its serial number, code and so on). Symbolic asymmetries are embedded 
in the coin and any node can verify the validity or legitimacy of the use of the coin. Conversely, the 
permission-logic approach operates an account-based payment system, where the legitimacy and 
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validity of a transaction does not necessarily rely on the identification of the coin, but on the 
identification of the nodes undertaking the transaction. In this case centralization emerges as some 
special nodes operate as private banks, fulfilling the role of information intermediaries and brokers 
of information and value among coins on-chain. In this case, symbolic asymmetries depend on 
technological asymmetries of the network.  
This type of centralized blockchains are usually called permissioned, while decentralized ones are 
usually called permission-less, and for this reason we named this specific techno-economic approach 
a permission-based interpretation of de/centralization. Technological asymmetries in a permissioned 
network are introduced de jure, by endowing different nodes with different rights. Depending on the 
specific protocol adopted and on the specific network, special nodes can be defined as full nodes, 
super nodes, mining nodes, master nodes, and so forth.    
Both the protocol-logic and the permission-logic approaches share the intuition that the symbolic 
dimension is shaped by the nature of the protocol implemented and that the value and the 
significance of the coin might be affected by the different ways to operate the network.  In both 
cases the degree of centralization of the network has a direct effect on the way in which the nature 
of the coin is perceived. Yet, the protocol-logic and the permission-logic interpretations of 
de/centralization might be incompatible. Both Proof-of-Stake (PoS) and permissioned logics where 
introduced to obviate to the shortcomings of the permission-less Proof-of-Work (PoW), but while 
the former is decentralized from a permission-logic point of view, the second introduces 
centralization.   
A PoW protocol denotes a decentralized network under the permission-based interpretation, but it 
might generate more centralization from a protocol-based approach. The choice between the two 
might in turn depend on the way in which the coin is interpreted and on the political-economic 
approach adopted. A more centralized logic was favoured by those interpreting bitcoin as a store of 
value: centralization helped when it comes to the preservation of value of the coin deriving from an 
increased efficiency of the system. However, a decentralized logic of the infrastructure was mainly 
favoured by those interpreting the bitcoin in informational terms: as a means of exchange for inter-
personal transmission of information.  
Furthermore, different ways in which the information of the transaction is verified and validated by 
the network imply different expenditures of energy and, more generally, a different cost of running 
the system. The electricity cost sustained in order to validate transactions is a key variable entering 
the economic incentives of the validators in case of a permissioned PoW, but not necessarily under 
PoS. The value of the coin is not immune to the level of production cost that has to be sustained by 
the various validating nodes in order to operate the network. As a result, even when it comes to the 
direct expenditure sustained in order to operate the network, the degree of centralization of the 
network has a direct effect on the value of the coin. 
None of these protocol solutions are immune to the concentration of power within fewer and fewer 
nodes than expected, which constitutes a third type of techno-economic centralization, market-
power, to which we now turn. 
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5.3.3 Market-Power: Network as an Egalitarian Distribution of Capital     
The previous sub-sections discussed the protocol-logic and the permission-logic. The former’s 
interpretation of de/centralization considered at how the nature and significance of a coin is shaped 
by different protocol solutions, such as the shift from PoW to PoS, i.e., how the objective value and 
significance of the coin and its interdependencies with other coins are affected by asymmetries in 
the protocol logic. The  latter’s interpretation considers how the subjective value and significance of 
the same coin for different nodes is shaped by different consensus protocols based on the different 
role and status of these nodes within the network: how asymmetries in the subjective values and 
significances of a coin among different nodes transacting it are affected by asymmetries in the 
protocol logic.  
Both consider how a/symmetries codified in the protocol logic of the technological dimension 
generate a/symmetries in the symbolic dimension. These asymmetries in the technological 
dimension might, in turn, themselves be the outcome of more fundamental asymmetries in the 
social dimension, which will be the topic of the three techno-political interpretations discussed in 
the three techno-legal interpretations discussed further below in this document. However, neither 
the protocol-logic approach nor the permission-logic approach considers the possible reverse 
causality between the two dimensions, namely the fact that asymmetries in the symbolic dimension 
might trigger asymmetries among the nodes of the network in the technological dimension. This is 
the domain of the third techno-economic interpretation of de/centralization, which we call the 
market power interpretation.  
As opposed to the two previous interpretations, this approach seeks to understand interactions 
between the value of the coin and the economic decisions taken by the nodes. This stream of work 
belongs to the economic literature and is mainly interested in applying mechanism design and the 
theory of incentives to understand how the degree of centralization over the blockchain is 
endogenous shaped by actors’ incentives. The incentives are first and foremost the coins that the 
validators can obtain as rewards for their roles of gatekeepers of the blockchain system through a 
consensus process. This approach then sees the coin as a pure economic instrument endowed with 
social value in exchange adopted as a reward for the work and effort spent by the various nodes. 
This interpretation of the coin as income, or reward for labour, is consistent with both the metallist 
approach (the coin’s value has its origin the costly validation process) and the informational 
approach (the coin used as a fungible means of exchanged used to reward labour). In either case, 
what interests the market-power approach is the economic value of the coin not its legal significance 
and for this reason this is clearly a techno-economic approach, rather than a techno-legal one.  
The market-power approach to de/centralization is now also referred to as “cryptoeconomics”.38 
Actors are utility maximises and profit seekers.  The goal of this new field of the economic literature 
is the design of the optimal protocol that can maximize the welfare of the system while also 
guaranteeing on-chain “decentralization” among its actors. Consistent with a techno-economic 
approach, the focus of this type of analysis is the way in which the specific architecture and logic of 
                                                          
38
 For an overview of “cryptoeconomics”, see the useful summaries provided by Consensys 
(https://consensys.net/academy/blockchain-basics-book/cryptoeconomics); the Ethereum foundation 
(https://cryptoeconomics.study/); and Binance (https://www.binance.vision/economics/a-beginners-
introduction-to-cryptoeconomics) among others.  
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the network infrastructure interact with the chosen values of the monetary rewards — typically, the 
coin, but some other times even the level of transaction fees. Some cryptoeconomics models are 
dynamic, meaning that on-chain concentration is a function of the incentives to enter (access) a 
blockchain system, others are static, in the sense that the competitive dynamics occurring on-chain 
only depend on a fixed number of actors operating over the blockchain. A non-comprehensive list of 
the works belonging to this stream is represented by: Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018), Biais et al 
(2019), Bonneau (2018), Bohme et al (2015), Budish (2018); Chiu and Koeppl (2017), Cong and He 
(2019), Easley et al. (2019), Huberman et al. (2017), Kroll et al. (2013), Ma et al. (2018). Narayanan 
and colleagues (2016: 130-136 & 190-206) provide an exhaustive overview of the economic and 
technological problems linked to the incentives embedded in any crypto consensus algorithm.    
As a result, de/centralization in the cryptoeconomic case can be defined as market power and 
market structure in economics and industrial organization is usually defined as follows. A techno-
economic system is decentralized if no node has the special power to unilaterally and purposefully 
affect the value of the coin independently form others. This approach can be understood as a 
conflation of the previous two techno-economic approaches. Similar to the metallist and the 
protocol-logic interpretations, a system is understood as decentralized whenever the social value 
and significance of the coin results from the uncoordinated and collective decisions of the various 
nodes, and centralized whenever it rests on the asymmetric powers of certain nodes, whose 
decisions count more than those of other nodes. Similar to the informational and permission-logic 
approaches, centralization reflect asymmetries in the status, capabilities and valuations of the coin 
among the different nodes (and not pre-defined and objective rules codified ex-ante in the 
blockchain protocol and homogeneously valid across all nodes indifferently).  
The market power approach does not go as far as the other two approaches in wondering what 
confers economic value to the coin, nor does it consider the fact that the nature and significance of 
the coin depends of the specific social and technological context. But differently from the previous 
two interpretations, the market power approach introduces the new possibility that the blockchain 
protocol and the coin value do not necessarily interact directly, but that the interdependencies 
between the two might be mediated by the economic decisions of the various nodes that operate in 
response of a given value, and given certain protocol rules. The nodes in the market-power approach 
act as key intermediaries between the symbolic and the protocol dimension.  
The field of cryptoeconomics is interested in devising the optimal protocol knowing that a change in 
protocol not only change the value of the coin, but in turn also provides a different set of incentives 
to the nodes whose decisions endogenously affect the value of the coin. The decisions of the nodes 
concern the economically optimal level of investments in those assets that allow them to gain coins 
as rewards for their participation in the consensus mechanism codified in the blockchain protocol. 
These investments can either be in specialised mining assets (in the case of PoW) or in voting rights 
(in the case of PoS). As a result, the market-power approach recognises that the distribution of 
power among the nodes is not given but reflect a Sutton-type strategic game (Sutton, 1991; 1997) 
where nodes escalate their investments and, in so doing, concentrate the power to validate and 
approve transactions in fewer and fewer hands. In economics terms, cryptoeconomics studies a 
situation of endogenous investment levels leading to an endogenous (market) “structure” of the 
blockchain network.   
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Centralization in the market-power approach reflects a situation of on-chain concentration of capital 
in few hands, thus generating on-chain power asymmetries among nodes. Gencer and colleagues 
(2018) provide one of the first empirical studies comparing the degree of decentralization of bitcoin 
and Ethereum networks along this line, by checking the concentration (or dispersion) of mining 
power among bitcoin and Ethereum miners. Obviously (and this is a core aspect of the market-
power approach), the incentives to escalate in capital investment is directly affected by the social 
value and significance of the coin in turn, making concentration more likely the higher the return on 
the investment and therefore the more valuable the coin paid as a reward. While the protocol, and 
permission-approaches take the strategic decisions of the nodes as given, the market-power 
approach takes the de/centralized nature of the currency (and the origin of its value) as given. For 
this reason, the market-power approach complements and extends the other techno-economic 
approaches to decentralization, it does not replace these perspectives. At the same time, an 
excessive centralization of the validation power among the nodes of the chain might negatively 
impact the value of the coin in the eyes of the members of the social community, thus in turn 
shifting the value and appeal of the coin.  
In the light of these double endogeneities, it is possible to summarise the meaning of 
de/centralization in the market-power approach as follows. Decentralization defines a situation of 
symmetric interdependencies between the coin’s value and significance and the structure of the 
network in terms of distribution of validation power among the nodes. This means that a 
decentralized network is one where no node (or subset of nodes) has the power to exercise control 
over the coin and to univocally determine its value and significance of a coin through its escalation in 
validation investments. This also means that the distribution of the validation power among the 
network’s nodes does not reflect the effects on the coin’s value and significance of the decisions of 
any specific node on above the others. This situation of symmetric interdependencies retraces the 
nature of pre-ASIC or ASIC-resistant blockchains, where the technological and economic viability to 
escalate in CPUs or GPUs investments that concentrate mining equipment in few hands is 
particularly reduced.  In this case, the value and social significance of a coin depends on the solution 
of the cryptographic protocol by the part of the network’s nodes in the same way in which each 
node sees the value of the coin as a given, thus acting as an incentive-taker, rather than as a value-
setter.  
At the same time, decentralization can also denote a situation where the incentives perceived by the 
nodes to verify and validate transactions and claims are independent from their escalation in 
investments, and therefore where the distribution of validation power among the nodes is 
independent from the value of the coin. This is the situation of a “democratic” PoS where each node 
as an equal amount of voting rights to validate transactions, and therefore an equal level of 
incentives, independently from their capital expenditures, and their relative status and the value of 
the coin itself. In this case market-power decentralization corresponds to a situation of protocol-
logic decentralization — independence between the symbolic and the technological structure of the 
network).   
On the other hand, centralization emerge whenever there are asymmetric interdependencies 
between the value or significance of the coin and the distribution of the validation power among the 
nodes, meaning that asymmetries in the symbolic dimension foster asymmetries in the technological 
dimension and vice versa. This represents a situation where asymmetries in value among different 
84 
 
coins generate incentives among the nodes of a certain network to invest in coin-specific assets that 
allow them to increase the rewards obtained in one coin at the expenses of the rewards obtainable 
in other coins. This generates escalation in investments and capital accumulation for some specific 
coins, and therefore asymmetric nodes in turn.  
The current history of cryptocurrencies and cryptoassets shows that market-power centralization 
appears in both PoW and PoS. Both can be understood as two different types of capitalistic 
centralization, revealing a pure economic understanding of centralization (see section 2.4). 
With respect to PoW, market-power centralization characterises the typical situation where the 
greater value and popularity of some coins compared to other alternative coins incentivizes nodes to 
shift from general purpose machines such as CPUs or GPUs towards specialised equipment, such as 
ASIC mining hardware. In this case, the economic justification of the investment derives from the 
greater value of the coin compared to others. At the same time, centralization also denotes the 
opposite causality. As fewer powerful nodes operating ASIC farms can now operate as value-setters, 
rather than value-takers, they can directly affect the value and significance of their coins vis-à-vis the 
same coins held by the other nodes of the network, and vis-à-vis other coins altogether. The first 
case of centralization reflects a so-called “majority attack” (or 51% attack) leading to the 
manipulation of the value and significance of certain specific coins vis-à-vis the others internally to a 
single blockchain network. The second case represents the essence of a market manipulation in the 
crypto-space, where the decisions taken by few powerful nodes of a blockchain network create 
unjustified and inflated valuations of a coin vis-à-vis other coins supported by other blockchains.    
With respect to PoS, market power centralization emerges whenever the voting rights held by each 
node do not reflect a democratic principle (one-vote per head), but are weighted according to the 
economic relevance of the node: nodes with higher levels of coin stock or capital investment also 
obtain higher stakes, which make them more relevant than nodes with lower stakes. This system 
where on-chain voting rights are not counted but weighted is also usually defined in the crypto-
literature as “plutocracy” (Buterin, 2018). As a result, the interpretation of the coin as a digital 
commodity backed by protocol-logic decentralization also supports market-power decentralization, 
while an interpretation of the coin as digital fiat money might lead to on-chain capitalistic 
centralization (but do not need to).  
5.3.4 Summary of Techno-Economic Interpretations of De/centralization   
The three techno-economic interpretations of de/centralization discussed above conceive the coin 
as an economic tool endowed with some economic value that can be either monetary (in exchange) 
or subjective (in use) depending on the specific interpretation of the coin adopted. All three techno-
economic approaches reveal different reasons why the value and significance of a blockchain coin 
can be affected by asymmetries in the network technology and, vice versa, why certain asymmetries 
in the coins’ values and significance might trigger on-chain asymmetries among the nodes of the 
network.  
A blockchain network is decentralized from a protocol-logic perspective only if the objective value of 
the coin is completely independent from the contingent state of the network, interdependencies 
and decisions of the nodes. The value of the coin is common to all nodes and is predefined ex-ante 
by the protocol rules. This peculiar interpretation of decentralization derives from the fact that the 
protocol-logic approach adopts the metallist understanding of decentralization that implies that 
85 
 
whenever the value of the coin depends on the contingent agreements, interactions and 
interdependencies between different actors or elements, some form of centralization will always 
emerge.  
A blockchain network is decentralized from a permission-logic perspective whenever the value of the 
coin can change and fluctuate based on the contingent state of the network, but it is common to all 
nodes and does not depend on the asymmetries in special status between the nodes validating the 
transaction and the ones transacting. In this case the coin can be a socially constructed means of 
exchange endowed with pure exchange vale on-chain, but centralization emerges whenever the 
consensus process is permissioned. 
A blockchain network is decentralized from a market-power perspective whenever the value of the 
coin for any node cannot depend on the strategic behaviour and investment decisions of the same 
node: any node must remain value-taker, and no node can purposefully act in order to discriminate 
its coins from the ones of others.  
The protocol-logic approach makes sure that the blockchain protocol renders network asymmetries 
among nodes irrelevant, the permission-logic approach makes sure that the blockchain protocol 
rules them out ex-ante (de jure), while the market-power approach makes sure that the incentives 
built in the blockchain protocol prevents on-chain network asymmetries to emerge ex-post as well 
(de facto).  
Both the permission-logic and the market power approach treat centralization in terms of 
discrimination and inequalities among nodes. But while the permission-logic approach is mainly 
interested in making sure that a node’s coin is not negatively discriminated against the ones of 
special status nodes, the market-power approach mainly makes sure that a node cannot positively 
discriminate its own coins cis-a-vis the ones of other less powerful nodes.  
Table 6.3 and 6.4 recap the key characteristics of the three techno-economic approach to 
de/centralization 
 
 
Techno-Economic second-
order interdependencies  
How the technological characteristics of the blockchain network shape and affect the significance of the 
coin and the nature and origin of its value and vice versa.   
Approach  
Tries to understand how the value of the coin is endogenously shaped by the network technology and 
vice versa: a change in the way in which the nodes can communicate and transact on-chain and can 
verify, validate and append transactions directly affects the economic value and significance of the coin 
and vice versa. 
Definition of 
de/centralization   
How asymmetries in the social significance and meaning of coin (the symbolic dimension of a digital 
network) depend on the asymmetries among the elements of the network (the technological dimension) 
and vice versa. 
Unit of analysis  
(De/Centralization applies 
to) 
The blockchain network (& protocol) 
Table 6.3: Overview of the techno-economic perspective. 
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Protocol-logic Permission-Logic Market-power 
 Decentralization 
Meaning of 
decentralization 
Independence of the symbolic 
dimension from the technological 
dimension 
Symmetric interdependence 
between the symbolic dimension 
and the technological dimension 
Symmetric interdependencies or 
independence between the symbolic 
dimension and the technological 
dimension 
Condition for 
decentralization 
Techno-symbolic Independence:  
 
The intrinsic value of the digital 
commodity only depends on the 
pre-established rules of the 
consensus protocol (ex-ante) and is 
completely independent from the 
specific and contingent state of the 
network and the way in which the 
various nodes decide to cooperate 
or compete in order to solve the 
consensus protocol 
Symbolic and technological 
symmetries:  
 
The value of the coin is not 
predefined ex-ante and can 
fluctuate according to the 
contingent state of the network. 
At any given time, identical coins 
are endowed with identical value 
(fungibility of the coin) and the 
same coin gives identical claims 
to any member (privacy and 
equality) 
Symmetric interdependencies: No node 
(or subset of nodes) has the power to 
exercise control over the coin and to 
univocally determine the value and 
significance of a coin by escalating its 
capital investments in validating assets. 
 
Independence: 
the incentives perceived by the nodes to 
verify and validate transactions and 
claims are independent from their 
escalation in investments (distribution 
of validation power among nodes) 
Causality / 
Directionality 
Absent  Bidirectional / Symmetric  Bidirectional / Symmetric 
Nature of value  Objective and a-social Objective and social  Objective and social 
Implications for 
the 
technological 
sphere 
Network protocol as a risk-free 
lender of last resort 
No identification-based 
payments (legal equality and 
privacy of all nodes)  
Economic equality of all nodes (no 
economic power)  
 Centralization 
Meaning of 
centralization 
Interdependence between the 
symbolic dimension and the 
technological dimension 
Asymmetric interdependence 
between the symbolic dimension 
and the technological dimension 
Asymmetric interdependence between 
the symbolic dimension and the 
technological dimension 
Condition for 
centralization 
Coin value and significance depends 
on the contingent on-chain 
interdependencies among nodes of 
the network and are defined ex-
post 
De jure symbolic and 
technological asymmetries: 
some special nodes have the 
protocol right to determine the 
validity and the value of other 
nodes’ coins leading to potential 
asymmetries among identical 
coins (no fungibility or neutrality 
of the coin) and among nodes 
(no privacy or equality) 
De facto symbolic and technological 
asymmetries: some special nodes have 
the economic power to determine the 
validity and the value of other nodes’ 
coins leading to potential asymmetries 
among identical coins (no fungibility or 
neutrality of the coin) and among nodes 
(no privacy or equality) – capitalistic 
inequality 
Causality / 
Directionality 
From the technological to the 
symbolic dimension 
From the technological to the 
symbolic dimension  
Bidirectional / Asymmetric 
Nature of value  Objective and social Subjective and social  Subjective and social  
Implications for 
the 
technological 
sphere 
Presence of private traders and 
brokers on-chain 
Presence of informational 
intermediaries for the 
settlement of transactions such 
as private banks or on-chain 
institutions entitled to regulate 
the value and validity of the 
coins on-chain  
Presence of private corporations or 
private actors accumulating capital 
endowed with economic power to 
distort and shape the value and validity 
of the coins on-chain 
Table 6.4: Summary of the three techno-economic perspectives: the protocol-logic, permission-logic, and market-power 
Having covered the three techno-economic perspectives on the second-order interdependencies 
between the Coin and Network Technology, the following three sub-sections discusses the three 
techno-legal perspectives on the same set of second-order independencies with a fourth subsection 
summarizing the discussion: 1) platform-logic: the decentralized network as a neutral and open 
general-purpose technology; 2) code-is-law: the decentralized network as an on-chain governance 
mechanism; and 2) principal-agent: the decentralized network as coordination mechanism for the 
on-chain division of labour. 
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5.3.5 Platform-Logic: Network as a Neutral and Open General-Purpose Technology  
The work discussed in this sub-section breaks away from the economic interpretation of the coin 
and treats the coin as a proper token or digital asset that can be used for different purposes and in 
different ways for the provision of a variety of services. The fundamental event in this respect was 
the launch of Ethereum in 2015 defined by its developer as a Touring-complete “Decentralized 
Application Platform” (Buterin (2014). The launch of Ethereum broadened the meaning of the coin-
network relationship and the role of the blockchain protocol in mediating this relationship. The 
platform interpretation of de/centralization broadens the interpretation of the coin and treats it as a 
generic social claim. At the same time, it also broadens the concept of blockchain as a general-
purpose technology for the autonomous on-chain enforcement of rights, away from its initial 
understanding as a mere distributed ledger technology for the autonomous settlement of financial 
transactions. This change in the way in which the coin-network relationship is conceived is the 
essence of the techno-legal interpretation of de/centralization, as opposed to the techno-economic 
interpretation discussed above. 
In order to understand the essence of the symbolic-technological interdependence (Coin  
Network Technology) in the platform logic, it is necessary to distinguish between two different types 
of coins. A native coin is defined as that token that is used by the consensus protocol in order to 
provide the optimal incentives in order to autonomously enforce transactions and settle claims over 
the blockchain. XRP and ether are two basic examples of a native coin. The value of native coins is 
univocally linked to the value of the protocol and can therefore be intended as digital commodities, 
in accordance with the metallist and the protocol-logic approach. However, the same network can 
also be used as a platform for the operation and exchange of other secondary coins for the provision 
of an array of alternative services over the top. We can define these as App-coins, or simply as 
tokens. The value of these App-coins is directly proportional to the utility and the value of the 
service that they provide.  
The works belonging to the platform approach recognise that there is an inherent univocal 
relationship between the coins operated over a blockchain network and the protocol rules governing 
that network. Each coin has its own associated network protocol and can usually only be operated 
according to the protocol rules of that specific network. Yet, the presence of a multiplicity of 
concurrent App-coins might generate a competitive race among the various blockchain networks in 
order to gain the widest adoption among users. Because of network effects, the wider the adoption 
base the higher the chances that the underlying blockchain network will become valuable and 
widespread, and that the values of the coins associated with the platform (both native and App) will 
increase vis-à-vis the value of the coins of the other alternative blockchain networks. Coins in this 
case can be both native and cryptotokens operated over-the-top.  
The problem faced by the platform-based approach is the determination of the optimal scope of 
applications and App-coins supported by the network that maximizes the adoption of the network 
and therefore the value of its native coin vis-à-vis other blockchain ecosystem. In other words, in this 
steam of literature blockchain networks are treated as platforms subject to network effects, and the 
concept of centralization is interpreted through the lenses of platform theory (Catalini and Gans, 
2018; Gandal and Halaburda, 2016; Gans and Halaburda, 2015, Polasik et al., 2016; Luther, 2016). 
For this reason, and consistent with the literature on the topic, we define this interpretation of 
de/centralization as the platform approach.  
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Consistent with the approach adopted by platform studies in management and organization studies, 
the platform approach interprets de/centralization in the light of the typical tension between the 
creation of value fostered by platforms open to a variety of services and functionalities, and the 
capture of value ensured by the closed and proprietary nature of the coins allowed to operate over 
the network (Benlian et al., 2015; Boudreau, 2010 and 2012; Eisenmann et al., 2009; Gawer and 
Henderson 2007; West, 2003). The fundamental problem analysed by this peculiar approach of the 
coin-network relationship is whether it is better for the success and wide adoption of the network to 
open the platform to other “non-native” coins by implementing agnostic or interoperable protocols, 
or if it is better to discriminate and deny access to other coins by remaining closed and autarkic. In 
other words, it is a dilemma of whether it is convenient to: 1) transform the blockchain network into 
a platform able to operate a multiplicity of non-native (non-proprietary) coins so to exploit a 
proliferation of use cases and gain increasing utility and value in the eyes of the users (value 
creation), or 2) to maximise value capture by remaining closed and forcing all members of the social 
community to exclusively deal with the proprietary coins provided by the platform. This approach 
adopts the typical normative paradigm of the efficiency or welfare analysis of the managerial and 
economic literature.  
In this case de/centralization can be understood according to the categories of openness and 
neutrality. A network is centralized whenever it is not neutral with respect to the coins that can be 
operated over it and whenever it discriminates among various compliant coins or deny access to 
them altogether. On the other hand, a decentralized network is one characterised by symmetries 
among the various coins given a certain protocol, in the sense that all protocol-compliant coins are 
free to operate and being transacted over the network. The political requirements of equality and 
liberty characterising decentralization in this case apply to the coins operated over-the-top rather 
than the members of the social community, or to the nodes of the network: a decentralized network 
is open to support any protocol-compliant coin (liberty of all coins implies open access) and does not 
discriminate among them (equality of all coins implies neutrality). Stated differently, a centralized 
network behaves like a proprietary and/or closed platform, while a decentralized one can be 
intended as a neutral and open one.  
The platform approach focusses on the way in which the value of the (native) coin is endogenously 
linked to, and affect by, the technological choices concerning the openness and neutrality of the 
underlying network. Different technological decisions on the openness and neutrality of the network 
have implications on the value of the native coin. The platform approach does not interpret 
de/centralization in terms of de facto market power, or de jure rights. De/centralization in this case 
is most appropriately defined in function of the concept of control, consistent with the platform 
literature (Boudreau, 2010; Eaton et al, 2015; de Reuver et al, 2018). A centralized technology 
represents a closed and/or non-neutral network that retains complete central control over the set of 
App-coins that can be operated over its protocol. Conversely, decentralization in this case denotes a 
situation where the control over the set of App-coins that can be created, launched, transacted and 
operated over the infrastructure is left to third parties among the members of the social community.  
The paramount case captured by this type of analysis is the distinction between the Bitcoin 
infrastructure and the Ethereum platform. Both bitcoin and ether are univocally linked to their 
blockchain protocol and, for this reason, they derive their value from the popularity and trust in their 
respective blockchain networks — from a metallist point of view they can both be understood as 
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digital commodities only backed by the technology. However, Bitcoin used to be characterized by a 
rigid protocol that does not allow any other coin to be transacted but for its native one. Ethereum 
has adopted a general-purpose Turing-complete protocol,39 that is general purpose and flexible 
enough to allow for a wide array of actors to create, launch and transact their own private coins, 
provided they are ERC-20 (or ERC721) compatible. Another very relevant open issue, still belonging 
to this interpretative approach is the problem of inter-network interconnection and interoperability. 
Networks can become platform not only because they decide to relinquish control to the edges of 
the network, but also because they enable the interconnection of different actors belonging to 
heterogeneous system. In this case, centralized exchanges (CEX) are the archetypes of centralization 
of control, while decentralized exchanges (DEX) represent preliminary attempts to behave like 
platforms with no control over the interconnection process. Even in this case, the centralization-
decentralization dichotomy reflects the problem of harmonizing different functionalities and App-
coins under the same protocol rules.  
5.3.6 Code-is-Law: Network as On-chain Governance Mechanism 
The second stream of the techno-legal approach is probably one of the most famous and 
acknowledged understandings of de/centralization. The code-is-law approach mainly emerged in the 
legal literature and deals with the role of code in shaping the decentralized on-chain governance of 
the blockchain. Many of these works draw on Lessing’s (1999) argument that in the cyberspace 
“code is law” and use it in order to understand the governance role of smart contracts for governing 
Decentralized and Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) — here used as a generic concept and not to 
denote the specific case of the DAO investment fund.  
Differently form the protocol-logic approach of de/centralization the code-is-law approach is not 
interested in defining de/centralization in function of the nature and significance of the coin and the 
origin of its value. Differently from the permission-logic approach, the code-is-law approach does 
not define de/centralization based on the different on-chain rights of nodes to supervise, check and 
validate the legitimacy of the transactions of coins between anonymous (pseudononimous) 
members (in other words, to act as informational gatekeepers). Moreover, differently from the 
market-power approach the code-is-law approach is not interested in fine tuning the right incentives 
in order to avoid ex-post accumulation of capital and power in the hands of few nodes. Conversely, 
the code-is-law approach developed following the implementation of smart contracts on the 
Ethereum platform.  
De/centralization in this case is defined by looking at the way in which contractual conditions are 
observed and verified and claims are subsequently autonomously enforced following the verification 
of certain contextual conditions. The protocol, in this case, absolves the role of a legal institution 
regulating and enforcing contractual conditions among contracting parties. For this reason, the 
blockchain technology (and its protocol) in the code-is-law approach can be regarded as an on-chain 
governance mechanism where the conditions for the execution and enforcement of a contract are 
                                                          
39
 There are a range of ways in which Turing-completeness can be characterized, but easiest explained in terms 
of procedural programming languages, then to be Turing equivalent, such language must contain versions of 
the three basic programming constructs allowing for sequences of statements, selection (e.g., if-then-else), and 
iteration (e.g., while-do loops). For a more precise and programming-language invariant description, see:  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_completeness 
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detailed ex-ante, and verified ex-post. The works in this stream usually focus on problems emerging 
from asymmetries in information between two contracting parties with respect to terms and 
contextual conditions and understand blockchain as a solution to this information asymmetry 
problem.  
Thus, Atzori (2015) notes how the decentralized governance of the blockchain can potentially 
overcome the state in the enforcement of individual rights and replace it with a set of bilateral 
private relationship, Rejers and colleagues (2016) study blockchain sovereignty in terms of social 
contract theories, Wright and De Filippi (2015) identify a new subset of law, defined as lex 
cryptographia, which would substitute standard legal rules in the admiration of DAOs through smart 
contracts (see also De Filippi and Wright, 2018, chapter 4). Other works highlight problems and 
limitations of the decentralized cryptographic mechanisms for the enforcement of individual claims 
and rights (Sklaroff, 2017; Verstraete, 2018; Werbach, 2018; Werbach and Cornell, 2017).  
All these works are joined by their common focus on the way in which the transaction and exchange 
of valuable claims can be guaranteed, verified and automatically enforced by the operation of a 
“decentralized” governance mechanism over the blockchain infrastructure. Decentralization in this 
case qualifies the nature of the blockchain protocol, not the nature of the coin, or the origin of its 
value. In the code-is-law approach decentralization is mainly intended as the absence of an authority 
having legal power (residual rights) to verify facts, adjudicate between contracting nodes and to 
decide ex-post the course of actions to be taken based on its own understanding of the situation and 
personal considerations.  
As a result, the difference between centralization and decentralization in the code-is-law approach 
retraces the distinction between the two adopted by the protocol-logic approach: they both define 
de/centralization based on the temporal distinction between ex-ante and ex-post decisions. But 
while the protocol-logic approach applies this difference to characterise the nature of the coin and 
the origin of its value (it is a techno-economic), the code-is-law approach applies the ex-ante/ex-post 
difference to distinguish between ex-ante verification and ex-post adjudication of a contractual 
relationship (it is a techno-legal interpretation). In both cases decentralization implies an ex-ante 
origin of the significance and value of the coin, which are independent from the peculiar 
contingencies and state of the network.  
The two perspectives also share the same interpretation of the meaning of a centralized network, 
intended as a network where there is a special on-chain entity that operates as a backer of last 
resort (techno-economic) or as a ruler or adjudicator of last resort (techno-legal). The parallelism 
between the two approaches can be pushed even further. While the coin in the techno-economic 
case represents a risk-free investment guaranteeing a predictable base return backed by the rules of 
the protocol (intended as a trusted risk-free minter), the coin in the techno-legal case represents an 
uncertainty-free legal agreement that guarantees a predictable “base protection” backed by the 
protocol (intended as a trusted and uncertainty-free enforcer). 
The way in which asymmetries are understood in the case of centralization is however probably 
more similar to the interpretation given by the permission-logic approach. Technological 
asymmetries in the code-is-law approach might emerge from two reasons: asymmetries in the 
verification and observation of facts (informational asymmetries) and asymmetries in the 
interpretation, validation and adjudication of claims based on these facts (decisional asymmetries). 
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In a decentralized network the terms and conditions on which claims are based should not be 
situated (architectural aspect) and not subject to the interpretation of certain specific nodes (logical 
aspect). This means that in a decentralized network not only can all contracts be enforced ex-ante 
and on-chain, but also that the information and facts on which contractual terms are based should 
be common and identically perceived by all nodes on-chain. A decentralized network is, therefore, a 
network where all nodes can operate as distributed oracles, and can independently verify and check 
the contextual conditions.   
Conversely, a centralized network is one where technological asymmetries among the nodes of the 
network generate symbolic asymmetries among the claims of the members. Symbolic asymmetries 
in this case denote a situation where similar claims held by different members lead to different 
outcomes based on the specific contingencies perceived by the nodes and/or the specific decisions 
and interpretations of the adjudicating arbitrator. Contingent-based enforcement and validity of 
claims implies subjectivity in the value and significance of a coin and might lead to discrimination 
among members — asymmetries breaching the equality and privacy conditions. In sum, 
centralization is mainly understood in terms of the subjectivities emerging from asymmetries in 
information and knowledge. In this case the blockchain is mainly an informational technology and, as 
such, it also fulfils the role of an institutional technology.  
The code-is-law approach is heavily rooted in the economic theory of incentives based on 
incomplete contracts, (Tirole, 1999 and Maskin and Tirole, 1999), in the Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) literature (Williamson, 1979; 1985) and in the Coasean property right theory literature (Coase, 
1960), and it represents the essence of institutional cryptoeconomics (Davidson et al., 2018; 
Arrunada and Garicano, 2018).  All these works focus on the role of time and understand governance 
in the light of the incentives emerging from the ex-post adaptation of ex-ante incomplete contracts. 
As a result, in this case the word “governance” has its roots in the institutional economic literature 
and in the literature on the theory of the firm (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1996; 1998). However, in the 
techno-legal approach adopted by the code-is-law interpretation governance remains on-chain and 
ex-post adaptation off-chain is ruled out.  
5.3.7 Principal-Agent: Network as Coordination Mechanism for On-Chain Division of 
Labour 
The last interpretation of de/centralization, the principle-agent interpretation, is strictly linked to the 
previous one and is still part of the so-called institutional cryptoeconomics. Both are interested in 
the way in which the blockchain network becomes a new technology for the organization and 
coordination of transactions among the various members of a social community. But differently 
from the previous code-is-law approach, the focus is not on blockchain as an autonomous enforcer 
of contracts, such as a court of justice, but on blockchain as a new organizational form for the 
alignment of incentives and the coordination of activities, alternative to markets and hierarchies. 
Although incentive asymmetries are still very relevant, the focus is mainly on the role of information 
and capabilities. Blockchain in this case is not understood as a tool for the unequivocal (uncertainty-
free) settlement and verification of the right version of facts or the correct state of the network.  
In the principal-agent interpretation of de/centralization the blockchain network becomes a new 
technology for the organization and coordination of transactions among the various members of a 
social community. The focus is mainly on the organization of activities and tasks on-chain and on the 
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emergence of private governance arrangements associated to the well-known make-or-buy problem 
(or division of labour).  
The works in this area are numerous and not necessarily coherent. This might derive from the fact 
that different theories of the firm understand the make-or-buy problem differently. For instance, 
TCE is a theory of incentives based on incomplete contracts, as the works of Tirole (1999) and 
Maskin and Tirole (1999) are, but other theories of the firm based on incentives such as Grossman 
and Hart (1986) are not. At the same time, Coase’s (1937) theory is mainly a theory of the firm based 
on market failures that is partially a theory of incomplete contract but it also contains some 
reference to incentives in the line of resource- and capabilities-based theories of the firm (Jacobidies 
and Winter, 2005). Another very relevant stream of the economic literature on the theory of the 
firm is the principal-agent theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom. 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Incentives-based theories of vertical integration that are also incomplete-contract theories of the 
firm (such as; Williamson, 1985) substantially overlap with the code-is-law approach as they treat 
governance arrangements in the same manner as arbitrators of last resort. Yet, there are many 
theories of the firm that do not inquire the vertical integration problem adopting an incomplete 
contract perspective (Gibbons, 2003).  
In any case, all works that can be grouped under the “principal-agent” approach highlight how the 
asymmetry in information, incentives, and capabilities between two contracting parties generate all 
sorts of coordination failures, and therefore of transaction costs, for example due to opportunism, 
moral hazard, principal-agent, adverse selection, and so on. This can lead to costly intermediation 
and inefficient division of labour. Institutions in this case become tools to restore coordination and 
ensure efficiency among parties that would not otherwise naturally cooperate and agree on the best 
course of collective action to be taken. Under this perspective, blockchain becomes a new 
institutional arrangement alternative to hierarchies and markets (with the addition maybe of 
networks: Powell, 1990; Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005 – see also Ziolkowski et al 2018a and 2018b).  
The centralization-decentralization dichotomy should therefore be interpreted along these lines, by 
checking the distribution of decision rights among the various nodes of the network. Decision rights 
can either be intended as control rights or as property rights, depending on whether ownership and 
control are severed or not. Markets are decentralized as the locus of decision making is left to the 
single actors behaving in their self-interests. However, different actors might have different 
expertise, incentives, knowledge and opinions on a certain course of action. Centralized hierarchies 
are seen by the managerial and economic literature as central points of decision making emerging to 
reduce the divergence in incentives characterising different nodes of the system.  
In contrast to standard hierarchies and market solutions, the blockchain becomes a powerful 
institutional arrangement to ensure the coordination of economic activities and collective 
production without any need for a central hierarchy, similarly to all distributed infrastructures 
(Benkler, 2006). Notable works that have adopted this interpretation and focussed on the on-chain 
governance of a blockchain are (among many others) by: Arrunada and Garicano (2018), Davidson et 
al (2016), Davidson et al (2018), Meunier and Zhao-Meunier (2019), Miscione et al (2018a and 
2018b), Zachariadis et al. 2019, Ziolkowski et al. (2018).     
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Based on our definition of a techno-legal approach, it is possible to define the principal-agent 
interpretation of de/centralization by considering the locus of decision rights in the context of the 
division of labour.  
A centralized network is one where some nodes have the right to decide on behalf of other nodes, 
and thus exercise control over other nodes’ activities, decisions or properties, i.e. the storage of 
their cryptographic keys, the operation of their mining hardware, the employment of their coins, and 
so forth. This is, after all, the essence of a hierarchy. Hierarchies are centralized as they aggregate 
the control of various assets and activities under the same decision maker. Hierarchies decouple 
decision and control rights from the title (claim) holder and makes the latter dependent on the 
decisions of the former. A decentralized network is one where each node takes all decisions 
concerning its own titles of property and claims “by itself”, merely based on its own capabilities, 
information and knowledge and do not rely on others’ capabilities, information, and knowledge. In 
the principal-agent approach a decentralized network is a network where there is no need to 
outsource tasks and activities to specialised nodes as all activities and capabilities are symmetrically 
distributed to all nodes so that all nodes can undertake all activities that are necessary to operate 
“by itself”.  
In the centralized case, technological asymmetries in the capabilities of the nodes generate 
subjective asymmetries in the way in which the coin is understood and valued. These are the 
asymmetries discussed in the permission-logic approach above. The essence of the principal-agent 
approach derives from the realization that these asymmetries might in turn generate a shift in the 
locus of decision rights from the asset owner (principal node) to the asset manager (agent node). 
The latter then becomes a central intermediary that acts on behalf of other nodes. The reverse is 
also possible: some nodes can decide to outsource the decisions concerning the employment of 
their coin to other third parties as a response to increasing asymmetries in the symbolic dimension 
as some nodes might be more specialised than others. In the case of a centralized network, 
asymmetries in the capabilities of the nodes lead to a specialization of the tasks of the various nodes 
and therefore to a division of labour. 
On the other hand, decentralization emerges under perfect distribution of resources and capabilities 
and therefore under pervasive adoption of the “make” option vis-à-vis the “buy” option. In this case, 
symmetry in the symbolic dimension implies alignment of incentives and capabilities, meaning that 
there is no need to outsource tasks at all as nodes perceive the coin in the same way, and they 
would all follow the same course of action anyway. Thus, symbolic symmetry necessarily implies 
technological symmetry and, as a result, decentralized governance forms. In this decentralized case, 
each node retains control over its property (coins) and decides how to employ and use it. The 
blockchain intended as a distributed infrastructure adopts this understanding of decentralization.  
It should be noted that the way in which the term “control” is employed in this case differs from the 
way in which “control” should be intended in the platform approach. In the case of platforms, 
control refers to the right (of the platform owner) to, broadly speaking, decide the rules of the 
platform. Control is about access to the platform and the way third parties ought to use and operate 
the platform, to be intended as the property of the platform owner. In the case of hierarchies, the 
logic is reversed: control refers to the right of the right holder to decide what others ought to do 
with their own property in virtue of some asymmetry between the two parties. Control in this case is 
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not about exclusion of undesired hosts (as in the case of platforms); it is about command over others’ 
decisions. The specialization of certain nodes into specific activities based on their capabilities and 
roles denotes some form of centralization based on some principal-agent (hierarchical) relationship. 
The current blockchain ecosystem has emerged as some nodes interconnected to the network 
specialised into certain activities of the blockchain “supply chain”, leading to the outsourcing of 
control and decision rights over the coins. Some notable examples are: the emergence of wallet 
providers acting as third- party custodians of private keys; and the emergence of exchanges acting as 
specialised investors on behalf of third parties. The same holds for the emergence of mining nodes 
specialised in mining and validation of transactions, which are usually associated to broader mining 
pools and virtual pools directed by specialised third parties. Some nodes, usually called master 
nodes or super nodes, specialise in certain relay or transmission activities within the network for the 
broadcast of all transactions to all nodes. All these examples show an increasing degree of 
asymmetric interdependence of one node on other specialised service-providers within the network. 
More generally, any blockchain where light-nodes are distinguished from full nodes, manifest some 
degree of division of labour and specialization, and therefore some degree of centralization. 
To summarize, decentralization in the principal-agent approach emerges whenever different nodes 
can operate independently under the condition of symmetric information, opportunities and 
capabilities. Mutual interdependence among nodes denotes a situation of asymmetric information, 
opportunities and capabilities. As a result, this approach characterises the relationship between the 
division of labour and decentralization in the opposite way in which it is understood by the standard 
theory of the firm.  
Differently from the standard ideal market solution characterised by an extreme division of labour, 
decentralization in the case of blockchain is characterised by minimal (inexistent) division of labour, 
meaning that a decentralized network is one where all nodes are endowed with the same set of 
symmetric capabilities and, as a result, do everything in-house. The “make” option in this case 
implies the mining, verification, transmission, key storage, validation, voting, activities and so forth). 
In other words, according to the principal-agent interpretation of de/centralization, a perfectly 
decentralized blockchain is a blockchain exclusively operated by full nodes. On the other hand, 
differently from the standard hierarchical solution, the aggregation of different activities under the 
same “full” node is not understood as centralized response to a market failure (transaction cost) nor 
does it characterize a hierarchical solution, but as a precondition of symmetric distribution of 
information, capabilities and opportunities.  
As a result, while hierarchies under the standard transaction-cost logic of Williamson (1985) and 
Coase (1937) reduce the extent to which labour can be divided among independent actors and 
emerge whenever the “make” option is more convenient and “economically rational” than the “buy” 
option, the exact opposite is true in the case of a centralized blockchain: centralization in the 
principal-agent perspective characterises a situation of greater division of labour and specialization 
of the tasks, where specialised nodes are mutually dependent on the actions and decisions of each 
other’s. Consistent with the liberal understanding of liberty and equality, and differently from the 
neoclassical one, decentralization in this case corresponds to a situation where the absence of 
transaction costs leads to a minimal division of labour among the nodes on-chain (independence). 
The neoclassical understanding of decentralization is precisely the opposite: the perfect 
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decentralization emerging from the ideal world of zero transaction costs lead to the maximum 
division of labour and interdependencies among economic actors. 
One potential explanation of the reason why this paradox emerges derives from the peculiar way in 
which transaction costs are minimised in the blockchain: thorough the sharing and common access 
to the same common ledger and timestamp generating logical centralization of the distributed 
system.  As a result, it is possible to conclude that while the nature of the interdependencies among 
the nodes can be treated as decentralized, the blockchain itself (as any logically centralized 
distributed system) is a sort of centralized super-hierarchy.  
5.3.8 Summary of Techno-Legal Interpretations of De/centralization  
The techno-legal interpretations of de/centralization recognize that the coin is a legal claim and that 
the technological dimension of the network has a direct impact on the way in which the various legal 
claims are treated and understood by the various nodes.  
The platform-logic interpretation recognises that the range of applications and services transacted 
over a network can have an impact on the way in which the native coin of the network is valued and 
understood. A network can be more or less centralized based on its degree of openness to, and 
neutrality for, other App-coins. This is often the interpretation of de/centralization adopted by the 
legal, economic, and information systems literature with respect to the distinction between 
platforms and infrastructures. De/centralization in this case is linked to the concept of control.  
The code-is-law interpretation recognizes that the blockchain network and its native coin can also be 
used as a legal enforcer of contracts and that the way in which these contracts are verified and 
enforced might impact their social value, validity and meanings. The concept of smart contract is 
mainly linked to this second techno-legal approach. A network can be more or less centralized based 
on the protocol used to verify and enforce claims on-chain. Whenever the value and significance of 
the claims held by any node depend on the specific way in which the contractual terms are 
understood and contingencies are verified (meaning that claims are incomplete and ambiguous), 
and on the specific identity of the nodes verifying, observing and interpreting these terms (meaning 
that the symbolic value and significance of claims can be subjective), the network is centralized. A 
decentralized network is a network where coins can be understood as complete, self-enforcing and 
unambiguous (context-independent) claims. This is the interpretation of de/centralization adopted 
by the cryptoinstitutionalist literature.  
The principal-agent interpretation recognises that different nodes might treat their coins differently 
based on their own information, capabilities and roles. In this case, a network can be more or less 
centralized based on its degree of mutual dependence of the nodes and on the degree of the 
division of labour among those nodes. In this case, perfect decentralization emerges whenever 
nodes are completely symmetric so that they can do everything “in house” and do not need to rely 
or depend on the decisions of other nodes more specialised expertise or capabilities. Differently 
from the standard way in which markets and hierarchies are distinguished, decentralization in this 
case implies no division of labour at all.  
The techno-legal interpretations of de/centralization reveal different aspects of the blockchain than 
the techno-economic approaches. However, it is interesting to notice that, even though each 
interpretation focusses on a different aspect of the blockchain, the three techno-legal 
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interpretations of de/centralization can be understood as the legal equivalent of the three techno-
economic ones when the coin is treated as a generic right, rather than a valuable monetary tool.  
The platform-logic interpretation is the equivalent of the protocol-logic interpretation: both define 
de/centralization by focussing on the fact that the value or significance of the coin reflects the value 
and significance of its underlying network and its technological characteristics. Different ways to 
control and affect the nature and value of the underling network have different implications on the 
value and significance of the native coin associated to it. The code-is-law interpretation is the 
equivalent of the permission-logic interpretation as both focus on the way in which the value and 
significance of the coin is assessed, verified, and validated. Different ways to maintain the integrity 
and validity of the coin have implications for its value and significance. The market-power 
interpretation is the equivalent of the principal-agent interpretation as they both focus on the 
concentration of activities and capabilities in few nodes and on the way in which this concentration 
of power (or distribution of labour) affects the value and significance of the coin.  
This does not mean that the three techno-economic approaches are substantially a repetition of the 
three techno-legal approaches just in different sauce. Each interpretative approach of 
de/centralization focusses on its own peculiar mechanism and phenomena and on its specific 
blockchain aspect.  
Table 6.5 and 6.6 recap the key characteristics of the techno-economic approach to 
de/centralization. 
Techno-Legal second-
order interdependencies  
How the technological characteristics of the blockchain network shape and affect the significance of 
the coin and the nature and origin of its legal claims and vice versa.   
Approach  
Tries to understand how the claims embodied in the coin are endogenously shaped by the network 
technology and vice versa: a change in the way in which the nodes can communicate and transact on-
chain and can verify, validate and append transactions directly affects the nature and legal significance 
of the coin and vice versa. 
Definition of 
de/centralization   
How asymmetries in the social significance and meaning of coin (the symbolic dimension of a digital 
network) depend on the asymmetries among the elements of the network (the technological 
dimension) and vice versa. 
Unit of analysis  
(De/Centralization applies 
to) 
The blockchain network (& protocol) 
Table 6.5: Overview of the techno-legal category of perspectives. 
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Platform-logic Code-is-law Principal-agent 
 Decentralization 
Meaning of 
decentralization 
Symmetric interdependence 
between the symbolic dimension 
and the technological dimension 
Symmetric interdependence between 
the symbolic dimension and the 
technological dimension 
Mainly independence of the 
symbolic dimension from the 
technological dimension 
Condition for 
decentralization 
Open and neutral network: 
 
The value and significance of the 
underlying network depends on the 
technological characteristics of the 
network (openness and neutrality to 
other App-coins), and the value of 
the coin depends on the value and 
significance of the underlying 
network. 
However ,the reverse is also true: 
the value and significance of the coin 
affect the value underlying network 
and this might determine the 
technological nature of the network  
Complete, unambiguous, and 
objective claims: 
 
The value and legal significance of the 
coin are completely and 
unambiguously defined ex-ante in the 
network protocol and, for this reason, 
claims can be enforced automatically 
and autonomously 
independently from the peculiar 
contingencies and identity of any 
specific ex-post enforcer or arbitrator  
 
No division of labour among the 
nodes: 
 
All nodes are endowed with the 
same expertise, capabilities and 
information so that each node is 
identically able to carry out any 
activity or decision 
independently with no need to 
outsource any activity to other 
specialised nodes  
Causality / 
Directionality 
Bidirectional / Symmetric Bidirectional / Symmetric  Mainly absent (only indirect) 
Nature of claim  
Objective and technology-
dependent 
Complete, unambiguous, and 
objective 
Objective and common to all 
nodes 
Implications for 
the technological 
sphere 
Network as a general-purpose asset 
Network acting as a smart contract 
enforcer   
Economic equality and self-
subsistence (liberty as 
independence) of all nodes (no 
economic dependence and no 
specialization of roles)   
 Centralization 
Meaning of 
centralization 
Asymmetric interdependence 
between coins in the symbolic 
dimension  
Asymmetric interdependence 
between the symbolic dimension and 
the technological dimension 
Asymmetric interdependence 
between the symbolic dimension 
and the technological dimension 
Condition for 
centralization 
Closed and coin-specific network:  
 
The value of the native coin is 
unilaterally pre-defined by the 
network protocol and by the pre-
established range of DCoin and 
DApps that are allowed on the 
network. 
The network discriminates among 
different coins, thus generating 
symbolic asymmetries among coins.  
Incomplete, ambiguous, and 
subjective (context-dependent) 
claims: 
 
The value and legal significance of the 
coin have to be established based on 
the specific circumstances and, for 
this reason, the nature of the claim 
might vary based on the peculiar 
contingencies and identity of the 
specific ex-post enforcer or arbitrator  
 
Specialization and division of 
labour among the nodes: 
 
Nodes are endowed with 
different expertise, capabilities 
and information so each node 
must outsource some activities 
and decisions to other nodes so 
that each node relies on others 
in order to fulfil and carry out all 
its required activities and 
decision  
Causality / 
Directionality 
From the technological to the 
symbolic dimension 
From the technological to the 
symbolic dimension  
Bidirectional / Asymmetric 
Nature of value  Objective and social Subjective and contextual  Objective and social  
Implications for 
the technological 
sphere 
Network as a service-specific asset 
Presence of an enforcer and arbitrator 
of last resort (i.e. a court or justice)  
The network as a system for the 
efficient division of labour and 
specialization of tasks  
Table 6.6: Summary of the three techno-legal perspectives: the platform-logic, code-is-law, and principle-agent. 
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5.4 NTSC: Network Technology and Social Community  
The Ethereum project paved the way for the transformation of the original Bitcoin infrastructure 
into a proper platform for the operation of a variety of tokens supporting a variety of use cases. This 
opened up new perspectives on the blockchain that we called the techno-legal approach to 
decentralization. Differently from the Bitcoin infrastructure, the Ethereum platform enables the 
implementation of Touring-complete smart contracts for the automatic and autonomous 
enforcement of contracts between the various transacting parties.  
On the 30th of April 2016, nearly two years after the original conception of Ethereum, the DAO 
(decentralized Autonomous Organization) was launched in order to provide new decentralized 
business models to companies willing to offer services and products over the Ethereum platform.  
Few weeks after the project will be aborted and shut down due to an exploitation of a vulnerability 
of the DAO code that resulted in the theft of nearly 30% of the total number of ether coins raised by 
the crowdfunded token sale.  A month later the majority of the Ethereum community decided to 
cancel the implicated transactions, to “bail out” the victims affected by the bug, and to create a fork 
in the Ethereum blockchain to restore a new status quo. This act substantially meant a redistribution 
of wealth among the community by fiat, in direct contrast with the protocol. As feared by the 
opponents to the decision, which will later create “Ethereum classic”, this created a precedent: an 
ex-post purposeful intervention of a social community into the automated operations of the 
blockchain’s code. Transactions that were “lawfully” approved and validated by the protocol were 
overruled on political ground, based on moral judgments entailing considerations of fairness, and 
rightfulness.  
This event was not the first one of this kind. The Bitcoin community had already experienced 
something similar in 2013, when the bitcoin developers intervened to fix a hard fork that had 
developed in the bitcoin blockchain. But the Ethereum hard fork was certainly the first event to arise 
interest of the general public and that raised the attention of academics trying to understand the 
nature, the meaning and the implications of this act. Since the DAO collapse, the focus gradually 
started to shift from the rules according to which the coin is transacted among the nodes of the 
blockchain infrastructure (the techno-legal approach of “code is law”), to the rules and procedures 
followed by the members of the social community involved (more or less directly) in a certain 
blockchain ecosystem for the definition of the code, its update, amendment, abrogation, or change. 
Under this new approach, the focus of the analysis becomes the complex interaction between the 
social community of the members and the architectural design of the digital infrastructure. 
In the literature this is commonly referred to as a shift from the inquiry on the on-chain governance 
of the blockchain to an inquiry on its off-chain governance. In reality, things are more complex than 
that as the two are strictly linked (Reijers et al., 2018). A proper focus on the nature of the 
infrastructure-social community relationship will better highlight the nature of this linkage. Other 
works distinguish between governance through or by the blockchain (on-chain) and governance of 
the blockchain (off-chain). The meaning of these two categorizations is substantially the same and 
denotes a shift from the network consensus protocol to the realm of the social community. 
As noted by Reijers and colleagues (2018), while the first approach can be considered positive and 
procedural (it describes how the rule of code should work given a certain instrumental goal to attain), 
the second is normative and substantive in the sense that it involves normative value judgments by 
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the part of political actors on what goal ought to be achieved and therefore, ultimately, on what 
ought to be done whenever a situation presents a choice that cannot be framed using the existing 
code of conduct and cannot be framed in objective and measurable (a-political) terms. For this 
reason, the works enquiring the infrastructure-social community relationship adopt a socio-technical 
or techno-political approach to decentralization. While the techno-legal approach inquires the 
procedures through which the positive law of code rules the transaction of the token on-chain, the 
techno-political approach is interested in the way in which the constitutional values of the social 
community are defined off-chain and embedded into the blockchain protocol.  As De Fillippi and 
Hassan (2016) succinctly put it, “from code is law to law is code”.   
Pretty much all works belonging to this third interpretative stream recognise that, whenever 
unexpected crisis or events challenge the status quo and require the off-line intervention of the 
members of the social community, it is not sufficient to merely check the “on-chain” degree of 
centralization of centralization of a blockchain. Whenever the social community is involved off-chain 
to implement an institutional shift and so to establish a new constitutional order, the same 
dimensions characterising the degree of centralization of a blockchain on-chain can be used in order 
to understand the degree of centralization of the blockchain community off-chain. As a result, a new 
set of interpretations of centralization emerge: from a socio-technical or techno-political point of 
view, the degree of centralization is characterised by looking at the nature of the process adopted by 
the members of the social community in order to reach political (thus ethical) conclusions on the 
nature of the goal to be achieved, on the way in which the blockchain infrastructure ought to be 
normed and designed, and on the way in which this new constitutional order should be codified into 
a new legal framework. While the techno-legal approach inquiries decentralization through the 
lenses of a techno-legal interpretation of consensus, this third approach interprets decentralization 
by adopting a political and ethical interpretation of social consensus, while also trying to understand 
how the latter affects the former.  
This third strand of the literature is the most recent one among the three and (maybe also for this 
reason) it is not possible to divide the various works into clear-cut groups. Many works dealing with 
the problems involved in the off-chain governance of the blockchain do not adopt a single point of 
view on the matter, but try to provide a broader overview of the problems generated. Yet, it is still 
possible to distinguish various ways in which centralization can be defined in function of the 
infrastructure-social community relationship.  
5.4.1 Social Community & Information Sharing:  Decentralization as Information 
Symmetries 
Information asymmetries denote imbalances in knowledge and therefore in power among the actors. 
Members who have more and earlier information have an advantage over those members knowing 
less and later. This advantage might create power imbalances that are often deemed to be unfair or 
illegal, as the practice of insider trading in corporate finance.  
The problem of information imbalance represents a fundamental aspect in both previous 
dimensions: information asymmetries over the identity of the token holders might confer undue 
advantage (Coin  Social Community), in the same way in which information asymmetries over the 
transaction patters of the various nodes do (Coin  Network Technology).  The same holds true 
with respect to the information over the state of a blockchain. Whenever a problem emerges on the 
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blockchain, or some decisions have to be made, it is extremely likely that some members of the 
social community (“insiders”) will know more than others and, potentially, exploit this information 
asymmetry at their personal advantage.  
The literature presents various examples of this type (see Walch, 2019b). On the 17th of September 
2018, a bug in the bitcoin protocol was signalled by an anonymous reported to Bitcoin Core 
developers. These kept the vulnerability secret for nearly two days, before asking to all other 
members of the social community to upgrade their version of the protocol, first through public 
banners on bitcointalk and Reddit on the late evening of the 18th, then through a collective mailing 
list on the afternoon of the 19th.40 The fact that some members of the social community knew the 
status of the network more than others might already be regarded as a source of power imbalance 
among the various members of the community.  
A similar case occurred in October 2018 during an Ethereum conference held in Prague. On that 
occasion, ConsenSys organized a three-days meeting with around 20 Ethereum core developers in 
order to discuss future developments of Ethereum. Although written records of the meetings were 
produced, the event was not streamed online and all other members knew of the event only ex-post, 
thus manifesting their disappointment for how the situation was handled.41 Even in this case, some 
information on the state of the platform was circulated to some members before others could know, 
thus creating imbalances among the members of the community.  
These examples highlight the fact that centralization can manifest itself as power relationship among 
the various members due to their different knowledge of the current and future states of the 
blockchain infrastructure and network. This aspect generates a parallelism with corporate law of 
publicly traded corporations, that prescribes that information about the state of the company should 
always be disclosed to the public and the hiding and manipulation of information by insiders is 
considered unlawful and illegal (see Hacker, 2017; Reyes, 2019).     
This problem highlights two important facts. First, informational power depends greatly on the 
nature of the digital or physical space where meetings are held and information is shared. For the 
case of the Bitcoin bug, Bitcoin core developers used public platforms such as Reddit and private 
mailing lists, while in the case of the Ethereum-ConsenSys meeting, a participant admitted that one 
of the reasons why the meeting had to remain limited was that “[t]here quite literally wasn’t enough 
room for everyone. The spare breakout rooms at DevCon were designed for 10–15 people, and we 
had already brought in extra chairs to fit 20+.”42 The relationship between the digital platforms 
where information can be exchanged (virtually unconstrained in space) and the members of the 
social community then becomes key in this respect. Second, the selection of certain members over 
others can reflect more or less formalised and institutionalised differences in the roles and status of 
the various members or developers of the social community. Both these points can play a role in 
defining the degree of centralization from a techno-political point of view.  
                                                          
40
 https://www.coindesk.com/the-latest-bitcoin-bug-was-so-bad-developers-kept-its-full-details-a-secret and 
https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/ 
41
 https://medium.com/@lrettig/how-open-is-too-open-bfc412cf0d24 
42
 https://medium.com/@lrettig/how-open-is-too-open-bfc412cf0d24 
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5.4.2 Social Community & Information Sharing: Access and Control Symmetries  
For the various members of the community (stakeholders) to obtain the same information on the 
status of the blockchain infrastructure and network at nearly the same time, some place where 
information can be conveyed and shared becomes a necessary precondition. Differently from the 
blockchain infrastructure, where all information on the status of the network is instantaneously 
broadcasted to the whole network (and all its nodes), these off-chain information sharing places are 
platforms. These platforms can be more or less centralized based on their nature and characteristics. 
The degree to which any member of the community has the same rights of everyone else to access 
the platform, participate in the discussion, see and retrieve the same information that all others can 
access provides a further techno-political measure of centralization of a blockchain ecosystem. 
Decentralization in this case is defined by the degree of symmetry in the members’ rights to access, 
share, and control information over these platforms. Ownership and control rights over these 
platforms play a significant role in ensuring perfect symmetry.   
In the case of Bitcoin and Ethereum, multiple options are available. Not all of them are characterized 
by perfect symmetry in rights and control.43  Thus, GitHub and Reddit are both forums for open-
source and user-generated content and they both have dedicated pages for both the Ethereum and 
the Bitcoin community. Both can be freely access (perfect symmetry in access rights), yet neither 
platform is technically open source: they are both owned and controlled by private corporations 
(Microsoft in the case of GitHub, Advance Publications Inc. in the case of Reddit). This means that, at 
least in theory, not only access can be potentially restrained, but information over both sites can be 
centrally controlled. So far, the freedom to access and circulate information on GitHub has proved 
problematic for countries willing to control access to the internet and implement censorship.  
Other platforms can guarantee a higher degree of symmetry in rights. Bitcoin.org and 
Bitcoincore.org are two examples of open source projects where information about the status of the 
Bitcoin network is shared. The mailing list bitcoin-dev requires a subscription and registration, and is 
moderated by third parties, while a list of all subscribed members and their activities is available to 
the mailing list administrator. Other open source projects providing discussion forums (such as 
freenode.net) require a preliminary registration of the users. Some platforms and discussion forums 
are proprietary others are owned by third parties: some forums are available over private platforms, 
such as forums on cryptocompare.com.   
In sum, even though the information on-chain can be equally accessible and transferred by all 
members, this might not be the case for the off-chain access and transmission of information: 
ecosystems relying on platforms that present an asymmetric distribution of rights for the access and 
transmission of information among the various members of the social community will be 
characterised by a higher degree of centralization. Even though the blockchain infrastructure is 
censorship-resistant and tamper resistant, information off-chain can be censored and tampered with, 
depending on the nature of the platforms over which information is shared and transmitted. 
Information decentralization on-chain can very well be matched with high information centralization 
off-chain. Differently from the previous case, in this case information asymmetry does not derive 
                                                          
43
 A partial list can be found at https://bitcoin.org/en/development#code-review and 
https://cointelegraph.com/bitcoin-for-beginners/where-to-discuss-bitcoin#reddit.  
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from an informal imbalance of powers, but from a clear imbalance over the rights of the members 
over the off-chain information platforms.    
5.4.3 Social Community & Participation and Decision Rights:  On-Chain Modification 
Symmetries  
No code is for ever, and neither is a blockchain protocol. Code has to be upgraded, changed, or 
amended. The distribution of the rights defining who is allowed to propose, accept or implement 
these changes can provide a further insight on the degree of centralization of a blockchain 
ecosystem. These distinctions in the formal roles of the various members of the community are 
often formalised and institutionalised. For these reasons, these types of asymmetries can be treated 
as decision rights held by the various members of the community. Accountability often comes with 
these rights.   
Both bitcoin and Ethereum present a two-layer hierarchical structure when it comes to their 
community of developers. On the one hand, proposals follow an open source logic: anyone can 
propose modifications and upgrades to the codes. These suggestions and proposals can be made on 
any of the dedicated forum or discussion platforms, but they are mainly made on GitHub, which is an 
open source, user-generated platform (yet privately owned). As discussed earlier, suggestions can 
also be made internally, using dedicated channels (such as Bitcoincore.org). However, only a 
restricted set of core developers are in charge for the verification, validation, acceptance and 
implementation of the changes to the blockchain protocol. This narrow set of actors usually 
corresponds to the moderators or administrators of platforms, such as Bitcoincore.org.  
The overwhelming majority of public blockchain presents this type of hierarchical structure of their 
social members and programmers, formalising and institutionalising the distinction between core 
coders and all other open source contributors. Only the former is responsible and formally 
accountable for taking the last decisions. As only core developers are entrusted with decision rights, 
or residual rights, they substantially act as de facto managers, or owners (depending on the 
perspective) of the blockchain. Other authors suggest they should be treated as trusted fiduciaries 
(Hacker, 2017; Reyes, 2019; Rodrigues, 2018; Walch, 2018).    
The distinction between the different types of coders represents one of the most inquired aspects of 
the literature on off-chain governance and for this reason it does not require much discussion (Bodo 
and Giannopoulos 2019; De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016; Reyes, 2019; Rodrigues, 2018; Walch, 2018, 
2019; Ziolkowski et al 2018a). Core developers act as the ultimate gatekeepers and guardians of the 
blockchain code as they are the ones endowed with the exclusive rights to take the last decisions on 
what versions of the protocol should be executed, and which one should be rejected. The more 
restricted and narrower the circle of core developers vis-à-vis the totality of the members of the 
social community, the more centralized a blockchain ecosystem is. De Filippi and Loveluck (2016) 
distinguish between two main types or configurations: “democratic-organic” versus “autocratic-
mechanistic”. A fully democratic (thus decentralized) arrangement would be one “fully open”, where 
anyone willing to participate in the proposal and choice of the new protocol would be allowed to.  A 
more centralized situation would be one where even proposals should come from a restricted set of 
pre-authorised members. Blockchain communities are more or less centralized based on their 
degree of openness and participation, in the same way in which (on-chain) blockchain 
infrastructures are.  
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More generally, the greater number of members of the social community who decide to contribute, 
the greater the degree of decentralization. Under this paradigm, maximum centralization would 
ensue in the case of a single benevolent dictator deciding for everyone (Azouvi et al., 2018; Beck et 
al., 2018).  
The dichotomy between proposals and acceptance of the protocol (off-chain) play a similar role of 
the dichotomy between execution and verification of a transaction (on-chain). From a techno-legal 
point of view (Coin  Network Technology), some blockchain networks might only grant access to 
the infrastructures and its transactions to verified and authorised members, in the same way in 
which a blockchain community might only authorise some members to join the discussion and 
submit proposals from a techno-political (or socio-technical) point of view.  Similarly, in the same 
way in which a blockchain can operate through trusted gateways on-chain for the verification and 
validation of transactions modifying the on-chain status of the blockchain infrastructure (techno-
legal point of view), there might be trusted gateways off-chain entrusted with the rights to certify 
and validate the modification of the “constitutional” status quo off-chain (from a techno-political 
point of view). The two-stage framework characterising the techno-legal dimension of on-chain 
governance is similar to the two-layered architecture characterising the socio-technical dimension of 
off-chain governance. 
In any case, complete decentralization on-chain (form a techno-legal perspective) is completely 
independent from, and does not necessarily imply decentralization off-chain (from a techno-political 
point of view).  
5.4.4 Social Community & Political Power: Decentralization as Capacity to Influence  
The formal or institutionalised distinctions among the various members of the community do not 
explain why or how core developers are selected in the first place, neither does it rule out informal 
powers held by the different actors (regardless of their formal prerogatives). We can treat both 
aspects at the same time, and group them under the same classification: sources of informal power 
of the various members of the community deriving from their capacity to influence the decisions of 
other actors of the community. There might be different reasons for this source of power.  
First, power might derive from asymmetries in capabilities recognised and appreciated by the 
community. One developer might be regarded as particularly more capable than the others. This 
might generate some reputational mechanism, so that the opinions of a reputable developer are 
regarded more highly than the opinion of others. Highly regarded developers might have much more 
informal power than others when it comes to influencing the overall community. This reputation 
might be formalised or not. Communities with fewer influential and reputable voices will tend to be 
more centralized as they will depend on fewer individuals, as compared to communities where 
reputation is evenly spread among a greater number of members. Asymmetry in perceived (or real) 
capabilities and reputation confers power: the higher this asymmetry, the higher the power of 
individual members, the higher the overall degree of centralization.   
Second, some members might have more social legitimacy than others. Legitimacy might be 
independent from reputation or capabilities. Founders or early developers might have more 
legitimacy in the eyes of the members of the social community as they have shown greater and 
longer commitment to the project, regardless of their actual level of capabilities. Blockchains where 
there is one single well-identifiable funder or group of founders are more centralized than others 
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where a leading figure is missing. From this point of view, nearly all blockchain projects are more 
centralized than the bitcoin one, and this is especially true for Ethereum. As a result, asymmetries in 
perceived legitimacy among the different members confer power: the higher this asymmetry, the 
higher the power of single individual members, the higher the overall degree of centralization of the 
social ecosystem.  
Third, some members might have more exposure or notoriety than others. Vocal members might 
just be more influential than others, everything else equal. Notoriety might derive from involvement 
in other institutions (academic, industry or professional bodies, political), news outlets or 
community forums. High exposure might generate the same type of informal power than the other 
two aspects.  
In sum, the degree of centralization of a certain decision-making process might also depend on the 
differential political power of some members to influence others.  
It should be noted that these sources of power depend on the possibility to identify a particular 
contributor, to recognise him or her, and to distinguish their advice or opinion from the ones of the 
others. Asymmetries in legitimacy, reputation, notoriety and exposure therefore depend on the lack 
of anonymity of the various members of the community. Pseudonymity might still work, as long as 
pseudonyms remain unique and univocally identify a single member (but they might not work for 
some other sources of power, such as the obtainment of predefined community roles that 
presuppose full disclosure of the identity of the member). As a result, even though on-chain 
anonymity and pseudonymity are the necessary precondition for on-chain decentralization from a 
socio-economic and techno-legal point of view, the revelation of the members’ identity off-chain is 
the condition that addresses some governance problems off-chain. Yet, this also increases the level 
of off-chain centralization as it generates asymmetries in power, as Satoshi Nakamoto correctly 
understood in 2008.  
While governance from a techno-legal and socio-economic point of view might still support privacy, 
governance from a techno-political or socio-technical point of view heavily depends on the social 
identity of the actors, and for this reason it might break-down in a regime of privacy protection and 
anonymous members. In any case, what is important to underline here is that full anonymity from a 
techno-legal point of view (on-chain) does not imply anonymity and therefore decentralization from 
a techno-political point of view (off-chain).  
5.4.5 Summary of Socio-Technical / Techno-Political Approach    
As recognised by many authors, whenever circumstances change and a crisis perturbs the status quo, 
the positivist approach of the “code is law” philosophy cannot provide any guidance on how a 
system should operate a transition from one institutional arrangement to another one. Someone has 
to act as a decision maker. This decision can be reached in various ways and according to different 
procedures. These procedures can be characterised by different degrees of centralization depending 
on the different degrees of asymmetries characterising the relationship between the political and 
ethical dimension of the blockchain social community and the technological dimension of the 
blockchain infrastructure.   
These techno-political or techno-ethical sources of asymmetries simply retrace the sources of 
asymmetries characterising the techno-legal dimension of decentralization, with the difference that 
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now asymmetries do not arise from the interaction between the blockchain infrastructure and the 
digital world, but from the blockchain infrastructure and the real world: information asymmetries 
among members of the social community over the current state of the infrastructure protocol, 
asymmetries in access and decision rights among members of the social community over the future 
nature of the infrastructure protocol, asymmetries in the identities of the members of the social 
community with respect to their political influence, perceived capabilities, legitimacy, reputation and 
notoriety.  
 
6 Conclusion  
The aim of this working paper has been to initiate a debate on de/centralization in digital networks 
by drawing on an in-depth study of blockchain networks. The paper first set out the scene for the 
study by highlighting the dual nature of digital platforms and -infrastructures and the diversity in the 
academic debate on the understanding of the two phenomena. The paper then proposed a 
conceptual framework outlining the de/centralization in digital networks across the dimensions of 
use and access, and promoted the notion of first-order and second-order interdependencies. This 
framework was projected onto the context of blockchain networks and formulated as a framework 
for the analysis of de/centralization in blockchain networks. This blockchain de/centralization 
framework was applied in an in-depth analysis of second-order blockchain interdependencies. The 
paper contributes to a significant refinement of the often coarse discussion of decentralization in 
blockchain networks, and it is our hope that the findings in the future will help contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of digital platforms and -infrastructures in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
7 Appendix A: Approach 
As part of an eight-month project initiated in February 2018 to write an online cryptocurrency 
innovation course, we undertook a comprehensive effort to seek out the blockchain literature from 
across a number of academic communities. This report has undertaken an explorative analysis of the 
core blockchain conceptualisations applied in the reviewed papers, and through this seeks to 
understand the theoretical foundation explored in these academic works. This report is, therefore, 
not strictly a bibliometric study of blockchain research, but a theoretical paper, which relates and 
contextualises the findings to extant blockchain research. The following seeks to contextualise the 
corpus from which our core ideas have emerged. 
We have collected 425 academic articles directly related to blockchain and cryptoassets. Table A.1 
lists the main journals and conferences represented in the corpus. We have, in addition, sourced 
selected unpublished working papers and central bank whitepapers from prolific blockchain 
observers, such as from the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve. As the conceptual 
grounding of blockchain within Information Systems is still in its infancy, we found it important to 
take a broad rather than narrow view when searching for literature discussing the phenomenon. The 
text mining software package Leximancer (Smith and Humphreys, 2006;  Thomas, 2014) offers a 
means of exploring and visualising large texts in order to elicit concepts and categories. This has 
been used to the study of a variety of subjects, for example, academic publications (Cretchley et al., 
2010;  Wuehrer and Smejkal, 2013;  Anagnostopoulos and Bason, 2015;  Randhawa et al., 2016). A 
textual analysis using Leximancer of the contents of the 425 journal articles forming the basis for our 
work in this report shows the variety of core concepts covered in the corpus. In particular, the 
analysis demonstrates the variety of core issues discussed in the literature, spanning technical 
discussions on what constitute a blockchain, the legal aspects, the critical issue of currency and 
value, the relationship to financial systems and regulation, and the relationship to smart contracts 
(See Figure A.1). 
American Behavioural Scientist 
Applied Economics 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 
Cato Journal 
Columbia Science & Technology Law 
Review 
Computer Law & Security Review 
Conference on Privacy & Trust 
Decision Support Systems 
Designs, Codes and Cryptography 
Economic Letters 
Economic Modelling 
Electronic Commerce Research & 
Applications 
Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 
Engineering Science, Technology, and 
Society 
Environment and Planning D 
European Conference of Information 
Systems 
Expert Systems with Applications 
Finance Research Letters 
First Monday 
Future Generation Computer Systems 
Games 
Hawaiian International Conference on 
Information Systems 
IEEE Access 
IEEE Computer Society 
Information & Management 
Information & Organization 
Information Economics and Policy 
International Advances in Economic 
Research International Journal 
International Journal of Computer 
Engineering & Technology 
International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 
International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 
International Review of Sociology 
Internet Policy Review 
Journal of Economic Behaviour & 
Organization 
Journal of Economic Interaction and 
Coordination 
Journal of Financial Crime 
Journal of Financial Stability 
Journal of Information Technology 
Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Money 
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
Journal of Management Information 
Systems 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 
Journal of the Association of 
Information Systems 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied 
Electronic Commerce Research 
Journal of Information Security and 
Applications 
Ledger Journal 
MIS Quarterly Executive 
Nebraska Law Review 
New Media & Society 
Organization 
OzChi Physica A 
Pittsburgh Tax Review 
Police Journal 
Procedia Economics and Finance 
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies 
Research in International Business and 
Finance 
SMU Science and Technology Law 
Review 
Social Semiotics 
Technology Forecasting & Social Change 
Telecommunications Policy 
Telematics and Informatics 
The George Washington Law Review 
The Independent Review 
The Journal of Private Enterprise 
The Policy Journal 
The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 
The Review of Austrian Economics 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
Theory, Culture & Society 
University of Illinois Law Review 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & 
Technology Law 
Virginia Tax Review 
William & Mary Law Review 
Yale Journal on Regulation 
Table A.1: Overview of the academic outlets represented in the corpus of papers 
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Figure 1: Leximancer concept map illustrating the core concepts as spheres reflecting connected concepts (top), and 
frequency of concepts (bottom). 
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